

## OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

By Anthony, Commissioner

This case is about a company that chose to market an over-the-counter ("OTC") analgesic by advertising that the product was superior to others in the treatment of back pain without any basis for that claim. Respondents Novartis Corporation and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc.<sup>1</sup> (collectively "Novartis") appeal from an Initial Decision and Order of Administrative Law Judge Lewis F. Parker (the "ALJ"), holding that superiority claims in advertisements for Doan's products were material and therefore deceptive in violation of Sections 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52. Complaint counsel cross-appeals the ALJ's decision not to order a corrective advertising remedy.

We affirm the ALJ's holding that the unsubstantiated superior efficacy claims for back pain relief were material and thus deceptive. We reverse the ALJ's holding regarding corrective advertising. We agree with the ALJ's findings and conclusions to the extent that they are consistent with those set forth in this opinion, and, except as noted herein, adopt them as our own.<sup>2</sup>

### I. Factual Background

Novartis Corporation is a New York corporation and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. is a Delaware corporation. Both are subsidiaries of Novartis AG, a Swiss corporation, and successors-in-interest to Ciba-Geigy Corporation and Ciba Self-Medication, Inc. (collectively "Ciba").<sup>3</sup> JX 2A ¶ 11.<sup>4</sup> In addition to the Doan's line, Novartis manufactures and sells other

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<sup>1</sup> Novartis is the successor in interest to Ciba-Geigy Corporation and Ciba Self-Medication, Inc. On April 23, 1997 the ALJ issued an order, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, substituting Novartis for Ciba as Respondent in this proceeding.

<sup>2</sup> We are in general agreement with the dissent regarding the applicable legal standards. The disagreements are over differing interpretations of the evidence.

<sup>3</sup> Ciba acquired the Doan's brand from DEP Corporation in early 1987. DEP Corporation had acquired the brand from Jeffrey Martin, Inc. shortly before. JX 2A ¶ 12. From January 1987 to December 1994, Ciba was responsible for the marketing and advertising of Doan's analgesic products. In December 1994, Ciba transferred the Doan's line of products to CSM, a wholly-owned subsidiary. CSM was responsible for the marketing and  
(continued...)

OTC products.<sup>5</sup>

Doan's has been marketed and sold for over 90 years and has always been advertised as a backache product. IDF 8; Peabody Tr. 286. The active analgesic ingredient in the Doan's products is magnesium salicylate. IDF 14; JX 1 ¶ 11. While no other brand of OTC analgesic contains magnesium salicylate as an active ingredient, IDF 22; Peabody Tr. 314, there are no scientific studies demonstrating that magnesium salicylate is more efficacious than other analgesics. IDF 22; JX 1 ¶ 9. The Food and Drug Administration (the "FDA") regulates product labeling for Doan's pursuant to its *Tentative Final Monograph on Internal Analgesic, Antipyretic, Antirheumatic Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use* (the "Monograph"). Under the Monograph, an OTC analgesic drug may be labeled as indicated for the temporary relief of minor aches and pain associated with one or more of the following: cold, sore throat, headache, toothache, muscular aches, backaches, and arthritis. JX 1 ¶ 5.

Doan

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<sup>3</sup> (...continued)  
advertising of Doan's analgesic products from December 1994 to March 1997. JX 2A ¶ 13.

<sup>4</sup> References to the record are abbreviated as follows:

IDF	Initial Decision Finding
ID	Initial Decision
Tr.	Transcript of Trial Testimony
CX	Complaint Counsel's Exhibit
RX	Respondents' Exhibit
JX	Joint Exhibit
RAB	Respondents' Appeal Brief
CCAB	Complaint Counsel's Answering and Cross-Appeal Brief
RRAB	Respondents' Reply and Answering Brief
CCRB	Complaint Counsel's Reply Brief

<sup>5</sup> These products include Ascription, Ciba Vision, Desenex, Dulcolax, ExLax, Gas-X, Habitrol, Maalox, Sunkist Vitamin C, Tavist-D, Theraflu, and Triaminic. IDF 5.

Usage Telephone Study (the “A&U Study”), CX 221, to find out how consumers perceived Doan’s and to direct future marketing efforts. See Peabody Tr. 133-34. The A&U Study surveyed users of the Doan’s product and non-users who were aware of the product. After analyzing the results of the A&U Study, Ciba’s Marketing Research Department concluded that “Doan’s has a weak image in comparison to the leading brands of analgesics and *would benefit from positioning itself as a more effective product* that is strong enough for the types of backaches sufferers usually get.” CX 221-c,d (emphasis added). It further concluded that “Extra-Strength Tylenol is clearly the gold standard for backache pain relief followed by Advil. Bayer and Doan’s are consistently perceived weakest.” CX 221-c.

Ciba used the results from the A&U Study to create a new Doan’s advertising strategy. Peabody Tr. 146. The strategy of this new campaign was to compare Doan’s to other general analgesics. Comparative claims for small-share niche brands like Doan’s are especially effective according to one of complaint counsel’s experts, Dr. David Stewart. Stewart Tr. 3457. Specifically, Dr. Stewart explained that explicit comparative references made by low-share brands attract more attention to, and increased purchase intention for the low-share brand relative to the high share brand. Stewart Tr. 3458-59.

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<sup>6</sup> In contrast to ads that are aired every week, flights are ads that air for several weeks

The ALJ's order prohibits Novartis from making superiority claims for any OTC analgesic drug with regard to the product's ability to relieve back pain or any other particular kind of pain without competent and reliable scientific evidence that includes at least two adequate and well-controlled, double-blinded clinical studies. (Part I) As fencing-in relief, the ALJ's order prohibits Novartis from making any representation regarding any OTC analgesic drug's efficacy, safety, benefits, or performance without competent and reliable scientific evidence to substantiate the claim. (Part II) Finally, the order contains a "safe harbor" for claims approved by the FDA under a tentative or final monograph, or pursuant to an approved new drug application. (Part III).

The ALJ concluded that the record did not support the imposition of a corrective advertising remedy. He noted that a belief study, relied upon by complaint counsel, showed that a superior efficacy belief lingered for six months after the last challenged ad was disseminated. Nevertheless, the ALJ compared the 51 years Warner Lambert ran deceptive Listerine ads to the eight-year Doan's campaign and concluded that there was insufficient evidence that consumer misbeliefs in Doan's superiority for the treatment of back pain would linger in the absence of the remedy. *Id.* at 64. Finally, he rejected complaint counsel's claim that the need for corrective advertising could be inferred.

### **III. Deception Analysis**

#### **A. Legal Standard**

The first issue in this case is whether the challenged Doan's ads were deceptive. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45. Section 12 of the Act declares dissemination of false advertisements regarding certain categories of products, including drugs, to constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice under Section 5. 15 U.S.C. § 52.

As the Commission explained in its policy statement on deception, appended to *Cliffdale Assocs., Inc.* 103 F.T.C. 110, 176-184 (1984) (the "Deception Statement"), a representation is deceptive if it "is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment." *Id.* at 176. In practice, the Commission's deception analysis is applied as a three-part test asking whether (1) a claim was made; (2) the claim was likely to mislead a reasonable consumer; and (3) the claim was material. *E.g.*, *Cliffdale Assocs., Inc.* 103 F.T.C. at 165. There is no requirement of intent. *Kraft, Inc.*, 114 F.T.C. 40, 121 (1991) ("Evidence of intent to deceive is not required to find liability."), *aff'd*, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), *cert. denied*, 507 U.S. 909 (1993).

The factors and evidence the Commission weighs in assessing the three prongs of the deception analysis are often interrelated. While Novartis' sole question on appeal is whether the ALJ "err[ed] in concluding that the alleged implied superior efficacy claim was material to

consumers,”<sup>9</sup> RAB 7, its claims arguably implicate the other two parts of the test. Therefore, to address fully Novartis’ arguments on appeal, and to provide a context for our discussion of the materiality issue, we briefly discuss the first two elements before considering materiality.

### **B. The Challenged Ads Conveyed Superior Efficacy Claims.**

We first consider whether the challenged ads communicated a superior efficacy claim for the treatment of back pain. In determining what claims may reasonably be ascribed to an ad, the Commission examines the entire ad and assesses the overall net impression it conveys. *Deception Statement*, 103 F.T.C. at 176; *Kraft, Inc.*, 114 F.T.C. at 122; *Thompson Med. Co.*, 104 F.T.C. 648, 790 (1984), *aff’d* 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), *cert. denied*, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).

Claims can either be express or implied. Here we are dealing with an implied claim. Implied claims range on a continuum. At one end are claims that are “virtually synonymous with an express claim” and use “language that literally says one thing but strongly suggests another.” *Thompson Med. Co.*, 104 F.T.C. at 789. At the other end of the spectrum are claims that use “language that relatively few consumers would interpret as making a particular representation.” *Id.*

The Commission’s assessment of whether an implied claim is made necessarily begins with the advertisement itself. A facial analysis alone will suffice if it permits the Commission to conclude with confidence that the ad makes the implied claim. *See Stouffer Foods Corp.* 118 F.T.C. 746, 798 (1994); *Kraft, Inc.*, 114 F.T.C. at 121; *Thompson Med. Co.*, 104 F.T.C. at 789. In cases where the claim is not manifest from an examination of the ad, the Commission will look to extrinsic evidence. *Id.* at 799; *Kraft Inc.*, 114 F.T.C. at 121; *Thompson Med. Co.*, 104 F.T.C. at 789. Such evidence might include, for example, the testimony of expert witnesses, market research studies regarding consumer reactions to the use of certain common terms, or consumer surveys. *Kraft, Inc.*, 114 F.T.C. at 121-22. The

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<sup>9</sup> In its appeal brief, Novartis states that while it “disputes the [ALJ’s] finding that the challenged Doan’s advertisements conveyed an implied superior efficacy claim to the requisite number of consumers under applicable precedent, it does not challenge that finding for purposes of this appeal.” RAB 6. Novartis repeats that its appeal “challenges only the ALJ’s conclusion that complaint counsel established the materiality of the alleged superiority claim,” in its reply brief. RRAB 2. In a footnote, Novartis states that it is not conceding that the claim was communicated. *Id.* 2 n.1. By failing to appeal the issue, however, Novartis *has* conceded the issue for purposes of this litigation.

## 1. A Facial Analysis of the Ads Reveals That They Conveyed Superior Efficacy Claims.

Respondent ran the challenged ads over eight years.<sup>10</sup> JX 2E ¶25. The “Graph” ad was the first in the new campaign. It begins with a visual of the profile of a person in front of what appears to be graph paper. CX 13. The individual twice attempts to bend over; the second time (after he has implicitly ingested Doan’s), he is able to bend farther. The audio portion of the ad states that “Doctors measure back pain by how far you can bend.” The ad then depicts a package of Doan’s on the left side of the screen while packages of three competing analgesic brands -- Advil, Tylenol and Bayer -- are displayed on the right. The audio portion concludes: “With an ingredient these pain relievers *don’t* have.” The spotlight on the other brands is then darkened leaving only a visual of the Doan’s package on the screen.

The television ads Respondent disseminated after “Graph” continued to emphasize that Doan’s has an ingredient not found in competing analgesics while depicting competing products. The “X-Ray” ad introduces an audio and visual reference to Doan’s as “the back specialist,” and this tag line is also used in several subsequent Doan’s ads. CX 14. Respondent began to use the terms “special” and “unique” to modify references to Doan’s “ingredient” in “Black and White Back” and “Ruin a Night’s Sleep” ads, respectively. CX 15; CX 17.

The superiority themes begun in “Graph” and “X-Ray” continued in subsequent ads such as “Activity Playtime” and “Activity Pets.” CX 20; CX 22. As in earlier ads, both depict a package of Doan’s alongside other analgesics while the voice-over states, “Doan’s has an ingredient these pain relievers don’t have.” And once again, the ads conclude with the “back specialist” tag line. Respondent repeated similar themes in the challenged “Muscles” ad. CX 23.

The Free Standing Inserts -- color print advertisements included with newspapers -- closely tracked the claims in the television ads. One FSI that first ran in 1989 and again in 1990 and 1991, features a large Doan’s package alongside smaller but clearly visible packages of Advil, Extra-Strength Tylenol, and Bayer. CX 32. Copy above the packages states: “Doan’s. Made for back pain relief. With an Ingredient these other pain relievers don’t have.” *Id.* Other FSIs made similar claims and included depictions of competing brands.

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<sup>10</sup> Graph (CX 13) ran from May 1988 through June 1991; X-Ray (CX 14) ran from August 1989 through June 1991; Black & White (CX 15) ran from June 1991 through October 1992; Black & White Pan (CX 16) ran from December 1992 through June 1994; Ruin A Night’s Sleep (CX 17) ran from January 1992 through August 1992; Ruin A Night’s Sleep (CX 18) ran from August 1993 through June 1994; Activity Playtime (CX 20) ran from July 1994 through July 1995; Activity Pets (CX 22) ran from July 1994 through July 1995; and Muscles (CX 23) ran from August 1995 through June 1996. JX 2E ¶ 25.

*See, e.g.,* CX 33-39.

Based upon a facial analysis of the challenged ads, we find that they clearly conveyed a claim that Doan's is superior to other analgesics, such as Bayer, Advil, Tylenol, Aleve and Motrin, for relieving back pain. The express claims that Doan's is made for back pain and contains a unique or special ingredient that the other featured brands do not have, coupled with the depiction of the other brands, combine to communicate that Doan's is superior to the competing analgesics for back pain. This message is reinforced by the statement in some ads that Doan's is the "back specialist." The superior efficacy claim is implied, but on the continuum of implied claims, we find the claim so clear as to be nearly express.

## **2. Extrinsic Evidence Confirms That the Challenged Ads Conveyed Superior Efficacy Claims.**

Substantial extrinsic evidence confirms our conclusion that the challenged ads make a superior efficacy claim. We affirm and adopt the ALJ's findings on this point (ID at 62-63), and highlight some of the more persuasive extrinsic evidence.

Several consumer surveys and copy tests show that consumers understood the ads to be making a superiority claim. For example, copy tests on mock-up versions of some of the challenged ads conducted by Bruno & Ridgeway, an independent consumer research company employed by Ciba, showed that approximately 30 to 45% of the consumers tested discerned a superiority message from the ads.<sup>11</sup> Likewise, a Mail Panel Communication Test conducted by Market Facts, a firm retained by Ciba to test the 1991 FSIs, revealed that between 47 to 59% of respondents strongly or somewhat agreed that the FSIs indicated that Doan's is better

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<sup>11</sup> Bruno & Ridgeway used a mall intercept methodology where qualified respondents were shown mock-ups of the ads and then asked questions. CX 224-d; Peabody Tr. 160. A mall intercept study is conducted in suburban shopping malls in different cities. Interviewers posted in the mall solicit passers-by to participate. Interviewers first determine whether a participant meets the demographic requirements of the study. If so, the participant is shown materials and asked questions. Peabody Tr. 358. Mall intercept studies are sometimes criticized as less demographically balanced than mail panel or telephone surveys because mall-goers are not necessarily representative of society at large. *See* Peabody Tr. 204. Tests of this nature are referred to as forced-exposure communication tests.

Thirty-eight percent of the consumers tested indicated that the "Graph" ad communicated, as a primary or secondary message, that Doan's was "superior to other products." CX 224-m. In response to open-ended questions, 44% of the consumers who saw the "Black and White" ad gave answers that were coded as "superiority over other products." CX 236-j. If responses to all of the open-ended questions are netted, 62% indicated that at least one ad conveyed a superiority claim. CX 236-m. Similarly, the results for "Ruin A Night's Sleep" ad reported that 23% of Doan's users and 38% of Doan's non-users gave answers that were coded "superiority over other products." CX 244-h,v.





In sum, the issue of whether the claim was made is not a close one. While technically an implied claim, Respondent's superior efficacy message is plain from a facial analysis of the challenged ads alone. The extrinsic evidence introduced on this issue provides additional support for our finding that the superiority claims for back pain treatment were made.

**C. The Challenged Ads Were Likely to Mislead Reasonable Consumers.**

Having concluded that the claims were made, we proceed to consider whether those claims were likely to mislead reasonable consumers. Deception Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 177. The applicable standard is whether a claim is *likely* to mislead; proof that particular consumers were actually deceived is not required. *Kraft, Inc.*, 114 F.T.C. 133; *Cliffdale Assocs., Inc.*, 103 F.T.C. at 165; Deception Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 176. Further, “[t]he test is whether the consumer’s interpretation or reaction is reasonable.” *Id.* The interpretation need not be the only one to be reasonable. For example, a respondent can be held liable where multiple interpretations of a claim are possible, only one of which is deceptive. *Stouffer Foods Corp.*, 118 F.T.C. at 799; *Kraft, Inc.*, 114 F.T.C. at 120-21 n.8; *Thompson Med. Co.*, 104 F.T.C. at 789 n.7. The reasonableness of an interpretation is not contingent upon its being shared by a majority of consumers. A claim would likely mislead a reasonable consumer if at least “a significant minority of consumers” would be deceived by it. Deception Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 177 n.20. Importantly, the Deception Statement adds that an interpretation is presumed reasonable if it is one the respondents intended to convey. *Id.* at 178.

The misleading nature of the superior efficacy claims at issue here is plain. The claims are entirely unsubstantiated. Novartis concedes that no scientific studies demonstrate the therapeutic superiority of magnesium salicylate, the active ingredient in Doan's, over aspirin, acetaminophen, ibuprofen, or naproxen sodium for relief of back pain or any other indications contained in the Monograph issued by the FDA. JX 1D ¶ 9. As a general matter, the



Certain categories of information are presumptively material, including, but not limited to, express claims, claims significantly involving health or safety, and claims pertaining to the central characteristic of the product. Deception Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 182. Similarly, the Commission will infer materiality where the record shows that Respondent intended to make an implied claim. *Id.* However, we “will always consider relevant and competent evidence to rebut presumptions of materiality.” *Id.* at 182 n.47.

"To establish a ‘presumption’ is to say that a finding of the predicate fact," here, any of the factors listed above, "produces a required conclusion in the absence of explanation," here, materiality. *St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks*, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to rebut the presumption, Respondent must come forward with sufficient evidence to support a finding that the claim at issue is not material. Respondent can present evidence that tends to disprove the predicate fact from which the presumption springs (*e.g.*, that the claim did *not* involve a health issue) or evidence directly contradicting the initial presumption of materiality. This is not a high hurdle. Unless the rebuttal evidence is so strong that the fact-finder could not reasonably find materiality, the fact finder next proceeds to weigh all of the evidence presented by the parties on the issue. *See id.* at 516 (noting that after the presumption drops out, "the inquiry . . . turns from the few generalized factors that establish [the presumption] to the specific proofs and rebuttals . . . the parties have introduced"). While the presumption itself is negated by sufficient rebuttal evidence, as previously noted, the predicate facts that gave rise to the presumption are not. These facts remain evidence from which materiality can be inferred. *See Boise Cascade*, 113 F.T.C. at 975 (1990). However, this evidence is simply part of the entire body of evidence considered. *See also 21 Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence* §§ 5122 *et seq.* (1977 and 1998 Supp.) (discussing the history and application of presumptions).

### **b. The Facts Underlying the Presumption**

The ALJ applied a presumption of materiality because the challenged claim involves a health issue. He also concluded that the presumption was appropriate in light of evidence that the challenged superior efficacy claim relates to the central characteristic of the product, that is, Doan’s ability to relieve back pain. *See, e.g., Sterling Drug*, 102 F.T.C. at 753 (efficacy is “the most important feature of any analgesic”). Novartis admits that the presumption of materiality properly flows from these facts. RAB 46; RRAB 9.

We likewise conclude that these predicate facts -- that the claims go to health<sup>15</sup> and to a central characteristic of the product -- both support an initial presumption of materiality and constitute strong evidence that the claims were material. Common sense and experience, along with the Commission’s expertise in advertising matters, counsel that Respondent’s

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<sup>15</sup> The record establishes that approximately 50% of adults in the United States suffer from back pain; thus, the treatment of that pain is an important health concern. CX 388-b.

representation that Doan's is more effective than other analgesics in the treatment of back pain was important to consumers considering a purchase and likely affected their decisions as to which product to buy. This requires no great leap.

Along with the "health claim" and "central characteristic" bases for the presumption of materiality, the ALJ found that Ciba's intent to make a superior efficacy claim was evidence that the claim was material and supplied an independent basis for the presumption. ID at 64. Novartis objects to this finding.

An advertiser's intent to make a claim generally implies that the advertiser believes that the claim is important to consumers. See *American Home Prods.*, 98 F.T.C. 136, 368 (1981) ("The very fact that AHP sought to distinguish its products from aspirin strongly implies that knowledge of the true ingredients of those products would be material to consumers."), *aff'd*, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982). Thus, the Deception Statement includes intent as a predicate fact giving rise to a presumption of materiality. 103 F.T.C. at 182; see also *Thompson Med. Co.*, 104 F.T.C. at 816. For express claims, the intent to make the representation is self-evident. In the context of implied claims, however, extrinsic evidence is required to establish an intent to make the claim.

Complaint counsel presents various documents showing that Ciba knew that the ads were conveying a superiority message. Novartis argues that the documents have been taken out of context and offers the testimony of employees who state that Ciba had no intent to make the claim. We find complaint counsel's evidence more credible and compelling and conclude that Ciba did indeed intend to communicate a superior efficacy message to consumers.

The record is replete with evidence demonstrating that Doan's ads were communicating a superiority claim and that Ciba management was aware of that communication. For example, the Bruno & Ridgeway communication study of the "Graph" ad categorized 38% of consumers exposed to the ad as answering that it communicated that Doan's was "superior to other products." CX 224-m. In a May 1988, memorandum to Ciba regarding the study, Bruno & Ridgeway recommended producing the ad, *inter alia*, because it "communicated product superiority and perceived efficacy." CX 225-d (emphasis added). This memorandum was directed to Ciba's Marketing Research Department and circulated to the Group Vice President of Marketing and other senior marketing executives at Ciba. In addition, the 1989 Doan's Marketing Plan prepared by Ciba reported the product superiority interpretation of the ad and described the "Graph" ad as a "strong execution which effectively communicates product superiority and perceived efficacy . . . ." CX 335-z-8.

Communication tests conducted for Ciba on its "Black & White Back," "Ruin A Night's Sleep," and "Activity Playtime" advertisements indicated that they communicated a product superiority claim as well. For example, the Bruno & Ridgeway copy test for "Black & White Back" reported that 46% of respondents recalled a message of superiority over other products. CX 236-j.

In May, 1994, Ciba's advertising agency, Jordan McGrath Case & Taylor, wrote to Ciba indicating that the networks were seeking substantiation for one of the implied superiority claims:

*All three Networks are requiring substantiation for the claim "If nothing you take seems to help." The Networks believe that this language implies that Doan's provides superior efficacy vis-a-vis the competitive products shown . . . . As such, to make this claim we will need substantiation that Doan's is more effective (due to its Magnesium Salicylate ingredient) at relieving back pain versus the competitors pictured.*

Importantly, our Agency coun[sel] agrees with the networks.

IDF 111; CX 165-a. In response, Ciba deleted the words "you take" from the ad copy so that the ad stated "if nothing seems to help." CX 20.

Despite its knowledge that the ads were communicating an unsubstantiated efficacy claim, Ciba continued to disseminate some of the ads until May, 1996, just a month before the Commission's decision to issue a complaint in this matter and well after its investigation had begun.

Novartis argues that Ciba did not intend to make a superior efficacy claim, but rather to distinguish Doan's from other products. Novartis primarily relies on the testimony of former and current Ciba/Novartis managers who stated that Ciba did not intend to make any superiority claims. We are unpersuaded by these *post facto* denials. They ring hollow in the face of the contemporaneous documentary evidence revealing knowledge that a superiority claim was being communicated. See, e.g., *United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 353 U.S. 506, 602 (1957).

In sum, we agree with the ALJ that Ciba intended to make the superiority claim and conclude that this intent, along with the predicate facts that the claim goes to health and to a central characteristic of the product, create a presumption, and provide strong evidence, of materiality.

## **2. Complaint Counsel's Additional Evidence of Materiality**

Along with the evidence that gave rise to the initial presumption of materiality, discussed above, the record contains substantial additional evidence supporting a finding that the claim was material. This diverse body of evidence includes consumer survey results, expert testimony, and business records.

### **a. The Nature of the Claims**

The record contains ample evidence showing that superior efficacy claims are important to consumers attempting to choose a back pain remedy. First, experts for both parties testified that a superior efficacy claim would be important to the back pain sufferer when choosing an OTC analgesic. Mazis Tr. 1983 (testifying that superior efficacy is the primary reason why consumers choose one analgesic over another); Jacoby Tr. 3371 (testifying that superior efficacy claim would “motivate” back pain sufferers to purchase a product).

Second, the results of a study performed by Dr. Whitcup show the importance of efficacy claims. Dr. Whitcup asked consumers to rate the characteristics of pain relief products. Dr. Whitcup found that efficacy-related responses constituted three of the top four characteristics. RX 2-z-105. These results led Dr. Whitcup to conclude that analgesic products are generally chosen “on the basis of perceived efficacy,” along with other factors. RX 2-z-3; Whitcup Tr. at 2815.

Third, several studies and copy tests Ciba commissioned in the ordinary course of business demonstrate the importance of efficacy claims to consumers of back-pain remedies. For example, a study delivered to Ciba management highlights a key finding: “[Doan’s] is seen as particularly effective for back pain, and as having a special ingredient. . . . this specificity is what users are looking for . . . .” CX 256-c (Brand Equity Study, Exec. Summary). Similarly, Bruno & Ridgeway stated in its report on the copy test for the “Graph” ad that superiority “seems to be an important and persuasive idea.” CX 224-l. Weiss Marketing Research Co. likewise concluded that the fact that the “Graph” ad created the impression that Doan’s is better may persuade people to try Doan’s. CX 227-z-3.

### **b. The Price Premium**

Throughout the relevant period, Doan’s was priced well above the general purpose analgesics depicted in the challenged ads, including Tylenol, Advil, and Bayer. In 1992, for example, a 24-count package of Doan’s cost consumers 66% more than the same size package of Tylenol. IDF 15-16. The existence of this price premium constitutes further evidence of materiality. Deception Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 183.

Respondent argues that these price premiums cannot be linked to the challenged claim because the premium is attributable to Doan’s status as a niche brand. RAB 83. However, the challenged ads compared Doan’s to general purpose, lower-priced analgesics and not to other similarly priced niche products. Thus, the ads used a misrepresentation in an effort to convince consumers to pay the additional amount for a product similar to general purpose analgesics.

### **3. Novartis’ Evidence Against Materiality**

Novartis offers several arguments to support its contention that the superior efficacy

claim was not material. While we find that Novartis submitted a sufficient amount of relevant evidence to rebut the presumption of materiality, the totality of the evidence strongly compels a finding of materiality.

**a. Effectiveness of the Ads**

Novartis primarily argues that the ads were ineffective in communicating their message to consumers and therefore did not affect consumer purchase decisions (*i.e.*, they were not material). Respondent argues that Ciba ran ads that it knew were ineffective in order to appease retailers who demand manufacturer support for niche brands.<sup>16</sup> RAB 56-57. Respondent cites market data for the relevant period that reflect little or no growth in sales or market share and reasons that the superior efficacy claim, therefore, did not affect consumer purchase behavior.<sup>17</sup> RAB 71.

In the first place, this claim is irrelevant even if it were true. Materiality is not a test of the effectiveness of the communication in reaching large numbers of consumers. It is a test of the likely effect of the claim on the conduct of a consumer who *has* been reached and deceived. See Deception Statement at 182-83. The materiality inquiry builds upon the findings from the prior two factors in the deception analysis -- that the claim was made and that it was likely to mislead at least a significant minority of reasonable consumers exposed to

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<sup>16</sup> Novartis also argues that the evidence shows that consumers did not find the challenged ads interesting or persuasive. RAB 57-59. Even if this were the case, in the context of the materiality inquiry, it is the challenged claim that is at issue and not the ad as a whole.

<sup>17</sup> Along with its market *performance* arguments, Novartis advances a market *positioning* argument. Novartis contends that any superior efficacy belief that caused consumers to purchase the product was not the result of the misleading claim contained in the advertising, but rather was the result of product usage and Doan's historical market positioning as specifically for treating back pain. RAB 75-76. We reject this argument. The materiality inquiry focuses on the claim and its effect, not on other conceivable sources of consumer beliefs. Respondent's argument -- that if an advertiser is able to point to other possible sources for the misbelief engendered by its misrepresentation, it should be free to continue making its misrepresentation -- is untenable.



sales during the relevant period.<sup>18</sup> JX 2B ¶17. Because the number of consumers in the analgesics market in which Doan's competes is not growing appreciably (*i.e.*, the market is "mature"), a business must take customers from another brand in order to increase market share. Stewart Tr . 3467; CX 597. In such markets, maintenance of market share, and not increasing sales, is the primary criterion of success. *Id.* Indeed, Doan's ability to maintain its market share in the mature OTC analgesics market notwithstanding the fact that its advertising budget was much less than those of its competitors, JX 2E ¶24, reveals that the challenged advertising campaign was successful. The fallacy of Novartis' market performance arguments is also shown by Doan's survival and prosperity while other products were introduced and later withdrawn.

Even if Novartis' characterization of the market data were accurate, a history of static performance alone does not support its contention that the challenged ads were ineffective. Market performance is governed by a host of variables, and the materiality inquiry focuses upon a single claim.<sup>19</sup> Absent evidence, lacking here, that links market performance directly to the claim or controls for other variables influencing market performance, general market data is not particularly useful in assessing materiality.

#### **b. Puffery**

Novartis argues that the challenged claims were not material because they amounted to mere "puffing." RAB 61-64. Respondent posits that if consumers did not take the superiority claim seriously, the claim could not have misled them into buying the product. We reject this argument.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Novartis argues that unit sales, and not dollar sales, is the more appropriate measure. Novartis contends that the strength of the dollar sales is misleading because it is attributable to the introduction of premium priced line extensions, namely Extra Strength Doan's and Doan's PM. These line extensions, however, were supported by the same advertising as regular Doan's and to the extent that the advertising was successful in convincing consumers to buy these premium-priced items, the profits made on these products suggest that the ads were having their desired effect.

<sup>19</sup> For example, the existence and strength of competitors, the availability of substitute products, the maturity of the market, the state of domestic and foreign economies, general business cycles, distribution issues, and trends in consumer preferences, among other factors, can all affect market performance and do not relate to an unsubstantiated superior efficacy claim made in an advertising campaign.

<sup>20</sup> In the first place, Respondent's puffing argument goes to ad interpretation, an issue properly considered in connection with the second prong of the deception analysis, rather than to materiality. *See* Deception Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 181 (puffing addressed as part of the

(continued...)

The claim that Doan's is more effective than other analgesic products for treating back pain is not a subjective opinion, a matter of personal taste, or a hyperbolic statement that might be deemed "puffery." Rather, it is an objective claim that can be scientifically tested. The implied claim at issue here not only asserts superiority, but specifies in what respect (back pain relief), why (its unique ingredient) and compared to whom (named competitors). CCAB 93-94. This is the opposite of puffery, and the exact type of claim that a consumer would reasonably expect to be substantiated by adequate clinical studies. *See Pfizer*, 81 F.T.C. 23, 64 (1982) (puffing does not include "affirmative product claims for which either the Commission or the consumer would expect documentation").

Respondent also argues that approximately half of all consumers harbor a general belief that no analgesic is any more effective than any other in treating back pain. RAB 65-66. Presumably, Respondent's point is that these skeptics would never be swayed by false efficacy claims. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, the accuracy of the statistic and the validity of the claim that a consumer's general belief could not be overcome by specific misrepresentations, the argument still fails. An advertiser does not have to fool all of the people to be found liable; a "significant minority" of consumers is sufficient. *Deception Statement*, 103 F.T.C. at 177 n. 20. Nor does the existence of some hardened cynics free advertisers to make deceptive claims.

### **c. Consumer Surveys**

Novartis offers various consumer survey results as support for its contention that the claim was not material. For the most part, the results touted by Respondent, even assuming flawless methodology, are only marginally probative on the issue of materiality. With respect to the one survey that tested materiality, methodological flaws render its results unreliable.

Respondent first points to the ARS tests, which indicate a low consumer recall of superiority messages between one and three days after seeing certain ads, as demonstrating that some of the challenged ads were not material. RAB 69-70. As discussed above, these tests asked only about express superiority claims, which were not made. Because the ARS tests did not even ask about implied claims (the only kind of claims at issue), they are hardly helpful. Moreover, materiality does not depend upon whether the claim is remembered by consumers days later. As discussed above, a claim does not have to be memorable to be material.

Novartis also claims that a study conducted by Dr. Jacob Jacoby in late 1996 shows that the superiority claim was not important to consumers and that the challenged ads were unlikely to cause consumers to purchase Doan's. RAB 76-79; RRAB 23-25. In Dr. Jacoby's

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<sup>20</sup> (...continued)

discussion of the reasonable consumer's interpretation of the claim). As noted above, Respondent has expressly waived any challenge to the second prong.

study, consumers were shown one of six commercials<sup>21</sup> and then questioned. Three of the questions (numbers 5a, 5b, and 5c) pertained to materiality. Question 5a asked: “Did seeing this commercial influence whether or not you would buy the advertised product in the future?” RX 5-z-112. Only those who responded affirmatively proceeded to question 5b: “Did it make you more likely to buy this product, or less likely to buy this product?” *Id.* Finally, those who responded “more likely,” were asked 5c: “What is it about what the commercial said, showed or suggested that makes you more likely to buy it in the future?” RX 5-z-113. Dr. Jacoby contends that “only a trivial number” of those questioned indicated that the commercials made them more likely to buy the advertised product based upon a claim of superiority or because it had a special ingredient. RX 5-z-120.

Dr. Jacoby’s test for materiality was flawed in several ways. First, by asking question 5c only of those who answered questions 5a and 5b in certain ways, Dr. Jacoby’s study understated the number of respondents to whom the misrepresentation was material. Questions 5a and 5b ask about the *commercial* rather than the *claim*

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<sup>21</sup> Two of the six were challenged commercials, “Activity Playtime” and “Muscles.” The remaining four were non-challenged controls. RX 5-z-101 n.1.

During the administrative trial, Dr. Jacoby sought to buttress his results by performing calculations cross-referencing several other questions included in the survey. While Dr. Jacoby did not explain his methodology in detail, he apparently matched the consumers he interpreted as drawing a superior efficacy claim from the ads (in response to questions 6a, 6b, and 8b)<sup>22</sup> with those who stated, in answer to question 5b, that the commercial made them “more likely” to buy the product. See RX 209-a. See Jacoby Tr. 3061, 3338-343. Based upon these calculations, Dr. Jacoby concluded that for the challenged commercials, the overlap was only 12.7 and 4.7%, respectively. See RX 209-a. He reduced these results further by subtracting the percentages obtained from the control ads. *Id.*

This procedure did not salvage Dr. Jacoby’s study. The results of Dr. Jacoby’s cross-referencing exercise derive from the results obtained from question 5b. That question only tells us which consumers found the commercial persuasive and does not reveal anything about what aspects of the commercial made it persuasive. As explained above, a claim by itself can be material and yet, when viewed in the context of a commercial, fail to persuade a consumer to buy the product. Therefore, question 5b improperly excluded many relevant respondents. As it is, Dr. Jacoby’s results show that of the 35 consumers who indicated that they found “Activity Playtime” persuasive, 20 (57%) also drew a superior efficacy claim from the ad. See RX 209-a. While one might logically infer that the superior efficacy claim played an important role in making the ad persuasive to many of these consumers, the flaws in Dr. Jacoby’s methodology preclude a definitive and quantified linkage.

Finally, Dr. Jacoby conceded that if a person suffers from back pain and is offered a product that is superior for the relief of back pain compared to other analgesics products, then that person would be motivated to purchase the product. Jacoby Tr. 3371. Thus, even Dr. Jacoby agrees that a superior efficacy claim is likely to affect consumers’ purchase decisions.

## **E. Conclusion**

Thus, although we have concluded that the evidence adduced by Novartis requires us to look beyond a simple presumption of materiality, our review of that evidence shows that it ultimately adds little to Respondent’s side of the scales. Weighing *all* of the available evidence -- including the basic and irrefutable fact that the misleading claims of superiority relate to the central characteristic of the product and involve health; the evidence that the claims were

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<sup>22</sup> Question 6a asked the main idea of the commercial, and 6b asked about the other ideas the commercial was trying to get across. RX 5-z-96. Question 8a asked whether the commercial said, showed, or suggested that the advertised brand was more effective than other brands, and question 8b asked what the commercial said, showed or suggested that conveyed a superior efficacy claim. *Id.*; RX 5-z-139; RX 5-z-141. The results from these questions reveal a substantial communication rate for the challenged ads -- depending on the question, in the 30 to 50% range. RX 5-z-120-129; 139-148.

intended to affect consumer decisions; and the range of other evidence adduced by both sides - we have no hesitation in concluding that the claims were material. The extensive record amassed in this proceeding strongly confirms the common-sense proposition that efficacy is a pivotal consideration for consumers in selecting an analgesic, and that claims of superior efficacy are highly material to those consumer choices.

## **IV. Corrective Advertising**

### **A. Legal Framework For Imposing Corrective Advertising**

Corrective advertising is an appropriate remedy if (1) the challenged ads have substantially created or reinforced a misbelief; and (2) the misbelief is likely to linger into the future. See *Warner-Lambert Co. v. F.T.C.*, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). In such cases, the lingering effects of a deceptive advertisement constitute a "clear and continuing injury to competition and to the consuming public" and justify the requirement of a corrective message. *Warner-Lambert Co.*, 86 F.T.C. 1387 (1975).

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<sup>23</sup> *Warner-Lambert* was a remarkable case. "Comparable proof of deception-perception-memory influence would be virtually impossible in most advertising cases. ... corrective advertising must apply to more than the one-in-a-million type of ad campaign present in *Warner-Lambert*." R. Pitofsky, *Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection Regulation of Advertising*. 90 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 698 (1977) (footnote omitted).

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<sup>24</sup> As the Commission stated in *Stouffer* “[p]erfection is not the prevailing standard for determining whether a copy test may be given any weight. The appropriate standard is whether the evidence is reliable and probative.” 118 F.T.C. at 807. While a given study may be flawed in some respects, it still can be probative, and any deficiencies simply will affect the weight given to

samples are most representative of the total population.<sup>25</sup> Whitcup Tr. 2107. Finally, the NFO study used a mail panel method. Mail panel research involves mailing research instruments to individuals who previously have agreed to serve as survey participants. These individuals complete and return the research instrument. The mail panels used by NFO were designed to achieve demographic balance.<sup>26</sup> Clarke Tr. 11. NFO panels are especially useful in identifying hard-to-reach consumers because of the large sample size. *Id.*

We initially discuss two criteria that affect the evidentiary value of the parties' consumer belief studies. First, consumer beliefs should be measured without exposing survey participants to the challenged ads. This is because such exposure may elicit the participant's interpretation of the ad rather than his or her beliefs. Second, the universe of participants surveyed should be properly selected to eliminate usage bias and to compare relevant groups. In testing for credence claims about a product, where consumers may have difficulty objectively evaluating the product's performance, the survey should insert controls to counter bias stemming from the use of the product.

### **1. Exposure to Advertising**

All of the studies but one asked participants questions about their beliefs without exposing them to ads. Only the Lavidge study showed consumers television ads for four OTC products prior to questioning. Both complaint counsel's expert, Dr. Mazis, and Respondent's expert, Dr. Jacoby, testified that the appropriate way to measure beliefs is without exposure to ads. Mazis Tr. 1276; Jacoby Tr. 2962, 2968, 3155. By exposing consumers to advertising before asking questions about their beliefs, it is difficult to determine whether the consumers' responses to questions designed to elicit their beliefs reflect their interpretation of the ad or, in fact, their beliefs. We find that the Lavidge study is not probative of consumer beliefs because, contrary to the first criterion, participants were exposed to advertising as part of the study.<sup>27</sup> By contrast, the A&U, Brand Equity, NFO, and Whitcup, studies as well as the

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<sup>25</sup> Random digit dialing reaches both listed and unlisted numbers. Whitcup Tr. 2108.

<sup>26</sup> Mail panel participants may under-represent those with the lowest incomes (who may not have a permanent address or may be illiterate) and those with the highest incomes (who disproportionately decline to participate). Clarke Tr. 13.

<sup>27</sup> There are other flaws in the Lavidge study which may tend to understate the frequency of superior efficacy beliefs regarding Doan's. Dr. Mazis testified that it was difficult for consumers to answer the questions used in that study, because it required participants to sort through all the brands of which they were aware and then to make judgments about them. Mazis Tr. 1274-76. Moreover, Mr. Lavidge failed to control for usage bias; therefore, the fact that fewer of his participants used Doan's than used other products understated the superiority beliefs regarding Doan's. Mazis Tr. 1271. Mr. Lavidge even acknowledged that  
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relevant portions of the Jacoby study were conducted in keeping with this criterion.

## **2. The Proper Universe**

The appropriate universe is crucial to determine the probative value of any consumer survey. An improper universe can render a survey useless. Experts for both parties agreed that in a survey of consumers' beliefs regarding Doan's superior efficacy, the universe should be limited to those who suffer from and treat back pain. Mazis Tr. 1120; Lavidge Tr. 770; Whitcup Tr. 2109. All of the belief studies, with the exception of the Aleve Tracking Study, limited the universe of participants to those who suffered from back pain and had used an OTC analgesic product within the previous year. Because the Aleve Tracking Study was not confined to backache sufferers, the results are not particularly useful.<sup>28</sup>

The experts part company on the question of whether the survey respondents should be aware of the product for which the beliefs are tested. Complaint counsel's expert, Dr. Mazis, concluded that the appropriate universe for testing consumer beliefs about Doan's would include both people who were users of Doan's and people who were aware of, but not users of, Doan's (aware non-users). With such a universe it would be possible to compare the beliefs of users of Doan's to users of other products. In order to control for usage bias, it is also necessary to compare the beliefs of people who were aware of the product, but not users, with the beliefs of users of the product. Mazis Tr. 1122-23. On the other hand, Novartis' experts contend that a survey limited to participants who are aware of Doan's would not be representative of the relevant population, and would tend to overstate ratings for Doan's relative to other OTC analgesics. Whitcup Tr. 2182. In their belief studies, Novartis' experts included consumers who were unaware of Doan's. Dr. Jacoby testified that this was an important group of consumers because they were prospective consumers and they were the people to whom the advertising is directed. Jacoby Tr. 2937.

On balance, we conclude that the most reliable studies are those that focus on persons who have used Doan's or are aware of the product. Because our inquiry is whether the Doan's ad campaign has created or reinforced misimpressions about the product's efficacy, it makes sense to direct our attention to those consumers who, in fact, have an opinion about

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<sup>27</sup> (...continued)

personal experience with a product is very important in shaping a consumer's beliefs about the product. Lavidge Tr. 750. The ALJ rejected the Lavidge study. IDF 310.

<sup>28</sup> Admittedly, the purpose of the Aleve Tracking Study was to track the introduction of Aleve on the OTC market generally, although it did develop some information about Doan's. Dr. Mazis testified that the respondents in the Aleve Tracking Study were not focusing on back pain, so a back pain-specific product would be much less likely to be recalled. Mazis Tr. 2016.



Doan's -- which will necessarily be those who are aware of the product.<sup>29</sup>

The soundness of this approach is confirmed by consideration of the problem of user bias. Users of a product tend to rate it more highly than do non-users. *Mazis Tr. 992*.<sup>30</sup> This preference may be attributable, in part, to consumers' inability accurately to evaluate the efficacy of certain products -- such as analgesics -- relative to alternatives. *See American Home Prods. Corp.*, 98 F.T.C. at 282 (Initial Decision). Although the Whitcup and Jacoby consumer studies included consumers who were Doan's users (8% in Whitcup universe and 21% in Jacoby) the studies failed to ascertain the number of remaining consumers who were aware of Doan's, making it impossible to compare the beliefs of consumers who use the product to those who are aware of the product, but are not users. Accordingly, the most reliable assessments of consumer beliefs will be based on comparisons of like groups -- e.g., users of one brand to users of another brand; or aware non-users of one brand to aware non-users of another. Only the NFO belief study used such a methodology. The NFO demonstrated that 77% of Doan's users and 45% of aware non-users believed that Doan's is

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<sup>29</sup> Indeed, when Ciba itself tested consumer beliefs in the regular course of business, it limited its samples to those who were aware of the product. The A&U Study and the Brand Equity Study were confined to consumers who were aware of Doan's.

<sup>30</sup> *See infra* n.13.

<sup>31</sup> The Jacoby study, as far as it goes, actually corroborates the results of the NFO study. For example, in the Jacoby study, 38% of Doan's users reported Doan's as "more effective" in contrast to 23% of Advil and 17% of Tylenol users who reported their brands as "more effective." RX 5-z-105.

usage are among the most important of these factors.<sup>32</sup> *American Home Prods.*, 98 F.T.C. at 281. But product usage can be a primary source of a consumer's product image "only if the consumer has the ability to discriminate objectively between various similar products. . . . Thus, if a consumer is unable to evaluate objectively a product's actual efficacy, the role of advertising as a cause of the consumer image is enhanced." 98 F.T.C. at 410. Because consumers cannot objectively evaluate OTC analgesics, including Doan's, advertising is an important factor in creating and reinforcing beliefs about such products. Mazis Tr. 1609. The Doan's eight-year advertising campaign created and/or reinforced beliefs and made them more salient, understandable, and resistant to change. Mazis Tr. 1205-06. Indeed, such a long campaign could do both, having initially created and later reinforced beliefs.

After the 1987 A&U study showed that Doan's had a weak image, CX 221-c,d, Ciba launched the challenged advertising campaign, claiming that Doan's was superior to other general purpose analgesics for back pain and that Doan's contained a special ingredient for that purpose. Consumer survey data, conducted before final production of the ads, showed that consumers were drawing a superiority claim for back pain from the advertising. See ID at 62-63. The challenged superiority claims were consistent and made throughout the campaign. In fact, the eight-year campaign presented a focused message of comparative superiority.

The Brand Equity Study, conducted midway through the campaign, provides strong evidence that us<sup>33</sup>.

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<sup>32</sup> Indeed, word-of-mouth recommendations largely depend upon prior exposure to advertising and product usage. *American Home Prods.*, 98 F.T.C. at 281.

<sup>33</sup> Respondent argues, and the ALJ found, that the attribute of "being particularly effective for back pain" does not necessarily imply that a product is "more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief," and thus that the Brand Equity Study is not probative of superiority beliefs. IDF 246. We disagree. A product that is no more effective than any other would not be "particularly" effective. The word "particularly" is inherently comparative. See, e.g., *Webster's New International Dictionary* 1783 (2d ed. 1938) (defining "particularly" as "[e]specially; unusually").

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<sup>34</sup> Dr. Mazis testified that consumers would not infer that a product had a special ingredient for back pain simply from the fact it is only advertised and marketed for back pain. Mazis Tr. 1621.

<sup>35</sup> Contemporaneous documents further indicate that Ciba's ad agency, Jordan McGrath, recognized that the challenged advertising was affecting superiority beliefs about Doan's among consumers. One such document from 1994 stated that:

[t]he 1993 Brand Equity study showed that the specificity of Doan's positioning, as communicated by "The Back Specialist" campaign line has helped differentiate the

We reject Respondent's contention that the Aleve Tracking Study and the Whitcup Study demonstrate a low unaided recall of Doan's advertising, so consumers cannot harbor misbeliefs about Doan's. RRAB 61, 62. We have already noted that because the Aleve Tracking Study was not confined to back pain-sufferers, its results are not useful. It tends to understate those consumers who may have beliefs about Doan's and did not ask back pain-specific questions. And the results of the Whitcup study are undermined by the small number of Doan's users sampled (35) in contrast to the number of Tylenol users (190) and Advil users (121). RX 2-z-49. Indeed, Dr. Whitcup himself appended the letter "c" (designating "caution" due to a small base) to data regarding Doan's user responses.

As in its attack on materiality, Respondent argues that the Whitcup, Lavidge, and Jacoby studies show that a majority of consumers do not believe that any OTC analgesic brand was more effective than others for relieving back pain, RRAB 63, 64, presumably rendering advertising ineffectual in creating or reinforcing any superior efficacy beliefs. Even if those studies show that a *majority* of consumers so believe, a *substantial number* of respondents remain who believe that one brand may be more effective than others. See RX 23-j; RX 2-t; RX 6-j. The results do not shed light on whether the challenged ads created or reinforced misbeliefs in the minds of these remaining consumers.

Novartis also recycles its argument that, even if consumers harbor misimpressions about Doan's, such beliefs are due to Doan's ninety-year positioning as a back-specific analgesic and not to the challenged ads. RRAB 75-77. In fact, however, there is no record evidence to support Respondent's speculation. To the contrary, the A&U Study showed that Doan's historical positioning did not have a major impact on consumer beliefs, and that the product's image remained weak prior to the commencement of the ad campaign at issue here. CX 221-c. As the evidence discussed above shows, the ensuing multi-million dollar, eight-year campaign was successful in enhancing the product's image by persuading consumers, incorrectly, of Doan's superior efficacy. In any event, even if that misimpression existed to some degree prior to the ad campaign, the campaign at the very least had the effect of *reinforcing* such beliefs, which supports a corrective advertising remedy. See *Warner-Lambert Co.*, 562 F.2d at 762. In fact, the campaign could have both created and reinforced misbeliefs in that beliefs may have been created and later reinforced.

We likewise reject Respondent's argument that complaint counsel failed to establish a link between consumer beliefs and the challenged advertising. Respondent claims that the

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<sup>35</sup> (...continued)

Similarly, Jordan McGrath's Vice President Account Supervisor who worked on the Doan's account noted the effectiveness of the challenged claims: "'The Back Specialist' we have kind of engraved that in the consumer's mind." CX 503 at 97 [Jackson Dep]. Other Ciba documents indicate the significant role that advertising played in driving Doan's sales. CX 404-a-b; CX 499-a.

NFO study is flawed because Dr. Mazis did not ask survey participants whether they were aware of Doan's advertising. RRAB 79.<sup>36</sup> While a specific question asking whether participants recalled the challenged advertising might have been useful, we find that the failure to include such a question was not a fatal flaw. The evidence of parallel changes in consumers' beliefs about Doan's that track the course of the eight-year campaign sufficiently establishes the link between the challenged ads and the resultant misbeliefs.

Respondent further claims that the ads did not create or reinforce misbeliefs because the campaign was ineffective in communicating its superiority message (again repeating a claim employed to attack materiality). Novartis argues that Doan's used a small advertising budget and relied on "worn out" ads. See e.g., RAB 16, 23; RRAB 1. Such a campaign, it claims, would be incapable of creating misbeliefs in the minds of consumers that would justify corrective advertising. This line of argument, however, is not only inconsistent with the evidence already discussed regarding the campaign's actual effects but is also belied by Ciba's actions during the campaign, which evince its reliance on the campaign.

Ciba continually refined its marketing plans in response to changing demographic information. Ciba conducted research to define precisely the target audience of backache sufferers and revised its media plans accordingly. For example, after learning that its target audience was disproportionately female and Southern, the yearly marketing plans considered these factors in developing media strategies and ad placement. CX 335-z-14; CX 343-z-64. Ciba's decision to test Spanish radio ads in Houston during short periods in 1991 and 1993 is another example of Ciba's responsiveness to changing demographics. Similarly, when competitors entered the market, Doan's responded through defensive advertising. When Nuprin Backache was introduced in the first half of 1993, Ciba increased Doan's television advertising budget by approximately \$500,000. CX 357-b. When Bayer Select Backache was introduced, Ciba increased its spending to run more advertising during the new product's introductory period. CX 378-k. A Marketing Director wrote that Doan's used "a consistent strong advertising campaign to defend and even build share in the face of these new competitors." CX 399-b.

Finally, Novartis' resort to market share data and statistics wholly fails to show that the ads could not have created or reinforced consumer misbeliefs. Respondent claims that Doan's unit sales actually declined during the relevant period; that even when measured against OTC analgesics used to treat backache, Doan's market share stood at 5%; that Doan's

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<sup>36</sup> Dr. Mazis testified that he did not ask whether people had seen advertising for Doan's because at the time of the NFO study, the ads had not run for six or seven months, and people might not reliably recall ads that they did, in fact, see. Mazis Tr. 1797. He also testified that beliefs from ads may linger even though recall of specific ad claims may not. Mazis Tr. 1798, 1800.

was unable to increase its sales and market share even after dropping its price,<sup>37</sup> and that any increases in factory or consumer dollar sales resulted from the introduction of the Extra Strength and PM lines. RAB 17-19. In fact, the sales volume fluctuated during these years rather than declining and Novartis' expert, Dr. Scheffman, relied upon incomplete data that did not extend beyond 1993. RX 189-a. Volume sales increased by 10% in 1995. CX 402-c; CX 408-h. Further, Doan's share of the total analgesic category grew from 0.8 to 0.9% between 1993 and August 1995, a 12.5% increase, and there was nearly an 80% increase in factory sales. JX 2B ¶17. Moreover, in a mature market, a key criterion for advertising success is maintenance of market share. Stewart Tr. 3467. And, a variety of marketing plans during the relevant period indicate that sales were responding well to ads. CX 360-z-43; CX 393-q; CX 408-i. Accordingly, we conclude that the challenged ad campaign was successful, and that the challenged ads created or reinforced misbeliefs among consumers regarding the superior efficacy of Doan's.

## **2. The Effects of the Challenged Ads Are Likely to Linger.**

We next turn to the question whether the misimpressions caused or reinforced by the challenged advertisements are likely to linger in the absence of corrective advertising.

The NFO study, conducted six months after the ads ceased, demonstrates that 77% of Doan's users and 45% of those who were aware of but did not use Doan's believed that the product was superior to other brands for the treatment of back pain. These percentages are disproportionately high for both groups relative to other brands.<sup>38</sup> Thus, the NFO study shows

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<sup>37</sup> Respondent also argues that the low share of usage, conversion rates, and advertising penetration data demonstrate that consumers do not believe that Doan's is more effective than other analgesics for the relief of back pain. RRAB 59-60. At best, these factors serve as an inexact proxy for consumer beliefs. The direct evidence shows that consumers believed that Doan's was superior to other OTC analgesic products.

<sup>38</sup> Respondent's arguments that the NFO study is flawed, RRAB 67-71, are without merit. As noted above, the NFO study used an appropriately restricted universe, and its protocol was proper and provided reliable results. Respondent argues that the absence of follow-up validation procedures renders the data unreliable. But all experts agreed that the purpose of validation is to deter and detect interviewer misconduct, Mazis Tr. 1128; Lavidge Tr. 788; Jacoby Tr. 2950-51. we therefore find that this mail panel study (which did not utilize an interviewer) did not require validation. Respondent's concern that the wrong household members may have completed the survey questionnaires, thereby rendering the results unreliable, is unwarranted. The study employed mechanisms to account for this possibility, Clark Tr. 40-41, and eliminated questionable responses.

Finally, Novartis questions the significance of the NFO study results. Dr. Mazis  
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that, for at least six months after the challenged ads stopped being aired, their effect continued to linger.

A Novartis expert, Dr. James Jaccard, re-analyzed the NFO data, attempting to measure the magnitude of the differences in brand attribute ratings, RX 132 f-o, and to demonstrate that there likely are not meaningful differences in brand efficacy beliefs held by those who use or are aware of Doan's and those who use or are aware of other OTC analgesics. Jaccard Tr. 1427. In fact, Dr. Jaccard's testimony does not undermine the conclusions of Dr. Mazis and the NFO study.

First, Dr. Jaccard has no expertise regarding the OTC analgesic market and does not know whether any of the differences in effectiveness beliefs in the NFO study were significant. Jaccard Tr. 1523. Second, he conceded that traditional null hypothesis testing, as used by Dr. Mazis, is the dominant analytic technique, Jaccard Tr. 1510, and that his own approach is not common. Jaccard Tr. 1444-45. Third, Dr. Jaccard acknowledged that the differences observed in the NFO study might be practically significant. Jaccard Tr. 1450-51.

A number of factors that support the results of the NFO study also support an inference that consumers' false beliefs are likely to endure. See *American Home Prods.*, 98 F.T.C. at 411. Specifically, the challenged claims were (1) very salient to consumers (because superior efficacy is among the primary considerations for a consumer in selecting a back pain remedy), (2) clearly and consistently conveyed by the challenged ads, and (3) an integral part of an eight-year campaign. Respondent spent approximately \$65,000,000 disseminating these claims, primarily in fifteen-second ads whose primary message was the false superiority claim. The ads reached between 80 and 90% of Doan's target audience approximately 20 to 27 times each year. JX 2F ¶ 28. A likelihood of lingering effects can also be inferred from copy tests, which demonstrated that consumers drew a superiority claim from the Doan's ads after just one or two exposures.<sup>39</sup> See *Warner Lambert*, 86 F.T.C. at 1470.

Novartis' expert, Dr. Scheffman, testified that any misimpression created by the Doan's ads is not likely to linger due to Doan's insignificant advertising spending and the placement, length, and frequency of the challenged advertising compared to the amount of

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<sup>38</sup> (...continued)

analyzed the different sets of ratings for joint users of Doan's and one of the other five brands and found that, on average, 25% more people rated Doan's as superior for back pain relief. IDF 263. The comparative analysis for non-users who were aware of several products revealed that, on average, 20% more people rated Doan's superior. IDF 265. This demonstrates a strong difference in beliefs among these groups. Mazis Tr. 1196-1199.

<sup>39</sup> Dr. Mazis testified that the beliefs are likely to linger in light of the length and effectiveness of the ads, the fact that they stressed the superiority claim repeatedly, and the recall evidence from the copy tests. Mazis Tr. 1255-56.

advertising in the OTC analgesic marketplace. Scheffman Tr. 2612-13. We reject the argument that market share, total sales, or the relative size of the advertising budget determine whether a misbelief is likely to linger. All of these factors go primarily to the purported *magnitude* of the harm created by the deceptive ads and not to the likelihood that the misbelief will linger.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, niche marketers who engage in deceptive campaigns should not be immune from a corrective advertising requirement simply because of the relative size of their advertising budget or market shares.

Respondent also contrasts the evidence of lingering misbeliefs in *Warner-Lambert*, in which we ordered corrective advertising, to that in cases where we declined to order corrective advertising. RRAB 96. Novartis argues that we have rejected corrective advertising in three cases where challenged ads were disseminated for a longer period of time than those in this case, where the advertising budget for the challenged campaign was larger, and where there was higher consumer recall of the specific challenged claims. RRAB 47.

We disagree that such a comparison counsels against corrective advertising here. First, we have frequently noted that the amount of evidence in *Warner Lambert* was unusually strong and far exceeded the threshold needed to impose corrective advertising. “We emphasize that we do not believe corrective advertising may only be imposed where there is an evidentiary basis like that in *Warner-Lambert*.” *American Home Prods.*, 98 F.T.C. at 408 n.93 (citations omitted).<sup>41</sup> Second, none of the three cases relied upon by Respondent involved comparable evidence to support a corrective advertising remedy. In *Bristol-Myers Co.*, 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), complaint counsel introduced “no evidence” that misbeliefs would likely linger. *Id.* at 380. We declined to infer a likelihood of lingering solely from the face of the challenged ads. *Id.* Similarly, in *American Home Products Corp.*, we refused to infer a likelihood of lingering merely from the nature of the ads notwithstanding a total absence of evidence on that issue in the record.<sup>42</sup> 98 F.T.C. at 409. In *Sterling Drug, Inc.*, 102 F.T.C. 395 (1983), we found that the misrepresentations had not created or reinforced misbeliefs in light of studies conducted both before and after the challenged campaign revealing the same

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<sup>40</sup> In any event, in a mature market, such as OTC analgesics, a central purpose of advertising is to retain current users and a key criterion for an ad campaign’s success is whether it is succeeding in maintaining share, particularly in the face of a competitive onslaught. IDF 335; Stewart Tr. 3467. We find that Doan’s was able to maintain and even increase its sales in light of the competitive pressures of new entrants in the back pain category and affirm the ALJ’s finding on this point. IDF 336.

<sup>41</sup> See, *supra*, footnote 23.

<sup>42</sup> Some of the claims in that case were also secondary to the main message of the ads. 98 F.T.C. at 408.



levels of consumer misbeliefs.<sup>43</sup> *Id.* at 798. These cases are easily distinguished from this one, where extensive evidence supports each prong of the corrective advertisement test.<sup>44</sup>

Respondent next contends that low unaided brand awareness, evinced by consumer survey testing, demonstrates that the ads did not convince consumers that Doan's is more effective than other brands,<sup>45</sup> RAB 39-40, 73-75; RRAB 59, and thus no misbeliefs can linger. The advertising penetration data are not probative. Apart from the serious methodological flaws with the belief studies noted above,<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Complaint Counsel in that case conceded that the frequency of misbeliefs was not altered by the challenged ad campaign, but argued that the misbeliefs "nonetheless became 'sharper'" as a result thereof. 102 F.T.C. at 799.

<sup>44</sup> The dissent's emphasis upon the duration of the advertising campaign and dollars spent in these cases neglects the absence in those cases of sufficient evidence demonstrating a likelihood of lingering misbeliefs. This analysis cannot be reduced to a rigid algorithmic inquiry.

<sup>45</sup> The Aleve Tracking Study indicates that Doan's had a 2 to 3% unaided brand awareness in December 1994 and June 1995, respectively. RX 101-t. None of the 423 respondents in the Whitcup belief study reported "top-of-mind" awareness of Doan's advertising. RX 2-o.

<sup>46</sup> For example, the Aleve Tracking Study focused on general analgesics and was not confined to backache sufferers; thus, it is not surprising that consumers did not mention Doan's, which is not marketed as a general analgesic. Moreover, Novartis' own expert, Dr. Jacoby, conceded that penetration studies are of questionable value in measuring consumer beliefs about a product. People can form and retain beliefs based upon an ad without recalling it. Jacoby Tr. 3201.

that such beliefs were created by or substantially reinforced by the challenged advertising campaign, and that those beliefs are likely to linger into the future. Therefore, we find that the elements for corrective advertising are satisfied, and that corrective advertising is appropriate and necessary.

Corrective advertising is appropriate for an additional reason. We previously discussed the factors which, separate from the NFO study, support an inference that misbeliefs about the superior claim are likely to linger. Another inference arises under these facts. We cannot turn a blind eye to the obvious relationship between an absolute efficacy claim (“this product works”), which Doan’s has been running for ninety years, and a comparative efficacy claim (“this product works better than others”). Given that Novartis’ advertising campaign fostered a symbiotic relationship between these two claims, simply to permit Novartis to return to its ninety-year old positioning of Doan’s as a backache product makes it all the more likely the misbeliefs will linger -- absent some corrective action.

### **3. Content of the Corrective Message**

Dr. Mazis testified that, as a general matter, proper corrective advertising accomplishes its intended effect of dissipating misbeliefs over time. IDF 358-59. Studies designed to track the impact of corrective advertising imposed in *RJR Foods, Inc.*, 83 F.T.C. 7 (1973) and *Warner Lambert* support this conclusion. IDF 360.

The corrective message should (1) state that Doan’s products are effective; (2) correct the lingering misbelief that Doan’s products are superior to other products; and (3) permit Respondent to continue to advertise Doan’s specifically for back pain.<sup>47</sup> The following corrective message proposed by complaint counsel satisfies all of these requirements:  
"Although Doan

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<sup>47</sup> The FDA monograph allows pain-specific advertising, and Novartis is free to make claims specifically allowed by FDA.

<sup>48</sup> Of the respondents, 145 were Doan’s users and 225 were non-users who were aware of Doan’s. CX 489.

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<sup>49</sup> In response to the question, “What did the ad say or imply about Doan’s?” 38% of the participants indicated that Doan’s was the same as or was not proven to be better than other medicines. Only 3 to 4% indicated that it was better or worse. CX 489-p. In response to closed-ended questions regarding what the ad said or implied about Doan’s effectiveness for back pain in comparison to other medicines, 69% replied that it was the same or not proven to be better. Between 5 and 8.8% reported that it was better or worse. CX 489-x. Finally, in response to closed-ended questions about what was implied or stated, 75% agreed that the ad implied that Doan’s is about as effective for back pain as other OTC pain relievers. None said it was less effective and 17% said it was more effective. CX 489-z.

<sup>50</sup> In response to an opened-ended question asking what the package said, showed or implied about the product, 15% responded that they understood that Doan’s was not more effective than other pain relievers. RX 110-q. In response to a closed-ended question as to

message appear on all advertising except television and radio ads that are 15 seconds or less in duration. The corrective message must also appear on the product package. Including the corrective message on the product packaging is especially important because, as Dr. Whitcup testified, packaging is a particularly ubiquitous form of advertising in that people have to pick up the product in order to purchase it. Dr. Whitcup also noted that in deciding what product to buy, consumers may compare packages. See Whitcup Tr. 2286.

We reject complaint counsel's recommendation that the duration of the corrective message be determined by a performance standard. In *Egglands Best*, we required the corrective message to appear on the package for one year. 118 F.T.C. 340, 357. In *Warner Lambert*, we required the corrective message to appear in all advertising until the respondent had expended a sum equal to the average annual Listerine advertising budget for a ten-year period. 86 F.T.C. 1514-1515. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating: "[T]he corrective advertising order in this case, by tying the quantity of correction required to the investment in deception, is tailored to serve the legitimate governmental interest in correcting public misimpressions as to the value of Listerine and no more." In a footnote, the court went on to say: "As a result, any imprecision in the order's scope would seem likely to inure to Warner-Lambert's benefit." 562 F.2d 771.

We believe that a hybrid approach -- advertising expenditures and specific length of time -- is the best method for determining when the corrective message should terminate. If we were to require that the corrective message appear in advertising until Novartis has expended a specific amount of money on advertising, Novartis could choose to advertise for a short period of time in an expensive way. If we were to require the corrective message to appear only for a specific period of time, then Novartis could choose not to advertise for that period of time.<sup>51</sup> Accordingly, we order that the corrective message appear for one year on all packaging and advertising, except radio and television ads of 15 seconds or less in duration, and until Novartis has expended on Doan's advertising an amount equal to the average spent annually during the eight years of the challenged campaign.<sup>52</sup> In contrast to complaint counsel's proposed performance standard, as the Court of Appeals found in the *Warner Lambert* matter, any imprecision in the scope of the order is likely to inure to Novartis' benefit.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Indeed, an internal Novartis document suggests that if we order corrective advertising, they could stop advertising for three years. See CX 110-c.

<sup>52</sup> Respondents spent \$65.3 million on advertising between 1988 and 1996. JX 2d ¶ 21. The average annual expenditure on advertising is \$8 million.

<sup>53</sup> Dr. Mazis' expert testimony was that the belief that Doan's is more effective than other OTC pain relievers fro back pain will likely linger for a long time after the claim is no longer disseminated. Mazis Tr. 1255-56. Dr. Mazis' expert opinion is supported by three empirical  
(continued...)

Respondent argues that complaint counsel's proposed corrective advertising order violates the First Amendment. RRAB 106. Respondent argues that the corrective message does not convey the intended message and may be confusing. In addition, it argues that the corrective notice will be punitive because it will have a negative influence on consumers' beliefs about Doan's. RRAB 104. Further, it argues that the message would force it to abandon the 15-second ad format. RRAB 110. Finally, it argues that the corrective message "carries an unacceptable risk of forcing Doan's to abandon its back pain specific positioning and thus forcing Doan's off the market." RRAB 106. These arguments rely on Respondent's assumption that the corrective message could be perpetual because of the performance standard suggested by complaint counsel.

We reject these arguments. First, the corrective remedy is of a finite duration. Second, it will not force Respondent to abandon 15-second ads because it does not apply to such ads. Third, the corrective message was effectively communicated and is not unduly confusing or misleading. Finally, it is not punitive to require Respondent to tell the truth.

We now turn to the specific First Amendment arguments. Respondent asserts that complaint counsel's proposed corrective advertising provision would prevent it from truthful speech and require it to underwrite speech about the merits of other brands. RRAB 107-108. It relies on *Ibanez v Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation*, 512 U.S. 136 (1994). That case involved a reprimand by the Florida Board of Accountancy ("Board") of a Florida attorney for including her Certified Public Accountant and Certified Financial Planner credentials in her advertising and other communication to the public. *Id.* at 139-41. The United States Supreme Court noted that the challenged statements were true and that the government had nothing more than speculation or conjecture an

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<sup>53</sup> (...continued)  
studies that evaluated the effects of Commission corrective advertising orders. IDF 359.

<sup>54</sup> Although decided before *Central Hudson*, *Warner-Lambert* addressed the First  
(continued...)

We apply the *Central Hudson* test to the facts of this case. First, the government has a substantial interest in protecting consumers from deception. See *Warner Lambert*, 562 F.2d at 771. Thus, the first prong of the test is satisfied.

With respect to the second prong, we find that the corrective advertising remedy directly and materially advances the aforementioned governmental interest. We have determined that the challenged advertising has created or substantially reinforced misbeliefs in the minds of consumers and that those beliefs are likely to linger into the future. As discussed above, the corrective advertising remedy we order has been copy tested by both parties, and the results show that it effectively communicates the desired message. Accordingly, we conclude that the corrective advertising remedy advances the governmental interest in preventing future deception by correcting the lingering effects of Doan's past false advertising.

Finally, we conclude that the remedy is no more extensive than necessary. Our order is narrowly drafted to correct the misbelief at issue. We have balanced the need for correcting the lingering misbeliefs of consumers against Novartis' ability to advertise effectively. In doing so, we have been mindful of imposing less restrictive alternatives where appropriate. Therefore, we have specifically exempted television and radio ads whose duration is 15 seconds or less to achieve the proper balance. Accordingly, we find that the last prong of *Central Hudson* has been satisfied.

## V. CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the entire record and after consideration of all the arguments made by the parties, we believe that Doan's advertising claims were material, the required elements of corrective advertising have been satisfied, and a corrective advertising remedy is appropriate.

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<sup>54</sup> (...continued)

Amendment issue and concluded that the First Amendment did not bar a corrective advertising order. 562 F.2d 768-71 (supplemental opinion on petition for rehearing).