

SECRETARY

In the Matter of

CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY,  
a corporation, and  
PITT-DES MOINES, INC.,  
a corporation.

DOCKET NO. 9300

I.

On January 13, 2003, Respondents filed a Motion to Strike Trial Testimony Relating to Exhibits CX 1577 and CX 1578. Complaint Counsel filed its opposition on January 15, 2003.

II.

Complaint Counsel asserts that Respondents' expert, Dr. Barry Harris, testified on direct examination that it is inappropriate to compare budget prices and firm prices. On cross-examination, Complaint Counsel sought to elicit testimony from Harris regarding CX 1577 and

At the time Complaint Counsel began its questioning of Harris about CX 1577 and CX

1577 and CX 1578 for proper impeachment purposes only and was instructed that if CX 1577 and CX 1578 were excluded from evidence, a motion to disregard portions of Harris' testimony that refer to those documents would be entertained. Tr. at 7602, 7612-13.

Subsequent to the testimony elicited from Harris about the statements made by Vaughn, Respondents' motion to withdraw CX 1577 and CX 1578 was granted. Tr. at 7666-74. The two exhibits had previously been admitted pursuant to a joint stipulation. Respondents demonstrated

### III.

By this motion, Respondents seek to strike testimony elicited by Complaint Counsel from Harris about the statements made by Vaughn in CX 1577 and CX 1578. Complaint Counsel asserts that the out of court statements made by Vaughn are contradictory or inconsistent statements that may be used to impeach the testimony of Harris. Complaint Counsel does not assert, nor has it established, that the statements made by Vaughn were reviewed or relied upon by Harris in forming Harris' expert opinions in this case.

"The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness." Fed. R. Evid. 607. Complaint Counsel seeks to attack Respondents' expert's

1978), the Court of Appeals held that cross-examining counsel's use of the written conclusions of a non-testifying expert "under the guise of impeachment" of a testifying expert was impermissible. *Id.* at 546-47. There, defendant's expert witness had partially based his opinion on statistical evidence established by two other non-testifying experts. The Court of Appeals held that the conclusions reached by non-testifying experts did not impeach the testifying expert's use of the statistics. *Id.* See also *Box v. Swindle*, 306 F.2d 882, 887 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1962) (reports of non-testifying expert examined by a testifying expert and conflicting with the testimony of the expert could not be admitted even as impeachment evidence unless the testifying expert based his opinion on the opinion of the examined report.) In the instant case, Complaint Counsel has not established that Harris relied upon or even reviewed the conclusions reached by Vaughn.

Complaint Counsel, who proffered the statements made by Vaughn, has not demonstrated that the statements are proper impeachment evidence. The cases cited by Complaint Counsel in its motion in no way support its argument that the hearsay statements of a non-testifying witness that are not in evidence may be used to impeach the credibility of an expert witness. The majority

(government permitted to use an item of clothing that had been seized through an invalid search to impeach criminal defendant's statement about such item of clothing); *U.S. v. Abel*, 469 U.S.

(records showing how often criminal defendant gave drugs to patients admissible to impeach

defendant's testimony that he had dispensed illegal drugs to only a small percentage of his

admissible to impeach); *U.S. v. Dweck*, 913 F.2d 365, 369 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990) (where wife of criminal defendant testified she had met husband in 1979, government permitted to impeach wife by asking if husband had been in prison in 1979 even though Fed. R. Evid. 609 prohibits impeachment of defendants by convictions over 10 years old). The civil cases cited by Complaint Counsel are also not on point: *Lubbock Feedlots Inc.*, 630 F.2d 250, 261-62 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980) (where first witness on the stand had made a prior inconsistent statement, second witness permitted to testify about first witness' previous out of court statement); *DiStefano v. Otis*, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14039 \*2,


he had been an elevator mechanic admissible to impeach him on the issue of the claimed insufficiency of defendant's maintenance records); *Jones v. Southern Pac. RR*, 962 F.2d 447, 449 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992) (records of safety infractions committed by train conductor admissible to impeach testimony offered by that same train conductor). In the instant case, Complaint Counsel is clearly not referring to any prior statement made by Harris or to any of Harris' own records or documents.

As previously ruled, the deposition statements of Vaughn are not in evidence. Use of these statements with Harris is not proper impeachment. Thus, the portions of the trial transcript containing or referring to the statements of Vaughn will be disregarded. ~~Harris' Deposition~~

HARRIS was asked about the statements made by Vaughn. Accordingly, Respondent's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The following portions of the trial transcript are not in

7604:24-7605:8; 7616:11-13; 7618:9-20; 7619:9-10; 7619:18-7622:5; 7624:20-7625:11; and 7629:18-7630:5.

ORDERED:

  
D. Michael Chappell  
Administrative Law Judge