021 0192
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
In the Matter of
PFIZER INC., a
corporation; and
PHARMACIA CORPORATION, a corporation. |
Docket No. C-4075 |
COMPLAINT
Pursuant to the Â鶹´«Ã½ Trade Commission
Act and the Clayton Act, and by virtue of the authority vested in it by
said Acts, the Â鶹´«Ã½ Trade Commission ("Commission"), having reason to
believe that Respondent Pfizer Inc. ("Pfizer"), a corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission, has agreed to merge with Respondent
Pharmacia Corporation ("Pharmacia"), a corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the Â鶹´«Ã½ Trade
Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45, and it appearing to the
Commission that a proceeding in respect thereof would be in the public
interest, hereby issues its Complaint, stating its charges as follows:
I. DEFINITIONS
1. "Asset
Purchase Agreement" means the Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among
Pfizer, Pilsner Acquisition Sub Corp., and Pharmacia, dated July 13, 2002.
2. "Canine arthritis" means a painful,
inflammatory condition of dogs.
3. "Combination HRT" means any product indicated
for the treatment of menopausal symptoms that contains fixed dosages of
both estrogen and progestin.
4. "Commission" means Â鶹´«Ã½ Trade Commission.
5. "Dry Cow
Mastitis" means an infection of the udder affecting dairy cows during
periods when those cows are not producing milk.
6. "Erectile Dysfunction" or "ED" means a
condition which is diagnosed by the consistent inability to achieve and
maintain a penile erection adequate to sustain sexual intercourse.
7.
"Extended Release OAB Products" means once-a-day and twice-a-day
formulations of products to treat overactive bladder.
8. "FDA" means the United States Food and Drug
Administration.
9. "HRT" means Hormone Replacement Therapy.
10. "Johnson & Johnson" means Johnson & Johnson,
a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue
of the laws of the State of New Jersey, with its office and principal
place of business located at 1 Johnson & Johnson Plaza, New Brunswick, New
Jersey 08933.
11. "Lactating Cow Mastitis" means an infection
of the udder affecting dairy cows when those cows are producing milk.
12. "Novartis" means Novartis AG, a corporation
organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of
the Swiss Confederation, with its registered office located at
Lichtstrasse 35, 4056, Basel, Switzerland.
13. "Overactive Bladder" or "OAB" means a
symptomatic condition that includes urinary frequency, urinary urgency,
and urinary incontinence.
14. "Respondents" means Pfizer and Pharmacia
individually and collectively.
15. "Wyeth" means Wyeth, a corporation
organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of
the State of Delaware, with its office and principal place of business
located at 5 Giralda Farms, Madison, New Jersey 07940.
II. RESPONDENTS
16. Respondent
Pfizer is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and
by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, with its office and
principal place of business located at 235 East 42nd Street,
New York, New York 10017. Pfizer, among other things, is engaged in the
research, development, manufacture and sale of human pharmaceutical
products, animal pharmaceutical products, and over-the-counter products.
17. Respondent
Pharmacia is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under
and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, with its office and
principal place of business located at 100 Route 206 North, Peapack, New
Jersey 07977. Pharmacia, among other things, is engaged in the research,
development, manufacture, and sale of human pharmaceutical products,
animal pharmaceutical products, and over-the-counter products.
18. Respondents are, and at all times relevant
herein have been, engaged in commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section
1 of the Clayton Act as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 12, and are corporations
whose business is in or affects commerce, as "commerce" is defined in
Section 4 of the Â鶹´«Ã½ Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 44.
III. THE PROPOSED
ACQUISITION
19. On July 13,
2002, Pfizer and Pharmacia entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement
whereby Pfizer agreed to acquire, through its wholly-owned subsidiary
Pilsner Acquisition Sub Corp., 100 percent of the issued and outstanding
shares of Pharmacia ("Acquisition"). Pfizer intends to pay consideration
such that each issued and outstanding share of Pharmacia common stock will
be converted into the right to receive 1.4 shares of Pfizer common stock.
The parties estimate the aggregate value of the transaction to be
approximately $60 billion. After the completion of the transaction, Pfizer
will be the surviving corporate entity.
V. THE RELEVANT MARKETS
- 20. For the
purposes of this Complaint, the relevant lines of commerce in which to
analyze the effects of the Acquisition are:
a.
the research and development, and the manufacture and sale, of
extended release prescription drugs for the treatment of OAB;
b. the research, development, manufacture, and
sale of prescription combination HRT;
c. the research and development, and the
manufacture and sale, of prescription drugs for the treatment of ED;
d. the research, development, manufacture, and
sale of prescription drugs for the treatment of canine arthritis;
e. the research, development, manufacture, and
sale of prescription drugs for the treatment of dry cow mastitis;
f. the research, development, manufacture, and
sale of prescription drugs for the treatment of lactating cow mastitis;
g. the manufacture and sale of
over-the-counter hydrocortisone creams and ointments;
h. the manufacture and sale of
over-the-counter motion sickness medication; and
i. the manufacture and sale of over-the
counter cough drops.
21. For the
purposes of this Complaint, the United States is the relevant geographic
area in which to analyze the effects of the Acquisition in the relevant
lines of commerce.
V. THE STRUCTURE
OF THE MARKETS
22. The markets
for the research and development, and for the manufacture and sale, of
extended release prescription drugs for OAB are highly concentrated.
Currently, Pharmacia and Johnson & Johnson are the only companies that
market extended release OAB products in the United States. Pfizer is
currently seeking FDA approval for its own extended release OAB product,
darifenacin. Pfizer is one of only two companies that are well-positioned
to enter this market and compete successfully within the next two years.
23. The market
for the research, development, manufacture, and sale of
prescription combination HRT products is highly concentrated, with a
pre-acquisition Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") of 5906 points. Pfizer
and Pharmacia are two of the three leading suppliers of combination HRT
products in the United States, with their products femhrt and Activella,
respectively. The Acquisition would leave only two significant players in
this market, leaving Pfizer and Wyeth with almost 94% of total
prescriptions. The post-acquisition HHI would be 6066 points, representing
a 160 point increase in the HHI.
24. Pfizer dominates the markets for the
research and development, and for the manufacture and sale, of
prescription drugs for ED. With its well-known product, Viagra, Pfizer
currently occupies a monopoly position in the ED market, with a share of
over 95%. Pharmacia is the only significant potential competitor to Pfizer
for many years with intranasal apomorphine and D2 dopamine receptor
agonist (PNU-142,774) products, each in early clinical development.
25. Pfizer dominates the market for the
research, development, manufacture, and sale of prescription drugs for the
treatment of canine arthritis, with its Rimadyl product that has a 70%
share. There are only two other companies that sell prescription drugs for
the treatment of canine arthritis: Wyeth, with its EtoGesic product that
has a 30% market share; and Novartis, with its Deramaxx product that was
launched in February 2003. However, Novartis markets Deramaxx under a
licensing agreement with Pharmacia, which currently manufactures Deramaxx
and supplies it to Novartis. Thus, after the Acquisition, Pfizer would
control both the leading product in this market, Rimadyl, and the
manufacturing and supply of Deramaxx for its chief competitor.
Furthermore, under the existing licensing agreement between Novartis and
Pharmacia, Pfizer would have access to Novartis's competitively sensitive
information concerning Deramaxx pricing, forecasts, and marketing
strategy.
26. The market for dry cow mastitis drugs is
highly concentrated with a pre-acquisition HHI of 4120 points. There are
only three significant competitors in this market: (1) Pharmacia; (2)
Pfizer; and (3) Wyeth. Pharmacia and Wyeth currently account for 90% of
this market. Pfizer is an important third competitor with a full range of
mastitis products, including Orbenin DC for the treatment of dry cow
mastitis. This acquisition would increase Pfizer's market share to 55%,
and it would increase concentration by 672 points, resulting in a
post-acquisition HHI of 4792 points. The fringe competitors that offer
generic versions of older drugs for dry cow mastitis collectively account
for less than 3% of the market.
27. The market for lactating cow mastitis drugs
is also highly concentrated with a pre-acquisition HHI of 3800 points. As
in the dry cow mastitis market, there are only three significant
competitors in the lactating cow mastitis market: (1) Pharmacia; (2)
Pfizer; and (3) Wyeth. Pharmacia and Wyeth currently account for 85% of
this market. Pfizer is the only other significant competitor with a full
range of mastitis products, including Dariclox and Amoximast for the
treatment of lactating cow mastitis. This acquisition would increase
Pfizer's market share to 50%, and it would increase concentration by 912
points, resulting in a post-acquisition HHI of 4712 points. The fringe
competitors that offer generic versions of older drugs for lactating cow
mastitis collectively account for approximately 3% of the market.
28. Pfizer and Pharmacia are the two leading
U.S. suppliers of branded over-the-counter hydrocortisone creams and
ointments. Pfizer sells Cortizone and Pharmacia sells Cortaid. After the
Acquisition, the combined company would account for 55% of the annual
sales of over-the-counter hydrocortisone creams and ointments in the
United States. The post-acquisition HHI would be 4,469 points,
representing a 1,428 point increase in the HHI. Although over-the-counter
hydrocortisone creams and ointments sold under private label brands also
account for a significant share of the market, those products have limited
influence on the pricing of the over-the-counter hydrocortisone creams and
ointments sold by Pfizer and Pharmacia.
29. The market for the manufacture and sale of
over-the-counter motion sickness medication is highly concentrated. Pfizer
and Pharmacia are the two leading suppliers of over-the-counter motion
sickness medication in the United States, with a combined market share of
approximately 77%. Pfizer sells Bonine and Pharmacia sells Dramamine. The
post-acquisition HHI would be 6,089 points, representing a 2,041 point
increase in the HHI.
30. The market
for the manufacture and sale of over-the-counter cough drops is highly
concentrated as measured by the HHI. Pfizer and Pharmacia are the two
leading suppliers of branded over-the-counter cough drops, and the only
two such firms with more than 5% of the market. Pfizer sells Halls brand
cough drops and Pharmacia sells Ludens. Pfizer and Pharmacia combined
would account for approximately 64% of the market. The post-acquisition
HHI would be 4,775 points, an increase of 1,130 points above the
pre-acquisition HHI.
VI. ENTRY
CONDITIONS
31. Entry into
any of the relevant lines of commerce described in Paragraphs 20(a)
through (f) would not be timely, likely, or sufficient in its magnitude,
character, and scope to deter or counteract the anticompetitive effects of
the Acquisition. Developing and obtaining FDA approval for even the
simplest product takes at least two years and significantly longer for
more complex products. Additionally, patents and other intellectual
property create significant barriers to entry into these markets.
32. Entry into any of the relevant lines of
commerce described in Paragraphs 20(g) through (i) would be unlikely and
not timely to deter or counteract the effects of the Acquisition. Entry
into these markets would require the investment of extremely high sunk
costs, which would be difficult to justify given the limited sales
opportunities in the affected markets. Even if a new entrant were willing
to take on such investments, it would also face the difficult task of
convincing retailers to take limited and valuable shelf space away from
established brands. As a result, new entry into any of these markets
sufficient to achieve a significant market impact within two years is
unlikely.
VII. EFFECTS OF THE ACQUISITION
33.
The effects of the Acquisition, if
consummated, may be to lessen competition and tend to create a monopoly in
the relevant markets in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45, in the following ways, among others:
- a. by
eliminating actual, direct, and substantial competition between Pfizer
and Pharmacia in the market for the research and development of extended
release prescription drugs for the treatment of OAB, thereby reducing
innovation in this market; and by eliminating potential competition
between Pfizer and Pharmacia in the market for the manufacture and sale
of extended release prescription drugs for the treatment of OAB,
thereby: (a) increasing the likelihood that the combined entity would
delay or forego the launch of Pfizer's darifenacin product, and (b)
increasing the likelihood that the combined entity would delay or
eliminate the additional price competition that would have resulted from
Pfizer's entry into the market for extended release OAB products;
b. by eliminating actual, direct, and
substantial competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia, and lessening
competition, in the market for the research, development, manufacture,
and sale of prescription combination HRT products, thereby: (a)
increasing the likelihood of coordinated interaction, and (b) increasing
the likelihood that customers for prescription combination HRT products
would be forced to pay higher prices;
c. by eliminating actual, direct, and
substantial competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia in the market for
the research and development of prescription drugs for the treatment of
ED, thereby reducing innovation in this market; and by eliminating
potential competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia in the market for the
manufacture and sale of prescription drugs for the treatment of ED,
thereby: (a) increasing the likelihood that the combined entity would
delay or forego the launch of Pharmacia's intranasal apomorphine (IN APO)
and D2 dopamine receptor agonist (PNU-142, 774) products, and (b)
increasing the likelihood that the combined entity would delay or
eliminate the additional price competition that would have resulted from
Pharmacia's entry into the market for ED products;
d. by eliminating actual, direct, and
substantial competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia, and lessening
competition, in the market for the research, development, manufacture,
and sale of prescription drugs for the treatment of canine arthritis,
thereby: (a) increasing the likelihood of a unilateral exercise of
market power, (b) increasing the likelihood of coordinated interaction,
(c) increasing the likelihood that customers for prescription drugs for
the treatment of canine arthritis would be forced to pay higher prices,
and (d) reducing innovation in the market;
e. by eliminating actual, direct, and
substantial competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia, and lessening
competition, in the market for the research, development, manufacture,
and sale of prescription drugs for the treatment of dry cow mastitis,
thereby: (a) increasing the likelihood of coordinated interaction, and
(b) increasing the likelihood that customers for prescription drugs for
the treatment of dry cow mastitis would be forced to pay higher prices;
f. by eliminating actual, direct, and
substantial competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia, and lessening
competition, in the market for the research, development, manufacture,
and sale of prescription drugs for the treatment of lactating cow
mastitis, thereby: (a) increasing the likelihood of coordinated
interaction, and (b) increasing the likelihood that customers for
prescription drugs for the treatment of lactating cow mastitis would be
forced to pay higher prices;
g. by eliminating actual, direct, and
substantial competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia, and lessening
competition, in the market for the manufacture and sale of
over-the-counter hydrocortisone creams and ointments, thereby: (a)
increasing the likelihood of a unilateral exercise of market power, and
(b) increasing the likelihood that customers for over-the-counter
hydrocortisone creams and ointments would be forced to pay higher
prices;
h. by eliminating actual, direct, and
substantial competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia, and lessening
competition, in the market for the manufacture and sale of
over-the-counter motion sickness medication, thereby: (a) increasing the
likelihood of a unilateral exercise of market power, and (b) increasing
the likelihood that customers for over-the-counter motion sickness
medication would be forced to pay higher prices; and
i. by eliminating actual, direct, and
substantial competition between Pfizer and Pharmacia, and lessening
competition, in the market for the manufacture and sale of
over-the-counter cough drops, thereby: (a) increasing the likelihood of
a unilateral exercise of market power, and (b) increasing the likelihood
that customers for over-the-counter cough drops would be forced to pay
higher prices.
VIII. VIOLATIONS
CHARGED
34. The Acquisition Agreement described
in Paragraph 19 constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
35. The Acquisition described in
Paragraph 19, if consummated, would constitute a violation of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act,
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
WHEREFORE, THE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
Â鶹´«Ã½ Trade Commission on this eleventh day of April, 2003, issues its
Complaint against said Respondents.
By the Commission.
Donald S. Clark
Secretary
SEAL: |