

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION**

**COMMISSIONERS:**                    **Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman**  
   **Orson Swindle**  
   **Thomas B. Leary**  
   **Pamela Jones Harbour**  
   **Jon Leibowitz**

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**In the Matter of**                    )  
   )  
   )                    **Docket No. C-**  
   )

of Directors (“Board”) consists of four physician members elected by the entire physician membership, and four representatives of the hospital. The Chair and Vice-Chair of the Board are both physicians.

### **THE FTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENT**

3. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Preferred Health has been engaged in the business of contracting with payors, on behalf of Preferred Health’s members, for the provision of health care services to persons for a fee.

4. Except to the extent that competition has been restrained as alleged herein, Preferred Health physician members have been, and are now, in competition with each other for the provision of physician services in the Seneca, South Carolina, area to persons for a fee.

5. Preferred Health was founded in 1996. Its physician members and Oconee Memorial Hospital control Preferred Health. It carries on business for the pecuniary benefit of its physician members. Accordingly, Preferred Health is a corporation within the meaning of

insureds, decide individually whether to enter into payor contracts to provide services to insureds, and what prices they will accept pursuant to such contracts.

10. Competing physicians sometimes use a “messenger” to facilitate their contracting

negotiations with such payors, the Executive Director transmits payor offers to the Board, which then votes on whether to approve a proposed payor contract, including the fee schedule. Only if the Board approves a contract does the Executive Director transmit it to Preferred Health physicians for their acceptance.

15. Preferred Health physician members have agreed with each other and with Preferred Health not to deal individually, or through any organization besides Preferred Health,

19. In April 2003, United asked Preferred Health to transmit to its physician members a contract proposal containing rates ranging from 75% to 185% of 2002 RBRVS. The Preferred Health fee schedule included higher prices for almost all procedures – typically in the range of 10% to 30% higher. Preferred Health responded that it could not transmit the United offer “without a Board vote,” and informed United that “if you want to mail [direct contracts] now, the [Preferred Health member] offices will just call us and we’ll tell them to hold on until [the Board members] meet and vote.” Preferred Health also informed United that if the Preferred Health Board voted not to contract with United, then Preferred Health “would not do any form of negotiation.”

20. The minutes of a May 2003 Preferred Health Board meeting report that Preferred Health was unable to agree with United “on the various methods of reimbursement,” and that “the Board agreed to decline their fee schedule offer and inform [Preferred Health] members to contract directly with United should there be any interest.” Preferred Health did not transmit any United offer to the Preferred Health members.

21. United also has been unable to contract directly with Preferred Health physician members, who refused to deal with United because it would not agree to Preferred Health’s price demands. For example, in July 2003, United approached the largest primary care practice in Seneca with an offer to begin contract negotiations. The physicians refused to negotiate with United, because United “did not agree to take the [Preferred Health] fee schedule.”

### **CONTRACTING WITH CAROLINA CARE PLAN**

22. Carolina Care Plan, Inc. (“Carolina Care”), is a health plan doing business in the Seneca area. Prior to 2000, Carolina Care developed its physician network in the Seneca area through direct contracts with individual physicians. In early 2000, the Preferred Health physician members terminated their Carolina Care contracts and agreed that Preferred Health would negotiate all future payor contracts on their joint behalf.

23. In June 2000, Preferred Health proposed its fee schedule to Carolina Care. Carolina Care counter-proposed its standard price list, which contains the rates that it pays other physicians in South Carolina. These rates – almost all of which were at least 10% to 30% below the Preferred Health fee schedule – were between 100% and 140% of 2000 RBRVS for most procedures and closely matched what Carolina Care was previously paying the Preferred Health members with whom it had direct contracts prior to 2000. By September 2000, the Preferred Health Board rejected Carolina Care’s contract offer and demanded that Carolina Care accept the Preferred Health fee schedule.

24. Shortly thereafter, Carolina Care made another contract proposal to Preferred Health, increasing its proposed payment terms for certain procedures by as much as 42%. In October 2000, the Preferred Health Board instructed the Executive Director to reject this

proposal as well. Ultimately, Carolina Care met Preferred Health's demand in May 2001, and signed a contract containing Preferred Health's fee schedule. Preferred Health never transmitted Carolina Care's various fee proposals to member physicians during the course of negotiations, and never notified members of the Carolina Care contract until after signing it. Carolina Care told Preferred Health that "[the] physician fee schedule is significantly higher than [Carolina Care's] standard" in the rest of South Carolina.

### **CONTRACTING WITH CIGNA**

25. Cigna of South Carolina, Inc. ("Cigna"), is a payor doing business in the Seneca area. In early 2000, Preferred Health physician members who had direct contracts with Cigna terminated those contracts, and informed Cigna that Preferred Health would now jointly handle their contract negotiations. In late 2000, Preferred Health proposed its fee schedule to Cigna, which contained rates that were approximately 5% to 40% higher than the rates that Cigna had been paying under direct contracts with Preferred Health physician members. Confronted with Preferred Health's collective demands, and needing Preferred Health's physician members to assemble a marketable health plan in the Seneca area, Cigna, in March 2001, agreed to Preferred Health's price demands. Preferred Health did not notify physician members of the Cigna contract and fee schedule until after Cigna signed the contract.

### **CONTRACTING WITH OTHER PAYORS**

26. Preferred Health, on behalf of its physician members, has orchestrated collective negotiations with other payors who do business, or attempted to do business, in the Seneca area, including Private Healthcare Systems, Inc., Premier Health Systems, Inc., and Medcost, LLC. Preferred Health negotiated with these payors on price, making proposals and counter-proposals, as well as accepting or rejecting offers, without transmitting them to members for their individual acceptance or rejection. Preferred Health also facilitated collective refusals to deal and threats of refusals to deal with payors. Preferred Health's members collectively accepted or rejected these payor contracts, and refused to deal with these payors individually. Due to Preferred Health's dominant market position in the Seneca area, these coercive tactics have been successful in raising the prices paid to its physician members.

### **RESPONDENT'S PRICE-FIXING IS NOT JUSTIFIED**

27. Respondent's joint negotiation of fees and other competitively significant contract terms has not been, and is not, reasonably related to any efficiency-enhancing integration.

### **RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS HAVE HAD SUBSTANTIAL ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS**

28. Respondent's actions described in Paragraphs 12 through 26 of this Complaint have had, or tend to have had, the effect of restraining trade unreasonably and hindering competition in the provision of physician services in the Seneca area in the following ways, among others:

- a. price and other forms of competition among physician members of Preferred Health were unreasonably restrained;
- b. prices for physician services were increased; and
- c. health plans, employers, and individual consumers were deprived of the benefits of competition among physicians.

**VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT**

29. The combination, conspiracy, acts, and practices described above constitute unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Such combination, conspiracy, acts, and practices, or the effects thereof, are continuing and will continue or recur in the absence of the relief herein requested.

**WHEREFORE, THE PREMISES CONSIDERED,** the Federal Trade Commission on this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2005, issues its Complaint against Respondent Preferred Health.

By the Commission.

Donald S. Clark  
Secretary

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