PUBLIC

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••				
7			۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰	
<u> </u>				
	•			
			1	
			L	
N			~	
	Do	 cket No. 9302	ELERAL TRADE COMMISSION RECEIVED DOCUMENTS 226257 SEP 1 5 2006	
	In	the Matter of	SEP 1-5 2000 525149 SECRETARY	

RAMBUS INC.,

A CORPORATION

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF JEDEC SOLID STATE TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT COUNSEL

Daniel I. Prywes BRYAN CAVE LLP 700 Thirteenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005-3960

TABLE OF CONTENTS

,

ì

ł

5

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	'i .
A	
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE	1
ARGUMENT	
ARGUMENT	
ARGUMENT	

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

j ererene.	Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1977).	11
-		
	In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996) Ecko Products Co.,	
	A	
	1965)	б

This *amicus curiae* brief is submitted by the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association ("JEDEC"), in support of Complaint Counsel's brief addressing the proper remedy in this proceeding.

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

JEDEC is at the epicenter of this case. The Commission has now found that

Rambus Inc. ("Rambus") breached JEDEC's patent-disclosure policies and practices, and

engaged in conduct that violated the antitrust laws and Section 5 of the Federal Trade

-	Commission Ast - IFDEC's manshamble main a second of Decel_1_1_1_1_1	;
+		
**************************************		_
1		
1 Ja 1.		
r		
-		
Ĩ.		
۲		
		1
P) (1		
ř.		
·) •		
1		
1		1
		_
<u></u>		ť
<u>نا الم</u>		
r	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	-
. <u> </u>	-	
_		
	matitive conduct Dambur church IEDECU: standard estiliar and setting and setting	_
Ŕ.		_

to mislead JEDEC members by fostering the belief that Rambus neither had, nor was seeking, relevant patents that would be enforced against JEDEC-compliant products." (Decision, at 67.)


SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

JEDEC explains in this *amicus* brief why the appropriate remedy for Rambus's "deceptive course of conduct" (Decision, at 66) is an order enjoining Rambus from collecting future royalties on JEDEC-compliant devices that require use of Rambus's patents. Such a remedy would be equivalent to a prospective. industry-wide_royalty-free license.

IEDEC dags not promote qual

in equity. Instead, this remedy is the minimum necessary to restore the competitive outcome that

would have aviated if Dambus had disclosed its nations and nations and listing to the IDDEC.



devices.

)

JEDEC has a strong aversion to the inclusion of royalty-bearing patents in JEDEC

standards. This aversion is expressed in its publications. For example, the 1990 EIA

Engineering Dublication that corrected atom dands issued by IEDEC (then are af ELA? - with)

itan an area area " (ED 7 A TYOOG 4 000)

While IEDEC had no absolute prohibition on adapting standards that required the

	for in abasis in sector dend un boom 11 valourent information about not autoute autoute and the autoute to	
	1 	
,	h-T	
8		
1		
T		
h l		
Ŧ		
·		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
• •		
ŧ		
Ţ		

the one instance when JEDEC members did learn that Rambus had a patent that was likely to cover a different standard under consideration, "the members took deliberate steps to avoid standardizing the Rambus technology." (Decision, at 74.)


			<u>1</u>	<u> </u>	1	Cd. IPPPO	•	~	
ì	<u> </u>								
<u>i</u>									
	• •								
	ă								
	Microsystem	ns – "would have st	rongly or	mosed the use	ofroval	ty bearing elem	ents" for t	this type	
	wheresystem		liongry of	posed the use	orioyai	ty-bearing cien.		uns type	
	of device. (I	Decision. at 75.) T	his findin	g is especially	imnorta	nt_hecause_IED	EC seeks	as broad	
_									
_									
		-							
									
	a consensus a	as possible in selec	ting stand	lards.					

The Commission also found that JEDEC's adoption of patent-laden standards was

rare: "Payment of rovalties on memory interfaces has been very much the excention, rather than.

posed any risk of future royalty demands. As the Commission found: "JEDEC members – the principal buyers of the relevant technologies – gave these alternatives serious, searching consideration; in fact, the technologies as to which Rambus subsequently revealed patent claims sometimes were chosen only after prolonged debate." (Decision, at 76.) If the Rambus technology was barely selected as a standard when JEDEC believed that it was royalty-free, there is no reason to believe that the JEDEC committee – which the Commission found was

"highly consistive to east" (Desision at 74) ______Id have calculated the Developed to the 1- -- : f :



had known that the Rambus technology would be encumbered by royalties.

Taken together, these findings show, by a substantial preponderance of the

evidence, that JEDEC would not have adopted Rambus's technology into a JEDEC standard if

Rambus had disclosed its patent rights.

III. <u>ANY UNCERTAINTY ABOUT JEDEC'S RESPONSE TO THE</u> <u>HYPOTHETICAL DISCLOSURE BY RAMBUS OF ITS PATENTS MUST BE</u> <u>BORNE BY RAMBUS</u>

After reviewing Rambus's expert witnesses' testimony which it found "fraught

patented technology if RAND assurances were given, JEDEC and its committees did not themselves engage in *ex ante* royalty negotiations about the level of a "reasonable" royalty.⁵ (*See* John Kelly Trial Tr. 1882-83, 2072-74.) In those instances where a JEDEC committee learned of a patent covering a proposed standard (*see* Decision, at 57-59), there is no evidence

hat the committee coursed a DAND commitment to a marife constituents

Second, while the JEDEC committee was extremely sensitive to costs, it did not have expert economists available to attempt to compute minute differences in the costs of different alternatives. JEDEC committee members had to vote "up" or "down" on alternatives based on their own assessments, taking into account JEDEC's preference for avoiding the use of patents in JEDEC standards.

Third, as noted above, some key JEDEC members (such as Sun Microsystems)

	This principle applies here because the Commission has already concluded that
	damage to the industry and to the public has occurred as a result of Rambus's nati competitive
Ш.	
*	
. t	
1	
	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	
••• [•]	
	conduct and deception. According to the Commission, there is "[s]ubstantial record evidence"
	y k wa maana a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a
<u> </u>	/
}	
<u>د</u> .	
-8	
- \	
<u>.</u>	
F ,	
F ¥+	
111 - U	
¥ L	
<u>}</u>	
1	
_ <u></u>	
· · · ·	
،	
/	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

a the Commission has already o ringinle nling have had abudad th TL

	patents to a standard-setting group. As in this case, ⁶ the Commission found that "had [the
	standards group] known of the [undisclosed] patent, it could have chosen an equally effective,
	non-proprietary standard." 121 F.T.C. at 624 n. 2. The Commission enjoined the patentee from
	enforcing its patent, which equates in practice to a zero royalty rate. This choice of remedy was
	not an afforthought since the Commission stated that its remade use "search lie since with 1 "
	not prostorthought areas the l'areas are stated that the new advance Weenstelles ensure and a 27
I	
L	
<u>.</u>	
B15	
<u> </u>	
·	
• • •	
	121 F.T.C. at 624. The Commission felt no need to guess what the formulating committee would
	have done if the respondent had made a full and timely disclosure of its patents and applications
- 	to the standard-setting group. In Dell Computer, the Commission also noted that its remedy "is

typical case, where the Commission is concerned about competition in a product market, do not apply here.

V. <u>A ZERO ROYALTY RATE IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE</u> <u>COMMISSION'S REMEDIAL PRINCIPLES</u>


A zero-royalty order will be consistent with the principle of proportionality. As

Commissionan (than Destance) Variation marries and "Indessed in the -----

<u>»</u>	
'n	
-	
ا	
)	
ţ	
	_
1	·
ţ	
*	-
~	
_	
	the sense that they reflect the dangers of the conduct by which a firm has achieved or sustained a
<i>[</i>]	popition of dominance" W. Variaia Designing Anticured Demodies for Deminant Firm
۲ų.	
Ê	·
	[
I	

The following words of Commissioner Kovacic are particularly apt here: "Using

powerful remedies in these circumstances provides greater protection against repetition of clearly



suppressing means, and <u>deters</u> efforts by other firms to employ similar tactics." 31 Conn. L. Rev. at 1313 (emphasis added).

As a standard-setting organization, JEDEC is particularly concerned with these three goals: (a) avoiding a repetition of Rambus-like conduct at JEDEC; (b) dismantling the monopoly power obtained by Rambus through its deception in JEDEC's own meetings, which has already allowed Rambus to collect unreasonably high royalties for many years; and (c)

licensing remedies.	Because such an	order in this ca	ase would not seek to	create structural

	abanaas amana aamnatitans fan mamamu davisa taabnalaan an meduate thans is no nood fan tha	
2		
7		
i , <u></u>		
'n		
<u>ال</u>		
ě.		
. <u>*</u>		
د.,		
 * 		
		4
	Commission to regulate matters such as the amount of "know-how" to be transferred whether	
<u></u>		
<u></u>		
^ 		4
2		1

annal should also ha transformed or other 21 Con Ŧ D 1705 1205 TL achanias

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission should itself determine, on the

	- 1 1.1		
		• 	
	منو ۲۰۰		
	a r		
(· · · · · ·		
,1			
، ار عاج مله ک			
	·		
- Fr			
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
-		1	
r	royalties on its patents for JEDEC-co	ompliant memory devices.	
		Respectfully submitted,	
		XIX	
		Daniel I. Prywes	
		BRYAN CÁVE LLP 700 Thirteenth Street, N.W.	
r f 👾		$\frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}$	

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

í

×

ź ţ

[hereby certify that on Sentember 15, 2006. I caused two conies of the Amicus ×. The second second ş 1 H Ì.