1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	WILLARD K. TOM General Counsel  DAVID M. NEWMAN (Calif. Bar #54218) ERIC D. EDMONDSON Federal Trade Commission 901 Market Street, Suite 570 San Francisco, CA 94103 P: 415-848-5100/F: 415-848-5184 dnewman@ftc.gov; eedmondson@ftc.gov  RAYMOND E. MCKOWN (Calif. Bar #1509 Federal Trade Commission 10877 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90024 P: (310) 824-4343 F: (310) 824-4380 rmckown@ftc.gov  Attorneys for Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission  UNITED STATES DISCENTRAL DISTRICT CENTRAL DI	STRICT COURT
13 14 15 16 17 18	FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. COMMERCE PLANET, INC., et al, Defendants.	Case No.  SACV-09-01324 CJC (RNBx)  Opposition to Defendant Charles Gugliuzza's Motion to Dismiss
19 20 21		
22		
23		
24		
<ul><li>25</li><li>26</li></ul>		
27		
- '		

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Background 1

II. The S

1	FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 38/ U.S. 244 (1967)	10
2	Fullmer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105999 (E.D. Cal. 2009)	5
3	Hovsepian v. Apple, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117562 (N.D. Cal. 2009)	5
4	Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1991)	9
5	Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001)	8
6 7	Moog Industries v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1957)	10
8	Newcal Indus., Inc., v. Ikon Office Solutions, 513 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)	2
9	North Star Int'l v. Arizona Corp. Commission, 720 F.2d 578 (9 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983)	5
	Peck v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371 (8 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981)	5
10	United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2003)	8
11 12	Statutes and Dules	
13	<b>Statutes and Rules</b> 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) 1, 3, 4	4 <b>7</b> 0
14		1, 5
	Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)	ŕ
15	Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6)	1, 7
16	Fed. R. Evid. 201	8
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27 28		
/.X		

FTC's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss

## Twombly.

Defendant's motion correctly states that "an individual may be subject to
injunctive relief for the corporate defendants' violations of the FTC act if the FTC
can prove that the individual participated directly in the acts or practices in
question or had the authority to control them." See e.g., FTC v. Stefanchik, 559
F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2009); and FTC v. Publishing Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d
1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting FTC v. American Standard Credit Systems,
Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ("[t]here is no dispute that Martin
is the president of PCH. As an officer, Martin 'may be held individually liable for
injunctive relief under the [Federal Trade Commission Act] for corporate practices
if the FTC can prove (1) that the corporation committed misrepresentations or
omissions of a kind usually relied on by a reasonably prudent person, resulting in efean Tig 3.8400 0.0000 TD(eari)Tj22.3200 0.0000 TD(n consumer injury, and (2) that [Martin]j20.5200TD(n)Tj6.9600 0.0000000 TD/F11 12.20.00 rg I

23/ \$.6000 00.00 0.00 0.00 rgv6.8400 0.0000 TD(1)Tjo.6400 470.2800 TD0.4200 a6400 447.4800 TD

- (4) consumers could and in many cases did complete a transaction with defendants without ever seeing the information that would have told them that they were signing up for a negative option continuity plan (Complaint ¶ 18);
- (5) consumers did not understand that they had been enrolled in a negative option continuity plan and would be billed monthly for services by defendants, whether consumers used those services or not (Complaint ¶ 18);
- (6) in many cases, consumers did not become aware that they had been enrolled in a negative option continuity plan until they received a credit card bill with a charge for the plan from defendants (Complaint ¶ 19);
- (7) by placing material information about the transaction in locations on their websites that consumers were not required to visit to complete the transaction, defendants failed to disclose material facts about the transaction (Complaint ¶ 22);
- (8) because defendants failed to disclose that consumers were enrolling in a negative option continuity plan that involved the payment of monthly charges, defendants' assessment of those monthly charges was made without obtaining the express, informed consent of the consumers (Complaint ¶ 25);
- (9) defendant Gugliuzza was the president of Commerce Planet (Complaint ¶ 12);
- (10) defendant Gugliuzza participated in and had the authority to control the acts and practices of Commerce Planet (Complaint ¶ 12); and
- (11) defendant Gugliuzza knew or should have known that the practices alleged in the complaint were unfair or deceptive (Complaint ¶ 12).

The complaint alleges a plausible claim against defendant Gugliuzza for his alleged violations of the FTC Act. The complaint describes in detail how the defendants deceived consumers on defendants' websites by 000 TD(um)Tj17.6400 0.0000 TD(expression of the FTC Act.)

does not automatically exonerate deceptive activities.") Sæ also FTC v. Grant Connect, LLC at \*24-25 (FTC is likely to prevail in showing that websites with terms and conditions "included in smaller, more compact type beneath the 'submit' button" are not clear and conspicuous and therefore violate the FTC Act.) The fact that other online retailers use terms and conditions pages is irrelevant<sup>4</sup> to the FTC's allegation and, in any event, is an evidentiary argument inappropriate for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Defendant's further assertion that the complaint's unfairness count must fail because Commerce Planet supposedly received express, informed consent to charge consumers' credit cards is a purely factual contention. If, as the complaint charges, consumers were unaware that they had been enrolled in defendants' continuity plan (Complaint ¶ 18), then they cannot be said to have given express, informed consent to their card being charged on a monthly basis. Thus, defendants' assessing monthly charges against their credit cards would have been without the consumers' express, informed consent and would be an unfair practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act. (Complaint ¶¶ 24-26). Defendant cites complaint language that consumers "authorized their credit cards to be charged" (Complaint ¶ 15) out of context to argue that the complaint contradicts itself. (Motion to Dismiss at 12). But the complaint language that defendant cites describes the process whereby consumers requested to receive defendants' free online auction kit (Complaint ¶¶ 14-18), not to agree to the membership continuity plan. Whether consumers were deceived by defendants' concealment of the actual terms of the transaction, and, therefore, had not given express, informed consent to charge their credit cards is a fact question that will be resolved through discovery and litigation.

Finally, defendant Gugliuzza argues that he is no longer affiliated with

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

We argue below that the Court should reject defendant's request to take judicial notice of Exhibits B-E because they are irrelevant.

Commerce Planet and, therefore, that injunctive relief is inappropriate. (Motion to Dismiss, Sect. II. E) Injunctive relief is appropriate where there is a cognizable danger of recurrent violations. FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1237 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999). That a defendant has no further relationship to the entity he was involved with when the violations occurred is perhaps a fact to be considered, but it is far from dispositive, and courts will look to see whether "subsequent events [have] made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior cannot reasonably be expected to recur." Id. at 1238. Again, these are factual matters that are not appropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss; taking the facts alleged as true, the Commission has stated a cause of action to hold defendant Gugliuzza liable for injunctive relief.

## V. The exhibits that defendant requests the court to take judicial notice of are not proper subjects for judicial notice under FRE 201(b).

Defendant's request to take judicial notice of three of Commerce Planet's SEC filings and several corporate websites should be denied because they do not meet the criteria for judicial notice under Fed. R. Evid 201: that a fact be "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court," Fed. Rule Evid. 201 (b)(1), or that it be "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned." Fed. Rule Evid. 201(b)(2).

Exhibit A consists of Commerce Planet's 2006 Form 10-K, its September 30, 2007, Form 10-Q, and its October 23, 2007, Form 8-K, and is offered to establish facts recited in those documents. (SeeMotion to Dismiss fn. 3 & 4) In Leev. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689-90 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit distinguished between judicial notice of the fact that a public record document contained a statement and judicial notice of the truth of such a statement, where the facts recited in the public document are subject to dispute. United Satesv. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908-09 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003) similarly rejects taking judicial

notice of public documents where adjudicative facts did not meet the criteria of Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1) or (2). See dso Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (court may take judicial notice of SEC filings for purpose of determining what statement the documents contain, not to prove the truth of the documents' contents); Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991) (approving judicial notice of SEC filings in securities fraud case because documents "are the very documents that are alleged to contain the various misrepresentations or omissions and are relevant not to prove the truth of their contents but only to determine what the documents stated"). Because defendant Gugliuzza seeks to use Exhibit A to show the actual scope of his involvement with Commerce Planet and the actual relationship between Commerca Planet and the actual relationship between Commerca Planet and this Circuit and others have rejected as inappropriate for judicial notice.

Exhibits B through F are selected pages from the websites of other companies, offered to demonstrate that Commerce Planet's use of a link to a terms and conditions page is not unusual in the online marketing world. Judicial notice as to these documents should be rejected because the documents are irrelevant to any issue raised by the complaint. Defendant misconstrues the complaint by suggesting that the FTC is alleging that the use of a terms and conditionand diantehei T is 4000 to 400.

1 2

Even if defendant could show that Borders, Amazon, or other companies were engaged in deceptive conduct, "everybody else is doing it" is not a defense to an FTC enforcement action. FTC v. Accusearth, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74905 at 27-28 (rejecting "everyone else is doing it" defense because FTC's decision to prosecute a particular case is simply "Commission's exercise of discretion and judgment in the allocation of agency time and resources"); see \$50 FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 249-250 (1967) (holding that even if an entire industry was engaged in an illegal course of conduct, the Commission had the authority to proceed against only one member of the industry); Moog Industries v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1957) ("whether all firms in the industry shoul

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on February 1, 2010, I electronically filed the Opposition to Defendant Charles Gugliuzza's Motion to Dismiss with the Clerk of the United States Court for the Central District of California, using the Court's CM/ECF system. The CM/ECF system will send an email notification of the foregoing filing to the following parties and counsel of record who are registered with the Court's CM/ECF syste,:

Michael A. Piazza Wayne R. Gross Donnald A. Bunnin Greenberg Traurig, LLP 3161 Michelson Drive, Suite 1000 Irvine, CA 92612

Attorneys for Defendant Charles Gugliuzza

In accordance with the electronic filing procedures of this Court, service has been effected on the aforesaid party, whose counsel of record is a registered user of CM/ECF, via