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INTRODUCTION

On October 28, 2010, the Federal Trade Commission sued Wellness Support Network, Inc., and two of its officers for deceptively advertising their "WSN Diabetic Pack" and "WSN Insulin Resistance Pack" dietary supplement products. As illustrated in the Federal Trade Commission's complaint and exhibits, the defendants use dramatic consumer testimonials, references to "studies" and "clinical trials," references to the Nobel Prize, and descriptions of the products' "breakthrough" benefits to market these products to persons suffering from very serious diseases – diabetes and insulin resistance. Among other things, the complaint alleges that defendants claim that their products effectively treat and prevent diabetes, and reverse insulin resistance. The Federal Trade Commission has charged that these claims, among others, are false or were not substantiated at the time they were made, and therefore violate the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Wellness Support Network, Inc. ("WS

FACTS AND OVERVIEW OF FTC LAW

The FTC's complaint alleges that since 2004 defendants have engaged in unlawful conduct in violation of Sections 5(a) and 12 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) and 52, in connection with the advertisement and sale of two dietary

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to control the deceptive practices. *FTC v. Publ'g Clearing House, Inc.*, 104 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1997). The complaint alleges that Robert and Robyn Held personally participated in the false or unsubstantiated advertising of products for WSN. While such actual participation would alone be sufficient for injunctive relief, the complaint also alleges that the Helds had the authority to control the deceptive practices of the corporation by virtue of their roles in a closely-held company. An individual's status as a corporate officer and authority to sign documents on behalf of the corporate defendant can be sufficient to demonstrate the requisite control. *Publ'g Clearing House*, 104 F.3d at 1170-71. "Authority to control the company can be evidenced by active involvement in business affairs and the making of corporate policy, including assuming the duties of a corporate officer." *FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc.*, 875 F.2d 564, 573 (7th Cir. 1989).

The complaint also seeks such relief as the Court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers. WSN is liable for consumer restitution if the FTC can prove it violated the FTC Act. To obtain such relief from an individual for

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627 (9th Cir. 1997)). If liability for corporate fraud is alleged against individual defendants, "the allegations should include the misrepresentations themselves with particularity and, where possible, the roles of the individual defendants in the misrepresentations." *See id.* at *4-5 (quoting *Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc.*, 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989)); *see also Swartz v. KPMG LLP*, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to provide "an account of the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations."). As described below, the complaint amply meets these standards.

a. The complaint satisfies the pleading standards of Rule 9(b) with respect to the corporate defendant and its misrepresentations.

In Benning, the Court held that the FTC's original complaint "effectively establish[ed] the 'who, what, where and how' contemplated by Rule 9(b)," and thereby met the pleading standards under Rule 9(b) for a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act by the corporate defendants. Benning, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64030 at *13. The same is true here as to WSN. For example, for the "where" of the deception, the complaint quotes from, and attaches, specific web pages WSN used to disseminate its false or unsubstantiated claims. See Complaint (Dkt. #1), ¶¶ 20-21. The complaint also alleges that WSN advertised, marketed, distributed, or sold its products throughout the United States. *Id.* at ¶ 6. As for "how" the claims were made, the complaint provides quotes from WSN's web pages, including consumer testimonials (e.g., "I don't take insulin anymore!" Id. at ¶ 20, quoting Exhibit B); repeated references to the Nobel Prize (Complaint at ¶¶20-21, see also Exhibit A, pp. 1, 2, and 3; Exhibit B, pp. 2 and 3; and Exhibit C, pp. 1, 2, and 3); terms such as "breakthrough" (*Complaint* at \P 20-21, Exhibit A, p.1, Exhibit B, p. 1, Exhibit C, p. 1); and references to "studies" and "clinical trials" (Complaint at ¶ ¶ 20-21; Exhibit A, pp. 1, 2, 3, and 7; Exhibit B, pp. 1, 3, and 8; Exhibit C, pp. 1, 3, and 7). The complaint addresses the "what" Page 7 of 20 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS 3:10-CV-04879 JCS

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in a thorough explanation of the two dietary supplements at issue here. See id. at ¶ 10-19. For the "who," the complaint describes both the corporate and individual defendants, id. at \P ¶ 6-8, 10, 16, and alleges that defendants "created, prepared, disseminated, or caused to be disseminated advertisements and other marketing materials" such as Exhibits A-C. *Id.* at ¶¶ 20-21. The complaint also lays out the claims that arise from defendants' ads, and states that those claims are false or unsubstantiated. *Id.* at $\P \P 24-27$. In addition, the complaint identifies when the various misrepresentations occurred. Id. at \P 10, 16, 20, and 21.

These allegations demonstrate that the complaint satisfies the requirements of Rule 9(b) with respect to the false or unsubstantiated claims themselves and the corporate defendant's role in making them. Defendants' arguments to the contrary are without merit. They cite no authority whatsoever for their five-part test for sufficiency under Rule 9(b) proffered in their *Motion* to Dismiss, see supra p. 6, nor is there any. By identifying many of the specific advertisements and representations in those advertisements, and by elucidating the claims that the FTC charges as false or unsubstantiated, the complaint has provided defendants with a detailed road map of their FTC Act violations.

Defendants claim to be "in the dark" about a number of points, such as the FTC's standards for evaluating whether a claim is false, and the level of substantiation required for a claim. Motion to Dismiss, n.1 and accompanying text. These are questions of law; Rule 9's requirements, if they apply at all here, relate to the pleading of facts with particularity. The legal standards relating to the proof required for each element of the FTC's action need not be pled because they may be readily found in FTC case law and years of published guidance, some of which the FTC developed specifically for the dietary supplement industry. See, e.g., FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1994) (to prevail on a Section 12 claim, the FTC may show either that "the express or Page 8 of 20 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS 3:10-CV-04879 JCS

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Sept. 16, 2009) (same); *FTC v. Medical Billers Network, Inc.*, 543 F. Supp. 2d 283, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same); *FTC v. Nat'l Testing Servs., LLC*, No. 3:05-0613, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46485, at *4–5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 18, 2005) (same); *FTC v. Skybiz.com, Inc.*, No. 01-CV-396-K(E), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26314, at *11 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 2, 2001) (same); *FTC v. Communidyne, Inc.*, No. 93 C 6043, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18708, at *3–5, 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,439 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1993) (same); *cf. FTC v. Benning,* 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64030, *12-*13, 2010-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 77,081 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (stating in dicta that Rule 9(b) particularity requirements may apply only to elements of Section 5 claim that "mirror a claim of fraud" and do not extend to "elements of knowledge and authority to control.").²

In examining this issue, courts have highlighted how a cause of action for deception under the FTC Act differs from that of fraud. As set forth above, to establish a Section 5 violation, the FTC need show only that a defendant engaged in a representation or omission that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances and that the representation or omission is material. *Pantron I*, 33 F.3d at 1095. By contrast, the traditional elements of fraud include "a false representation; in reference to a material fact; made with knowledge of its falsity; with the intent to deceive; and on which an action is taken in justifiable reliance upon the representation." 37 AM JUR 2D FRAUD AND DECEIT § 23 (2010). In some fraud cases, plaintiffs also are required to show "resulting damage or injury proximately resulting from the representation and action." *Id*.

² At least one court in this Circuit has unambiguously applied Rule 9(b) in an FTC case, however: See *FTC v. Lights of America, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137088, *13-*14 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding Rule 9(b) applies in FTC actions because FTC Act claims are analogous to negligent misrepresentation). This case is not controlling in this District, however, and goes against the weight of the aforementioned authorities.

required); FTC v. SlimAmerica, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (proof of actual reliance by each individual consumer is not required).

In sum, allegations of deception under the FTC Act are not claims of fraud. For this reason, many courts have held that Rule 9(b) does not apply to a cause of action brought under the FTC Act under a deception theory. For the same reason, this Court should deny th

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unlawfully.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a matter left to the reviewing court's "judicial experience and common sense." *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.

In their motion to dismiss, the defendants argue that the FTC's complaint has not made a plausible claim against them on the facts alleged. They are wrong; the complaint satisfies the *Iqbal* and *Twombly* standards. The Commission properly alleges the following facts, among others, which must be accepted as true: (1) the defendants marketed and advertised Diabetic Pack and Insulin Resistance Pack, including via websites illustrated by Exhibits A, B, and C to the complaint, (2) defendants' advertising contained representations about Diabetic Pack and Insulin Resistance Pack which were false or were not substantiated at the time they were made; (3) individual defendants Robert and Robyn Held participated in the advertising and marketing of WSN's products; (4) Robert Held was the President and an owner of the corporate defendant, WSN; (5) Robyn Held was an officer of WSN; (6) WSN was a closely held corporation; and (7) the Helds, alone or with others, formulated, directed, controlled, had the authority to control, or participated in the acts and practices of the corporate defendant, including the acts and practices set forth in the complaint.

Accepting the above facts as true, the FTC has stated two claims for relief under the FTC Act that are more than merely plausible. In Count I, the FTC alleges that defendants' marketing and advertising, including but not limited to websites containing the pages attached to the complaint as Exhibits A–B, make representations about the Diabetic Pack product which were false or were not substantiated at the time they were made. Similarly, in Count II, the FTC alleges that defendants' marketing and advertising, including but not limited to websites Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 3:10-cv-04879 JCS

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containing the pages attached to the complaint as Exhibit C, contain representations about the Insulin Resistance Pack product which were also false or were not substantiated at the time they were made.

The complaint contains sufficient factual content to allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that defendants have acted unlawfully. The complaint states that defendants' claims are false or were not substantiated at the time they were made. There is robust caselaw and detailed published guidance noting that false or unsubstantiated claims constitute deceptive acts or practices which violate the FTC Act. See, e.g., FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Where the advertisers lack adequate substantiation evidence, they necessarily lack any reasonable basis for their claims. . . . And where the advertisers so lack a reasonable basis, their ads are deceptive as a matter of law."); Thompson Med. Co. v. FTC

detailing how the defendants made false or unsubstantiated claims about the

dietary supplements on their publicly available websites, the complaint alleges

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that the Helds participated in the advertising and marketing of those dietary supplements. The complaint also alleges that Robert Held was the president and an owner of WSN, a closely held corporation, and Robyn Held was a WSN officer. They thus not only participated in the unlawful activity but had the authority to control the corporation's violations. If true, such facts are sufficient to find the individual defendants liable for injunctive relief under the FTC Act. See Publ'g Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1170. They also are sufficient to imply that the individual defendants had the requisite participation and "knowledge," as described above, for them to each be liable for monetary relief under Section 5. *Id*. In short, the complaint's factual allegations meet the standards of

Rule 8(a) by providing defendants with all the information they need to understand and prepare to defend this lawsuit. In addition, the complaint meets the "plausibility" requirements of *Iqbal* and *Twombly*. When examined through the lens of the court's own "judicial experience and common sense," which Twombly encourages the court to use, the facts in the complaint allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendants have acted unlawfully. Taken as true, the facts in the complaint accomplish the following: they illustrate in detail the dramatic health claims defendants have used to sell their diabetes and insulin resistance products; they mark those advertising claims out as false or unsubstantiated at the time they were made; they describe the role the individual defendants played in the broadcasting of those claims; and they describe the positions the individuals held in the closely-held business that made the claims at issue. Because false or unsubstantiated advertising claims are unlawful under the FTC Act, these facts support the legal conclusion that both the corporate and individual defendants have violated the FTC Act and can be

held liable for both injunctive and monetary relief.

4. CONCLUSION

The Federal Trade Commission's complaint in this matter fully complies with Rule 8(a) and 9(b) – assuming Rule 9(b) even applies here. For these reasons, the FTC respectfully requests that the Court deny defendants' motion to dismiss.

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Respectfully submitted,

WILLARD K. TOM General Counsel

/s/ Kenneth H. Abbe

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Attorneys for Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on January 14, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of the attached OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT via the electronic filing system for the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of California, and via electronic mail to: