UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS: Jon Leibowitz, Chairman
William E. Kovacic
J. Thomas Rosch
Edith Ramirez
Julie Brill

In the Matter of

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOAR

the Commission, pursuant to Commission Rules 3.22(a), 3.42(g), and 4.17 (16 C.F.R. §§ 3.22(a), 3.42(g), 4.17), to "disqualify and remove itself as the adjudicator of the State Board's Motion to Dismiss, and Complaint Counsel's Motion for Partial Summary Decision." See Respondent's

supervision] prong of the Midcal test." Bd. Mot. at 1-2. On January 27, 2011, Complaint Counsel filed a brief in opposition to the Board's motion. Having considered all arguments in support of, and opposition to, the Motion, we deny the Board's Motion to Disqualify the Commission for the reasons explained below.

---

1 The Commission approved this Opinion on February 16, 2011, with Commissioner Brill not participating by reason of recusal.

2 Respondent also moves the Commission "to disqualify and remove itself as the

instant matter. See Bd. Mot. at 2.

[3] Although crafted by Respondent as an argument to disqualify, lack of jurisdiction is not
urg

3

jaf

3

Tj ET 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 0.0000 0.0000 cm 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 1.0000 0

33 tepoweaf umer

federalist form of government, see FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992) (the state action doctrine "was grounded in principles of federalism") – determining whether a party enjoys state action protection does not call for a tribunal to decide constitutional questions. See S. C. Bd., 455 F.3d at 444. ("Simply put, Parker construed a statute. It did not identify or articulate a constitutional or common law 'right not to be tried.'"); Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 171 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Parker 'immunity' is more accurately a strict standard for locating the reach of the Sherman Act . . . .").
Thus, the predicate for the Board's argument fails because the Commission's determination that the Board does not enjoy state action protection for its challenged conduct touches on neither jurisdictional nor constitutional questions. See SJ Opinion at 6-17.

Even if the Commission's consideration of the Board's state action exemption from the antitrust laws were properly characterized as a jurisdictional determination, the law is clear that the Commission may decide such questions in the first instance. See FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 647 (1972) (as a general rule, an agency should make the initial determination of its own jurisdiction); see also Christensen v. FTC, 549 F.2d 1321, 1324 (9th Cir. 1977); FTC v. Ernstthal, 607 F.2d 488, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In Christensen, for example, the court embraced this principle and held, for reasons of judicial economy and agency efficiency, that the Commission, rather than a federal court, was to determine the state action question in the first instance:

> If no cease-and-desist order is entered, the courts need never concern themselves with the jurisdictional issue. The same is true if the proceeding becomes moot because of voluntary conduct or the passage of time. Also of importance is the avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative process. Such interruptions undermine both the efficiency and the autonomy of the agency.

549 F.2d at 1324 (internal quotations and citation omitted).[5] Other circuits have reached the same conclusion, finding that the FTC, rather than a federal court, should determine state action exemption issues initially. See FTC v. Markin, 532 F.2d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 1976); FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1097-98 (7th Cir. 1976); cf. S.C. Bd., 455 F.3d 436 (holding that a state action determination by the Commission is not immediately appealable).

Our conclusion, moreover, would not change if the state action question were characterized as a constitutional one. It is true that the Supreme Court has said that "adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought 0.0000 0.0000 cr

---

[5] Exceptions to the presumption that an agency has the authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction "are justified only when it appears early and plainly that the agency is operating outside the scope of its authority." Christensen, 549 F.2d at 1324. See, e.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) (allowing immediate appeal of a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision to certify a collective bargaining unit that contained professional and non-professional employees without a poll when Congress had specifically withheld from the NLRB such power). No such circumstance exists here.

200, 215 (1994); see also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974). But the Court also has explained that "[t]his rule is not mandatory," and that it may be "of less consequence" when "petitioner's statutory and constitutional claims . . . can be meaningfully addressed in the Court of Appeals." Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215. That any Commission decision on a claim of state action exemption is fully reviewable by a Court of Appeals, South Carolina Bd., 455 F.3d at 445, militates allowing the FTC to consider it initially even if such a claim were properly characterized as a constitutional one.

In summary, we reject the Board's arguments that the Commission lacks the authority to determine whether the Board is exempt from the Federal Trade Commission Act under the state action doctrine.

II. Prejudgment

FTC Rule 4.17 provides that a party may move to disqualify a Commissioner from a proceeding. 16 C.F.R. § 4.17 (b). The standard for disqualification based on prejudgment is an exacting one. See Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., Dkt. No. 9324, 2008 WL 4153583, at *2 (Sept. 5, 2008). A party moving for disqualification must show that "a disinterested observer may conclude that [the agency] has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance of hearing it." Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc.. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The moving party must demonstrate that the minds of the Commission members "are irrevocably closed" with regard to the legality of the conduct at issue in the adjudication. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948). In this case, the Board points to four alleged sources of prejudgment: the 2003 Report of the State Action Task Force ("State Action Report"); a 2010 speech by Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch; the FTC's decision to issue an administrative complaint against the Board; and the FTC's press release concerning that decision. As we explain below, none of these examples evidences prejudgment.

We note at the outset that the Board's motion is not timely. Rule 4.17 requires a party to bring a motion to disqualify "at the earliest practicable time after the participant learns, or could reasonably have learned, of the alleged grounds for disqualification." 16 C.F.R. § 4.17 (b)(2). The Board's alleged grounds for disqualification consist of the State Action Report, which the Board has been aware of at least since preparing its response to the administrative complaint, which the Board filed on July 7, 2010 (see Bd. Response to Compl at 8 (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9343/100707dentalexamcmpt.pdf), over six months prior to the Board's instant filing; a speech made by Commissioner Rosch on August 5, 2010, over five months prior to the Board's instant filing; the legal standard the Commission employed to issue the administrative complaint; and a press release accompanying the administrative complaint, which was issued on June 17, 2010, seven months prior to the Board's instant filing. The Board either had actual knowledge, or reasonably should have had knowledge of these grounds well before the instant filing on January 14, 2011. Whether on timeliness grounds, however, or on the merits of the Board's arguments, we reach the same conclusion to deny the motion.

A. Report of the State Action Task Force

The Board contends that certain statements in the State Action Report are indicative of "bias and prejudgment." Bd. Mot. at 7. Specifically, the Board points to the Report's call for the FTC to engage in litigation as a means to clarify the state action doctrine, and its observation that the doctrine is "a serious impediment to achieving national competition policy goals." Bd. Mot. at 5-6 & n.3. We disagree with the Board's contentions.

First, the State Action Report is a report by members of the staff of the FTC. Though the Commission voted to release it publicly, the State Action Report is not a statement by the Commission or any individual Commissioner. See State Action Report at 1. Further, even if the content of the State Action Report were properly attributable to the Commission, it would not support a finding of prejudgment. The courts have been clear that members of regulatory commissions can form views about laws and policy on the basis of their experience. See Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683; American Med. Ass'n

We conclude that Commission authorization of the release of the State Action Report in 2003 does not suggest the Commission has "adjudged the facts as well as the law of [this] particular case," Cinderella, 425 F.2d at 591, and hence does not provide grounds for disqualification.

B. Speech by Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch

The second source alleged by the Board to evidence prejudgment is an August 5, 2010 speech by Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, in which he discusses FTC litigation activity in the recent past, and remarks that the FTC is "suing and litigating as an active prosecutor should." Bd. Mot. at 6 (quoting Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, "So I Serve as Both Prosecutor and Judge – What's the Big Deal?," Am. Bar Ass'n Ann. Meeting at 2 (Aug. 5, 2010)). The Board contends that this statement is "indicative of the bias and prejudgment with which the Commission has approached this present litigation." Id. at 7.

Although courts have found that public remarks given by FTC Commissioners that touch on the facts of specific cases can give rise to an appearance of prejudgment, see, e.g., Cinderella, 425 F.2d at 591, this is not the case here. The Board's asserted link between Commissioner Rosch's remarks and any facet of the instant case does not exist; the speech never mentions the state action doctrine, the complaint issued against the Board, or any legal or factual issues relevant to the instant case. Rather, the speech merely informed the public generally about the Commission's litigation efforts. The law is clear that such general statements about FTC activity are not grounds for disqualification. In American Medical Ass'n, for example, the FTC had sued the AMA for an alleged antitrust violation involving licensing restrictions. The AMA moved to disqualify the Chairman on the basis of a speech that discussed the use of licensing procedures to restrain competition, without any specific mention of the case, and another that mentioned the AMA case as one of many activities undertaken by the FTC in the medical field. Am. Med. Ass'n, 683 F.2d at 448. The Second Circuit held that such statements were not grounds for disqualification, remarking that "[a]t most, the public statements . . . indicate that the chairman was informing the Congress and the public as to FTC's activities and policies in general, including those in the medical field." Id. at 449 (citation omitted). Similarly, Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 80 (10th Cir. 1972), concerned claims that an interview by an FTC Commissioner using the allegations of a complaint against the plaintiff to illustrate how the FTC analyzes mergers evidenced prejudgment. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that merely discussing the complaint in a specific matter, without more, was insufficient to show that the Commissioner had "prejudged the central issue of the case." Id. The connection between Commissioner Rosch's speech and the legal and factual issues in the instant case is nowhere near that between the cases and the public statements at issue in Cinderella or Kennecott.

We can see no way in which Commissioner Rosch's speech could lead a "disinterested observer" to conclude that he had "in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law" in this case. Cinderella, 425 F.2d at 591. Consequently, we reject this ground for disqualifying Commissioner Rosch or the Commission as a whole.

C. The Issuance of the Administrative Complaint

The Board also argues that the Commission's issuance of an administrative complaint against the Board in this matter is evidence of prejudgment. Specifically, the Board points to the Complaint's allegation that the Board "acted without any legitimate justification or defense, including the 'state action' defense." Bd. Mot. at 8-9 (quoting Compl. at 1). The Board maintains that by voting to issue the administrative complaint, the Commission has "reached the legal conclusion that the State Board was subject to, and had violated, the FTC Act." Id. at 9.

As a threshold matter, it has long been decided that an administrative agency can combine investigative and adjudicatory functions. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57 (1975); Gibson v. FTC, 682 F.2d 554, 560 (5th Cir. 1982); Kennecott, 467 F.2d at 79; FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see also 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(C) (prohibition on a person engaged in the investigation functions of a matter from acting as an adjudicator in the same matter does not apply to FTC Commissioners). Thus, any challenge to the fact that FTC Commissioners approve the issuance of an administrative complaint and also act as adjudicators in the same matter fails as a matter of law.

That the Commission found sufficient justification to issue the administrative commission fD (;)