

STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER R. J. THOMAS ROSCH,
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART IN THE
MATTER OF MCWANE, INC. AND STAR PIPE PRODUCTS, LTD.,
AND IN THE MATTER OF SIGMA CORPORATION

FTC File No. 101 0080

January 4, 2012

The Commission has voted separately (1) to issue a Part 3 Administrative Complaint against Respondents McWane, Inc. (“McWane”) and Star Pipe Products, Ltd. (“Star”), and (2) to accept for public comment a Consent Agreement settling similar allegations in a draft Part 2 Complaint against Respondent Sigma Corporation (“Sigma”). While I have voted in favor of both actions, I respectfully object to the inclusion—in both the Part 3 Administrative Complaint and in the draft Part 2 Complaint—of claims against McWane and Sigma, to the extent that such claims are based on allegations of exclusive dealing, as explained in Part I below. I also respectfully object to naming Star, a competitor of McWane and Sigma, as a Respondent in the Part 3 Administrative Complaint, which alleges, *inter alia*, that Star engaged in a horizontal conspiracy to fix the prices of ductile iron pipe fittings (DIPFs) sold in the United States, and in a related, information exchange, as described in Part II below.

I.

related, alleged DIFRA information exchange. ¹ I do not consider naming Star, along with McWane and Sigma, as a co-conspirator to be in the public interest. There are at least three reasons why this is so. First, although there may be reason to believe Star conspired with McWane and Sigma in this oligopolistic industry, Star seems much less culpable than the others. More specifically, I believe that we must be mindful of the consequences of public law enforcement in assessing whether the public interest favors joining Star as a co-conspirator. ² Second, I am concerned that a trier of fact may find it hard to believe that Star could be both a victim of McWane's alleged "threats" to deal exclusively with distributors, and at more or less the same time (the "exclusive dealing" program began in September 2009), a co-conspirator with McWane in a price-fixing conspiracy (June 2008 to February 2009). (This concern further explains why I do not have reason to believe that the exclusive dealing theory is a viable one.) Third, I am concerned that Star's alleged participation in the price-fixing conspiracy and information exchange relies, in part, on treating communications to distributors as actionable signaling on prices or price levels. ³ See, e.g., *Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA*, 346 F.3d 1287, 1305–07 (11th Cir. 2003).

¹ See *McWane/Star Part 3 Administrative Compliance*, ¶¶ 29–38, 64–65; *Sigma draft Part 2 Compliance*, ¶¶ 23–33.

² See *Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing*, 551 U.S. 264, 281–84 (2007) (questioning the social benefits of private antitrust lawsuits filed in numerous courts when the enforcement-related need is relatively small); *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 557–60 (2007) (expressing concern with the burdens and costs of antitrust discovery, and the attendant in terrorem effect, associated with private antitrust lawsuits).

³ *McWane/Star Part 3 Administrative Compliance*, ¶ 34b; *Sigma draft Part 2 Compliance*, ¶ 29.