No. 11-1679

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS, Plaintiff – Appellant

٧.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Defendant – Appellee

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina Western Division

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 1, 2011, the N.C. State Board of Dental Examiners ("NCSBDE") filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction against the Feddermade Commission ("FTC") in the U.S.

and on February 10, 2012, the FTC stayed the Order pending review by this Court.

SeeFTC Order on Respondent's Applicatifon Stay, Docket No. 9343, 2012 FTC

LEXIS 28 (F.T.C. Feb. 10, 2012) ("Stay").

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This appeal is not moot as a matter fact or law. The violation of NCSBDE's constitutional rightend the availability of redress in the courts remain ongoing and unresolved issues. Even if th

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presented are no longer 'live' or the pastlack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.") (internal citation omitted). The Petition for Review before this Court of the FTC's Order challenges the FTC's cision based upon questions within the scope of an administrative appeal. Imtrast, this suit focuses on the right of a state agency to pursue a direct suitainagt a federal agency exceeding its constitutional and statutory mandate. The relief sought in this appeal cannot be addressed in the administrative proceeding and, therefore, cannot be reviewed on administrative appealSee Cavalier Tel., LLC Wa. Elec. & Power Co303 F.3d 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2002) (exhistion balanced againstripes interest in prompt access to federal judicial forum).

A. The Ongoing EnforcementProceeding Should Be Dismissed b Initio.

The key issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in holding that it lacks jurisdiction to redress constitution abolations against NCSBDE. Only an Article III court has the ability to adjudicathese issues that arise from federalism principles. NCSBDE has suffed, and continues to suffeconstitutional injuries that cannot be adjudicated by appealthing Order. That he FTC temporarily stayed the enforcement of its Order somet terminate the ongoing enforcement action. Since the issuance of that ay, the FTC itself has described its administrative enforcement action actions NCSBDE as "ongoing." See, elgen Ortolon, Doctors Targeted, FTC Aims at Scope Limitex. Med. Ass'n (Aug.

2012), available at http://content.yudu.com/A1xp7/kugust2012/resources/25.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). Thus, the continues to exercise jurisdiction over NCSBDE without the continued or statutory authority to do so.

B. No Intervening Events Prevent This Court from Affording Effective Relief.

To dismiss a case for constitutional mootness, events must have occurred to make it impossible to grant reliefSee Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). Here, no inversing events have impaired this Court's ability to adjudicate the issuesised by NCSBDE. The key inquiry is whether this Court may "grant any effectivation whatever to a prevailing party."

Id. at 12 (internal quotation omitted). Whurch of Scientologythe Supreme Court held that it couldtist grant relief regarding aconstitutional privacy claim, even though one component of the efesought was rendered unavailable by intervening eventsSee id. at 13. By contrast, NCSBDE's requested relief remains available. The FTC continues to exert jurisdiction via its Stay and Order; thus, NCSBDE may still seek relief egarding the FTC's assertion of jurisdiction over a state agency enforcing state låw.

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³ The FTC argues that "any declaratorliefewould be without force or effect" citing Suarez v. Roone 53 Fed. Appx. 703 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublishe 6) uarez is distinguishable becauste appellant advanced the actsamechallenge that he sought in separate proceedings d. at 703. NCSBDE saserts two distinct constitutional challenges SeePetitioner's Reply Brief DE 77 in Appeal 12-1172, filed July 19, 2012 for a discussion of this argument.

NCSBDE's Complaint contains ninenfulfilled prayers for relief that remain beyond the adjudicative capability the FTC's narrow, congressionally-delegated authority. These claims are "still hotontested by clearly adverse parties." Powell, 395 U.S. at 499 (mootness of commponent of relief does not render other "claims not worthy jufdicial consideration").

regulating professions.Cal. State Bd. of Optometry v. F,T@10 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

Recent rulings in Free Enterprise and Sebelius indicate that it is doubtful that even a clear congressial act—which is not present here—could give the FTC a preemptive power to: parse and resteep the Tenth Amendment, alter the balance of federalism, strain the ommerce Clause, ignore long-standing jurisprudence, flaunt its own prior decisis, and foreclose a state's resort to the third branch.

To address whether the Districto@t has jurisdiction over NCSBDE's claims, this Court must determine whetlite "fairly discernible" under the FTC Act ("FTCA") that Congress intended to preclude district court jurisdiction of such constitutional claims. Free Enter.

Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA")—butonly because those challenges were brought by employeesovered under the CSRA whorere complaining about adverse actions covered by CSRA. 132 S. Ct. 22134. Here, by contrast, neither of those jurisdictional conditions met because (1) NCSBDE is not covered by the FTCA; and (2) the FTCastempt to assert jurisdiction over NCSBDE is constitutionally prohibited.

First, NCSBDE is not an entity convered by the FTCA because it is not a "person, partnership, or corporation" ventothe judicial review provisions of the FTCA. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c). "As the Supreme Court has noted, when the issue presented is one of statutory interpation 'judicial review would not be significantly aided by an additional administrative decision Athlone Indus., Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm 7007 F.2d 1485, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal citation omitted) see also Atl. Richfield Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy F.2d 771, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (authorizing challenges to agency action that are unrelated to the merits of the dispute but concerns assertion of agency jurisdiction).

Second, NCSBDE claims that the FT Colated its constitutional rights by asserting jurisdiction to conduct its administrative proceeding. This type of complaint is not covered under the provisions of the FT Colate Latif v. Holder 686 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012) (allow constitutional charges in district

court when the statute did not providedness mechanism). Therefore, it is not "fairly discernible" that Congress intended preclude district court jurisdiction.

Three additional factors show that CSBDE's claims are not the type intended by Congress to be reviewed within FTCA judicial review procedures.

First, NCSBDE's challenges to the FTC's administrative proceeding are wholly collateral to any challenges based on the substance of the Or6ere Free Enter.,

130 S. Ct. at 3150 (finding a constitutional challenge to the PCAOB's existence collateral to any challenge affinal Commission orderly lathews v. Eldridge 424

U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976) (finding control procedural challenges to termination of benefits collateral to a substantive claim for entitlement to benefits).

As noted in Mathews' statutorily-created finality requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucilia termination to be soft and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered to.

Court's review of an administrative appearall subject these claims to a different standard of review. 432 F.2d 55, 1159 (7th Cir. 1970). At that point, the court of appeals would only decide whether threat order is supported by the evidence and would not question the authority of the commission in issuing the complaint. Id. (allowing independent suit to challengemmissioner's exercise of statutory discretion) (internal citation omitted). The relief sought by NCSBDE is not contemplated by the judicial review previous of the FTCA and will be forever foreclosed if this action is dismissed for mootness.

Third, adjudication of these claims is outside the FTC's expertisee. Enter, 130 S. Ct. at 3150. Whether the C can exercise jurisdiction over NCSBDE acting in its overeign capacity is a threshold issue. A number of courts recognize that the FTC is not entitled to deference on its jurisdiction arguments in similar situations. See, e.g. ABA v. FTC 430 F.3d 457, 467-68 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting deference to the FTC's "attempted tuxtpænsion" over the legal profession simply because "the Adit not provide for an exemption" Cal. State Bd. of Optometry, 910 F.2d at 981-82 (rejecting C's jurisdiction over state board, holding that "were we to defer to this construction . . . we would short-circuit the protections offered Steat by the political process" New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v. FT 908 F.2d 1064, 1071-72 (tlCir. 1990) (FTC has no expertise or fact-finding authority on state action immunity).

Jurisdiction is properly before thiso Ort because it is not fairly discernible that Congress intended to preclude NCSB Tourn bringing this action before the District Court and because Article III of the Constitution establishes that it is the role of the courts to addicate constitutional claims.

III. THE FTC'S CONDUCT CONS TITUTES UNLAWFUL ACTIONS CAPABLE OF REPETITION YET EVADING REVIEW.

Assumingarguendothat any portion of this suit is to be considered moot, the FTC's unlawful exercise of jurisdiction over NCSBDE still falls within the exception allowing jurisdiction for conduccapable of repetition, yet evading review. This exception "applies when (the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to seation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same coinciples party will be subject to the same action again." Lux v. Judd651 F.3d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 2011).

The exception applies because the FTC's administrative proceedings resulted in its Order before CSBDE could obtain judicial review of the FTC's unlawful exercise of jurisdtion. Federal courts routinely hold that actions ceasing or controversies expiring within a short time period "ordinarily evade reviewe"

Indeed, members of Congress take issue with the FTC's over-reaching jurisdiction in this case. See Letter from Five Members of Congress to FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz (Mar. 2, 2012), available at http://burgess.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0232012 letter leiboitz ftc interference with state regulation.pdf ("We strongly urge you to cease any further intrusion in the state regulation of medicine anothtisetry and withdraw from the actions you have already taken.").

FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc551 U.S. 449 (2007) ("stepite . . . command that the cases be expedited to the greatestsipte extent," a four-year period is too short for issue to be fully litigated); Va. Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v.,F263 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that strittiated 15 months before election held every two years evaded review) yerruled on separate grounds Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FE,0681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012).

NCSBDE filed suit in Fleruary 2011 seeking a judicial determination of constitutional challenges to the FTC's jurisdiction, and the FTC issued its Order in December 2011. This 10-month periodvishin the period that evades review.

If the Court does not rule on thesenstitutional challeges to the FTC's jurisdiction, there is a reasonable likelihood that NCSBDE will be subject to the same action again. See Lux, 651 F.3d at 401. This "standard is not 'mathematically precise' and requires only reasonable likelihood' of repetition." Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg'l Jail 107 F.3d 243, 249 (A Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). NCSBDE continues be affected by the RT's unlawful exercise of jurisdiction by an FTC Order for thirty year See Order at 6.

Governmental action that continues to the rights of parties is sufficient to require court intervention even the absence of a live controvers see, e.g. Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle 16 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1974) ("capable of repetition exception" applied to employers uit to invalidate state regulations

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despite strike terminatiobecause employer showed "existence of an immediate and definite governmental action or policy that has adversely affected and continues to affect a present interest").

The exception should apply even more when an independent federal agency such as the FTC repeatedly has usedaddsninistrative proceedings to bludgeon state agencies into submission to a self-visng theory of jurisdiction without clear congressional authorization or court court court. The Order, stayed pending the administrative appeal, subjects a state agretor thirty years of federal microgovernance by the FTC. There is cassonable likelihood that not only the NCSBDE but any other state licensing bownith be the target of the FTC's illegal exercise of jurisdiction in the future as it has repeatedly demonstrated.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Appellantsprectfully requests this Honorable Court to hold this case is not moot.

/s/ Noel L. Allen

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned counsel of record fappellant affirms and declares as follows:

- 1. This brief complies with the padienitation of this Court's order of November 2, 2012.
- 2. This brief complies with the typefacequirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements Fet. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify I electronically file the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the CM/ECF System on November 19th, 2012. I certify that all parties to this case are registered CM/ECF users and that is the accomplished by the Appellate CM/ECF System.

Executed this 19tday of November, 2012.

/s/ Noel L. Allen