

buyers. Similarly, the Consent Agreement requires Fresenius to obtain the consent of all lessors necessary to assign the leases for the real property associated with the divested clinics to the buyers. These provisions ensure that each buyer will have the assets necessary to operate the divested clinics in a competitive manner.

The Consent Agreement contains several additional provisions designed to ensure that the divestitures are successful. First, the Consent Agreement provides each buyer with the opportunity to interview and hire employees affiliated with the divested clinics and prevents Fresenius from offering these employees incentives to decline any buyer's offer of employment. This will ensure that each buyer has access to patient care and supervisory staff who are familiar with the clinics' patients and the local physicians. Second, the Consent Agreement prevents Fresenius from contracting with the medical directors (or their practice groups) affiliated with the divested clinics for three years. This provides each buyer with sufficient time to build goodwill and a working relationship with its medical directors before Fresenius can attempt to capitalize on its prior relationships in soliciting their services. Third, to ensure continuity of patient care and records as each buyer implements its quality care, billing, and supply systems, the Consent Agreement allows Fresenius to provide transition services for a period of 12 months. Firewalls and confidentiality agreements have been established to ensure that competitively sensitive information is not exchanged. Fourth, the Consent Agreement requires Fresenius to provide each buyer with a license to use Fresenius's policies, procedures, and medical protocols, as well as the option to obtain Fresenius's medical protocols, which will further enhance the buyer's ability to continue to care for patients in the clinics that will be divested. Finally, the Consent Agreement requires Fresenius to provide notice to the Commission prior to any acquisitions of dialysis clinics in the markets addressed by the Consent Agreement in order to ensure that subsequent acquisitions do not adversely impact competition in the markets at issue or undermine the remedial goals of the proposed order.

The Commission is satisfied that New DSI is a qualified acquirer of the majority of the divested assets. New DSI is currently a significant operator of dialysis clinics, having been formed to acquire the divested assets resulting from the 2011 DaVita/DSI investigation. The company was formed by Frazier

Healthcare, a firm with a dedicated focus on healthcare, and New Enterprise Associates, the world's largest venture capital firm with over \$10.5 billion under management.

Similarly, the Commission is satisfied that AIP is a qualified acquirer of divested assets in Alaska. AIP is a limited liability company wholly-owned by Dr. Mary Dittrich, the divested clinic's medical director, and Dr. William Dittrich. AIP has received financial support from Crystal Cascades LLC, an investment fund that manages \$100 million.

Finally, the Commission is satisfied that DRG is a qualified acquirer of divested assets in the Dallas, Texas area. DRG is an integrated care provider in Dallas, Texas with nine nephrologists on staff and whose nephrologists currently serve as the medical directors of these divested assets. DRG holds the majority ownership interest in the five Liberty clinics in Dallas that would be divested, and has a strong reputation in the Dallas area.

The Commission has appointed Richard qua5hesemf



V. *Impact on Competition*

The proposed acquisition likely would result in significant anticompetitive harm in the highly-concentrated relevant markets for each of the MP Alloys. Carpenter and Latrobe are the only competitors in these highly-concentrated markets. The acquisition will eliminate actual, direct, and substantial competition between Carpenter and Latrobe, and likely result in higher prices for both of the MP Alloys.

V. *Remedies to Competition*

The proposed Consent Agreement remedies the competitive concerns raised by the transaction by requiring the parties to divest assets related to the manufacture of the MP Alloys to Eramet. The terms required by the Consent Agreement will enable Eramet to effectively replace the competition in the MP Alloys markets lost as a result of the proposed acquisition.

Eramet is a global supplier of specialty alloys with an established sales and marketing network in the United States that will allow it to be immediately competitive in the relevant MP Alloys markets. Eramet is based in France, which is an approved foreign source country for U.S. military operations under DFARS. The proposed Consent Agreement requires Carpenter to provide Eramet with product licenses and the manufacturing technology necessary to manufacture the MP Alloys. This includes technical assistance from current Latrobe company designees, and confidential business information directly related to the manufacture of the MP Alloys. In addition, the Consent Agreement requires Carpenter to contract manufacture the MP Alloys for Eramet at cost until Eramet is able to produce and commercially sell these products on its own. The Commission has appointed James R. Bucci, who has over 35 years of experience in the specialty alloy industry, as the interim monitor to oversee the divestiture.

If after the public comment period the Commission determines that Eramet is not an acceptable acquirer of the assets to be divested, or that the manner of the divestitures is not acceptable, Carpenter must unwind the divestiture and divest the assets within 180 days of the date the Order becomes final to another Commission-approved acquirer. If Carpenter fails to divest the assets within the 180 days, the Commission may appoint a trustee to divest the relevant assets.

The purpose of this analysis is to facilitate public comment on the

proposed Consent Agreement, and it is not intended to constitute an official interpretation of the proposed Consent Agreement or to modify its terms in any