this case, the complaint does not allege that U-Haul and Budget reached an agreement, despite Mr. Magyar's report to his bosses that he privately encouraged Budget to raise its rates "and they did." *See* Complaint Paragraph 19.

Even if no agreement was reached it does not necessarily mean that no competitive harm was done.[4] An unaccepted invitation to collude may facilitate coordinated interaction by disclosing the solicitor's intentions and preferences. For example, in this case Budget learned from Mr. Magyar that if Budget raised its rates U-Haul would not undercut Budget. Thus, the improper communication from U-Haul could have encouraged Budget to raise rates. Similarly, the public statements made by the CEO of U-Haul could have encouraged competitors to raise rates.

Although this case involves particularly egregious conduct, it is possible that less egregious conduct may result in Section 5 liability. It is not essential that the Commission find repeated misconduct attributable to senior executives, or define a market, or show market power, or establish substantial competitive harm, or even find that the terms of the desired agreement have been communicated with precision.

III. The Proposed Consent Order

U-Haul has signed a consent agreement containing the proposed consent order. The proposed consent order consists of seven sections that work together to enjoin U-Haul from inviting collusion and from entering into or implementing a collusive scheme.

Section II, Paragraph A of the proposed consent order enjoins U-Haul from inviting a competitor to divide markets, to allocate customers, or to fix prices. Section II, Paragraph C prohibits U-Haul from entering into, participating in, maintaining, organizing, implementing, enforcing, inviting, offering or soliciting an agreement with any competitor to divide markets, to allocate customers, or to fix prices. Section II, Paragraph B bars U-Haul from discussing rates with its competitors, with a proviso permitting legitimate market research.

The proviso in Section II, Paragraph D prevents the proposed order from interfering with U-Haul's efforts to negotiate prices with prospective customers, and it would permit U-Haul to provide investors with considerable information about company strategy. This proviso also permits U-Haul to communicate publicly any information required by the federal securities laws.

Sections III, IV, V, and VI of the proposed order include several terms that are common to many Commission orders, facilitating the Commission's efforts to monitor respondents' compliance with the order. Section IV, Paragraph A requires a periodic submission to the Commission of *unredacted* copies of certain internal U-Haul documents. This provision is necessary because U-Haul impeded the Federal Trade Commission's investigation of this matter. Specifically, U-Haul submitted to the Commission, in response to a *subpoena duces tecum*, documents authored by Mr. Shoen, from which were redacted many of the sentences quoted in the complaint. In the Commission's view, there was no justification for the redaction. The proposed order should deter repetition of this conduct.

Finally, Section VII provides that the proposed order will expire in 20 years.

By direction of the Commission.

Donald S. Clark,

Secretary.

Statement of Chairman Leibowitz, Commissioner Kovacic, and Commissioner Rosch

The Commission today has entered into a consent agreement with U-Haul and its parent company, AMERCO, resolving the Commission's allegation that they attempted to collude on truck rental prices. The parties have settled an invitation-to-collude case and not a Sherman Antitrust Act Section 1 conspiracy case. Put differently, the complaint in this case alleges an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act that does not also constitute an antitrust violation.

Invitations to collude are the quintessential example of the kind of conduct that should be – and has been – challenged as a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,[5] which may limit follow-on private treble damage litigation from Commission action while still stopping inappropriate conduct. In contrast to conspiracy claims that would violate Section 1, invitations to collude do not require proof of an agreement; nor do they require proof of an anticompetitive effect. The Commission has not alleged that Respondents entered into an agreement with Budget or any other competitors in violation of Section 1. Today's Commission action is instead based on evidence that Respondents unilaterally attempted to enter into such an agreement. The Commission therefore has reason to believe that Respondents engaged in conduct that is within Section 5's reach.

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[4] The Commission has previously explained that there are several legal and economic reasons to punish firms that invite collusion even when acceptance cannot be proven. First, it may be difficult to determine whether a particular solicitation has or has not been accepted. Second, the conduct may be harmful and serves no legitimate business purpose. Third, even an unaccepted solicitation may facilitate coordinated interaction by disclosing the intentions or preferences of the party issuing the invitation. *In the Matter of Valassis Communications, Inc.*, Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 71 Fed. Reg. 13976, 13978-79 (Mar. 20, 2006). *See generally* P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, VI Antitrust Law ¶1419 (2003).

[5] *In re Valassis Commc'ns, Inc.*, F.T.C. File No. 051-008, 2006 FTC LEXIS 25 (April 19, 2006) (Complaint); *In re MacDermid, Inc.*, F.T.C. File No. 991-0167, 1999 FTC LEXIS 191 (Feb. 4, 2000) (Complaint, Decision and Order); *In re Stone Container Corp.*, 125 F.T.C. 853 (1998) (June 3, 1998) (Complaint, Decision and Order); *In re Precision Moulding Co.*, 122 F.T.C. 104 (Sept. 3, 1996) (Complaint, Decision and Order); *In re YKK (USA) Inc.*, 116 F.T.C. 628 (July 1, 1993) (Complaint); *In re A.E. Clevite, Inc.*, 116 F.T.C. 389 (June 8, 1993) (Complaint); *In re Quality Trailer Products Corp.*, 115 F.T.C. 944 (Nov. 5, 1992) (Complaint).

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Part A, Office of the Secretary, Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is being amended at Chapter AN, Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness (OPHEP), as last amended at 71 FR 38403–05 dated July 6, 2006. This is OPHEP.

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