## FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

[File No. 111 0122]

Western Digital Corporation; Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment

**AGENCY:** Federal Trade Commission. **ACTION:** Proposed consent agreement.

**SUMMARY:** The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged violations of federal law prohibiting unfair or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>In particular, the written request for confidential treatment that accompanies the comment must include the factual and legal basis for the request, and must identify the specific portions of the comment to be withheld from the public record.

FTC Rule 4.9(c), 16 CFR 4.9(c).

the assets to be divested, or that the manner of the divestiture is not acceptable, Western Digital must unwind the divestiture and divest the assets within 180 days of the date the Order becomes final to another Commission-approved acquirer. If Western Digital fails to divest the assets within the 180 days, the Commission may appoint a trustee to divest the relevant assets.

The purpose of this analysis is to facilitate public comment on the Consent Agreement, and it is not intended to constitute an official interpretation of the Consent Agreement or to modify its terms in any way.

By direction of the Commission.

Donald S. Clark,

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Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Western Digital Corporation/Viviti Technologies Ltd. and Seagate Technology LLC/Hard Disk Drive Assets of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.

After a thorough investigation the Federal Trade Commission has challenged Western Digital Corporation's ("Western Digital") proposed acquisition of Viviti Technologies Ltd., formerly known as Hitachi Global Storage Technologies ("HGST"). This challenge comes several months after the Federal Trade Commission closed its investigation of Seagate Technology LLC's ("Seagate") acquisition of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.'s hard disk drive assets ("Samsung"). The two proposed transactions were announced within weeks of each other, and both had potential implications for competition in the same product markets. Commission staff reviewed both matters at the same time in order to understand the effects on competition resulting from each transaction on its own, as well as the cumulative effect on the relevant markets if both transactions were allowed to be consummated.

The evidence gathered in the Commission's investigation revealed that the relevant product markets in which to assess the competitive impact of the proposed transactions are based on specific end-uses for hard disk drives ("HDDs")—such as desktop, notebook, and enterprise—because product features, pricing, and competition differ by end-use applications. For many of these end-uses, we did not have reason to believe that the proposed transactions would result in effects that would have justified a challenge. In the 3.5 inch desktop HDD ("desktop HDD") market, however, we had reason to believe the

consummation of both of these acquisitions would result in likely anticompetitive effects. The Commission came to this conclusion based on the evidence from interviews with market participants, testimony of the parties' executives, and documents produced by the parties and other industry participants.

The Commission determined after its investigation that there were significant differences between the competitive implications of the two proposed mergers. Since in each case the acquiring firm was a strong competitor, attention turned to the characteristics of the two firms that were to be acquired in these proposed transactions—HGST and Samsung. Based on this analysis, it was clear that an independent HGST was much more likely to be an effective competitive constraint in the desktop HDD market than would an independent Samsung.

In particular, HGST has been a strong, high quality and innovative competitor

in the desktop HDD market. Morer 5  $T^*$  (was clear that et than strong, )Tj j Tsnd innovati(Ellps,