

BY HAND

Richard B. Smith, Esq. Premerger Notification Office Federal Trade Commission

Re: Informal Hart-Scott-Rodino Opinion Letter

Dear Mr. Smith:



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ISSUE

Whether a corporate officer and director who acquires voting securities as part of his compensation from an issuer may claim the "solely for the purpose of investment" exemption where his intent upon acquisition is to obtain his bargained for compensation and not to exercise any rights as a shareholder beyond voting; and where the percentage of securities acquired is less than 10 percent.

FACTS

1. Description of the Issuer

Company "C". the issuer is a publicly held company that since its founding has been dominated by Stockholder A who has always controlled in excess of two-thirds of the outstanding voting power of Company C and had the right to nominate a majority of Company C's Board of Directors.

As a result of the reduced voting rights of the Company C stock in public hands and as a result of shareholder



agreements, Company C's public stockholders, including the officer/director involved in this request, are not collectively

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2. Description of "Investor I"

Stockholder A, the dominant stockholder of Company C,


Investor I to share in the profits of the company should it be successful under his leadership.

In addition to the initial purchase of shares, Investor I's annual compensation package included the usual components: cash, stock options and other fringe benefits. The stock options were a material part of that compensation, and were designed to be an incentive for Investor I to excel in the management of Company C.

Investor I desires to exercise his stock options solely in order to realize (and convert to cash) that portion of the financial compensation to which he is entitled from the stock option component of his compensation package. His holdings amount to less than 2% of Company C's voting securities and each time he exercises a stock option, it is with the intent to

Both Investor I and Company C satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Section 7A(a)(2)(C).

^{1/} Investor I was also appointed a director by Stockholder A.



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a result of such acquisition, the securities acquired or held do not exceed 10 percent of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer." This exemption is restated in 16 C.F.R. § 802.9. The regulations define "solely for the purpose of investment" by providing that "Valoting securities are held exceeding to be acquired to be a securities are held exceeding to be a securities and the securities are held exceeding to be a securities and the securities are held exceeding to be a securities are held exceeding to be a securities and the securities are held exceeding to be a securities and the securities are held exceeding to be a securities and the securities are held exceeding to be a securities and the securities are held exceeding to be a securities and the securities are held exceeding to be a securities and the securities are also and the securities are a securities and the securities are a securities and the securities are a securit

decisions of the issuer." 16 C.F.R. & 801 1(i)(1)

ment" exemption in a factual context similar to the one outlined above we bolious that the swallable interpretations as well-sa

First, the language of Section 7A(c)(9) and the relevant regulations, 801.1(i)(1), and 802.9, address the "purpose of the investment." These all contemplate the situation where the acquiring party is able to participate in the management of the issuer as a result of the investment and the influence obtained by holding the issuer's stock. For example, a 2% holder of the stock of a widely held company such as American Telephone & Telegraph or General Motors may have influence if he or she chooses to exercise it as a result of his or her minority ownership. Thus, the conduct of such a small shareholder is both probative of the holder's intent and may have competitive ramifications subject to review under the Act. This point is illustrated in the original Statement of Basis and Burpose for Section

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ling shareholder, director, officer or

the foregoing with respect to any entity directly or indirectly controlling the issuer.

Implicit in these six examples is the acquiring party's ability to influence — to some degree — the management or Board of Directors of an issuer as a result of the acquiring party's investment. But the examples cannot be viewed in isolation where other factors are present. They do not address Investor I's situation, where his "investment" is a part of his compensation (instead of receiving cash, he exercises stock options and converts the creating cash is the content of the cash is the content of the cash is the cas

der A, so that his less than 10 percent investment cannot give him influence or control over the issuer.

You suggested that the conduct that is closest to the instant case is illustrated in example (4) above -- naving an orthogonal and the conduct that is closest to the

officer or director of the issuer. Here by contrast the shareholder is an officer and director who has been given stock

acquired by Investor I with the intent that Investor I's stockholdings invest him with influence over the Company. Rather, the intent of the stock rights -- and Investor I's exercise of them -- is to increase Investor I's income. As such, Investor I's status as an officer and director is not inconsistent with his acquiring and holding the shares for investment only.

Second, the informal interpretations of this exemption implicitly, if not explicitly, require that there be a causal

issuer by virtue of the investment. In an informal interpretation the Staff stated that the exemption is not available if the securities are purchased "with the intention of influencing the basic business decisions of the issuer or with the intention of

This normally arises where one corporation purchases voting

participating in the management of the issuer." See Letter to Michael N. Sohn, Esq. from Bureau Director Thomas J. Campbell dated August 19, 1982 (reprinted in ABA, Premerger Notification Practice Manual No 25 1985) The Bureauts finding that certain activities associated with the acquisition -- statements that the acquiring party might seek control of the target, demanding a list of shareholders, and retention of a proxy solicitor service -- place the transaction outside the Section 802.9 exemption implies that a certain causal nexus between the investment and the "control conduct" is necessary.

No such nexus is present here. Investor I's only

by virtue of the fact that he is an officer and a director appointed by Stockholder A, and not by virtue of his ownership of

ity to maintain his positions as an officer and director. Nor does he have the intent to use his shareholdings in that manner. Indeed, if Stockholder A dismissed Investor I, Investor I's holdings would not be sufficient to permit him to exercise influence or control to maintain his positions.

In our view, unless Investor I intends to or actually takes steps as a shareholder to influence or control the

of Company C and exercises influence and control by virtue of his appointment to those positions is not probative.

Third, the Commission's current consideration of a blanket ten percent exemption, based upon its experience over the last eight years that such acquisitions are "unlikely to violate the antitrust laws" argues in favor of interpreting the language

antitrust significance to acquisitions of 10% or less of out-

are merely exercising stock options in order to enjoy the fruits of their compensation packages. 3/

Finally, finding the investment only exemption to apply

The issues we now face relate to the question of what type of conduct or action, other than considering or taking steps in preparation for a takeover attempt, constitute sufficient evidence to establish that a person's intent is not consistent with an investment only intent.

a person's influence results from his conduct as an officer or director of a corporation, and not from his conduct as a holder of less than 10% of the voting securities of that corporation, further acquisitions below the 10% threshold are not inconsistent with an "investment only intent." The fact that a person is an officer and director of an issuer does not alone "constitute



any inquiry into an investor's intent must be (1) on his activities as a shareholder, and (2) on whether the ownership structure

and Company C, his activities and the company's ownership struc-

Insider investors can thus exercise stock options and sell the stock the same day. An H-S-R requirement that one must report the exercise of a stock option makes no sense under these circumstances.

Indeed, the SEC recently amended its rules such that the exercise of a stock option is no longer considered a



ture are consistent with the solely for the purpose of investment exemption.

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