

Research objective

Setting




Entry and exit decisions



Aggregate dynamics

Figure: Total number of outlets opened/closed in Canada over time.




First movers





Table: Tabulation of the total number of markets that a chain was the (unique) first entrant.

Chain	First entrant
A & W	100
Burger King	50
Harvey's	65
McDonald's	334
Wendy's	34

Time of entry



Time of exit



Market characteristics

Table: Summary statistics for markets that were occupied in 1970, and for markets that were occupied after 1970.

Variable	Occupied 1970		Occupied after 1970	
	Mean	Std. Dev	Mean	Std. Dev
Population (persons)	21,144	7,433	23,895	12,809
Population density (persons per sq km)	2,892.93	3,276.488	1,615.26	2,271.38
Total sales (billion CDN)	1.410	1.160	2.330	1.170
Total retail locations	483	364	850	408
Income (dollars)	57,579	14,082.81	55,518.77	18,571.69
Property value (million CDN)	0.322	0.168	0.259	0.161

Results

Table:

Beliefs about market unobserved heterogeneity

m
 m
 1
 i
w.p.
 imt

 m
w.p.
 1
 imt



Two ways to learn

- Learning through entry: Within a year of entering a market, a retailer resolves its uncertainty about the size of the market.
 - $\text{imt} = 0$ if the retailer entered at time $t = 1$.
 - $\text{imt}_s = 0$ for all $s > 0$ if $\text{imt} = 0$.
- Learning from others: A potential entrant who has not previously entered (and left) the market already can learn from the observed past decisions of their informed rivals.
 - Updates the beliefs, imt , using Baye's rule and observed past stay/exit decisions among informed rivals.

Bayesian updating notation

- Set of informed retailers who made informed decisions at $t - 1$ is J_{mt-1} .
- Vector of informed decisions made at $t - 1$ is a_{mt-1} .

$$\text{Pr } a_{mt-1} = \frac{\text{Pr } a_{mt-1} \prod_{j \in J_{mt-1}} P_{jm}^{a_{jmt-1}} \prod_{j \notin J_{mt-1}} P_{jm}^{1-a_{jmt-1}}}{\text{Pr } a_{mt-1} \prod_{j \in J_{mt-1}} P_{jm}^{a_{jmt-1}} \prod_{j \notin J_{mt-1}} P_{jm}^{1-a_{jmt-1}} + \text{Pr } a_{mt-1} \prod_{j \in J_{mt-1}} P_{jm}^{0} \prod_{j \notin J_{mt-1}} P_{jm}^{1}}$$

Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE)

$$i \text{ } X_{mt}, imt, \quad \arg \max_{a_{imt} \in \{0,1\}} E \left[imt \quad V_i \text{ } X_{mt-1}, imt-1, m \right]$$

- Strategies $i \text{ } X_{mt}, imt, m$ i assumed to depend on state variables, X_{mt}, imt, m where

$$X_{mt} = a_{mt-2}, a_{mt-1}, mt-1, Z_{mt} .$$

- $V_i \text{ } X_{mt-1}, imt-1, m$ is the continuation value.
- imt is one shot payoff evaluated at strategies $i \text{ } X_{mt}, imt, m$ i .
- Integrating strategy function with respect to imt yields best response function $P_i \text{ } X_{mt}, m$.
- MPE obtained as fixed point.

Identification of structural model

- Strategic interactions (α_{ij}).
 - Chain's incumbency status has direct impact on its own flow profits through entry costs, but will only affect rival through best response probability.
 - This is true if chain was not already active 2 periods prior if a sequential entry.

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Simple DID test for learning

$$P_i^0 0,1 \quad P_i^0 0,0 \quad P_i^1 1,1 \quad P_i^1 1,0$$

- Lets focus on two chains.
- Chain i is either a potential entrant or incumbent, while its rival j either stayed or exited at $t - 1$.
- Set $\alpha_i = 0$ and let a_{imt} be uniformly distributed.
- $P_i^t a_{imt} - 1, a_{jmt} - 1$ is one-shot payoff

Simple DID test for learning

- Under null hypothesis of no learning ($\alpha = 0$):

$$\alpha_0 = \frac{1}{2}(\mu_{ij} - \mu_{ji}) = \frac{1}{2}(P_i(0,1) - P_i(0,0) - P_i(1,1) + P_i(1,0)) = 0.$$

- Also possible to write α_0 , based on assumptions above, as:

$$\alpha_0 = \frac{1}{2}(P_i(0,1) - P_i(0,0) - P_i(1,1) + P_i(1,0)).$$

- Therefore learning holds iff DID is zero:

$$\alpha_i = 0 \iff \alpha_0 = \frac{1}{2}(P_i(0,1) - P_i(0,0) - P_i(1,1) + P_i(1,0)) = 0.$$

DID regression

- Let $\beta_i^P(0,1)$, β_i^{01} , $\beta_i^P(0,0)$, β_i^{00} , $\beta_i^P(1,1)$, β_i^{11} , and $\beta_i^P(1,0)$, β_i^{10} .
- Based on the assumptions above, and some algebra, regression can be written as:

$$E a_{imt} | a_{mt-1}, Z_{mt} = \beta_i^{00} + a_{imt-1} + \beta_i^{11} a_{jmt-1}$$

Implications of learning: Strategic delay

Table: Average number of years before ...rst entering a market.

	With uncertainty	Without uncertainty
A & W	5.0	4.0
Burger King	3.3	4.5
Harvey's	3.3	8.2
McDonald's	7.7	5.8
Wendy's	11.7	11.9

Future directions



Thank you!