PREPARED STATEMENT OF

THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

on

BUSINESS PRACTICES OF DEBT RELIEF COMPANIES

Before the

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

Kansas City, Missouri

August 12, 2010

I. Introduction

Senator McGataill and members of the Committeearth Alice SakeHrdy, Assistant Director in the Division of Finarial Practices at the Edeal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission").¹ I appreciate theopportunity to appeabefore you today and the Commission thanks this Committee for its interest in the whorof the FTC to protect consume from deception and abuse in the sale of debt relief services.

The Commission has a long historfyprotecting consumers of infancial poducts and services offered by entities within the ægncy's jurisdiction. With Americans continuing to fel the effects of the economic downturn, the Commission has stepped up its efforts to stop fraudulent financial scheme that exploit consumers whore particularly vulnerable as a result of financial distress?

Stopping deceptive debt ellief practices is one of our higest consume protection priorities. Providers of due relief services purport to help people ho cannot paytheir debts by negotiating on their behalf with creditors. Debt settlement companies, for example, market their ability to dramatically reduce consumes' debts, often by making claims to reduce debt by specific and substantial amounts, such as "save 40 to 60 percent off your credit card debt." In manyinstances, consumers palgundreds othousands of dollars folloes services but get nothing in return.

¹ The views expressed in this statement represent the views of the Commission. My oral presentation and responses to any questions you may have are my own, however, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or any Commissioner.

² Since the beginning of 2009, the FTC has broughmore than 40 cases to stop scams that prey on consumers suffering from the financial downturn. Se, eg., PressRelease, FTC, FTC Che Dow model rtists What $g \ t \ Jb \ ess \ An \ erica$ (Feb. 17, 2010), $a \ ia \ lb \ ea$ www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/02/bottomdollar.shtm; PressRelease, FTC, FTC Ca kD own on Sa mme $T \ ying \ ok \ e \ b \ g \ f \ h \ b n \ c \ Dow \ h \ n \ n \ (July 1, 2009), a \ ia \ lb \ e \ ta$ www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/07/shortchange.shtm.

The FTC utilizes its four principal tools to protect consummer debt relef services: law enforcement, rulemaking consumer deucation efforts, and esearch and policy development. To halt deceptive and abusive practices and eturn money to victimized consumes, the Commissin has brough 23 lawsuits in the last sevenage against credit counseling firms, debt settlement services, and debt regetiators³. These ases have helped over 500,000 consumers haved by deceptive and abusive practices.⁴ The Commission continues to active type stig are debt relef companies and pursue gegressive eforcement in this arena As the Commission's law enforcement experience has shown, victims of these here often end up e in debt than when the ybegan. Especially in these difficult economic times, when so macromsumers may struggling to keep their heds above water, this is unaccepted.

Over the past deade, the Commission and state earliers havebrought a combined 259 cases to stop deceptivenal abusive pretices by debt relief providers that have trageted consumers in finacial distress. Despite these sustaine tfoorts, consumer complaints continued to increase as did probleatic advectising and telemaketing of these services. To strentghen the agency's ability to stop deception and base in the provision of debalief services, the Commission proposed amendate to the Telemaketing Sales Rule ("TSR"). O July 29, 2010, after a thorough and careful review of the rulemaking record, the Commission amounced its

³ A list of the Commission's law enforcement actions against debt relief companies is attached as Appendix A.

⁴ In addition to consumers who lost money to fraudulent debt relief companies, millions of consumers have been harassed by automated robocalls pitching services in violation of the Do Not Call provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Rule. The Commission has charged companies engaging in these robocalls with violations of the Rule. See e.g., FTC v. As a Pac Teen, Inc., No. 10C3168 (N.D. III., preliminary injunction issued June 17, 2010) IF C.v. JM & elerated robocals rvs. In ., No. 09-CV-2021 (M.D. Fla., preliminary injunction issued Dec. 31, 2009) IF . E. a. R. lief T. ch., IC, No. 09-CV-3347 (N.D. Ga., preliminary injunction issued Dec. 17, 2009).

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¹¹ Se, eg., FTC, PressReleæs, Fd a land StateA ga \dot{v} eT ag \dot{v} Mot gageF o \dot{v} ou vRa ea nd Loan Modifia tion Sa ms (July 15, 2009), a \dot{u} lb e a www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/07/loaniesshtm (announcing sweeptargeting mortgage assistance relef scams, including **T** C v. USF eclor $u \in \mathbf{R}$ ief Co p, No. SACV 09-768 JVS (MGX) (C.D. Cal., final order March 11, 2010) (State of Missouri, State of California, and FTC filed joint casealleging violations of FTC Act and TSR against defendants purporting to provide mortgage assistance relef services)) Press Releæs, FTC, FTC Announe "Ope ation Fals Chait ty" Law Enformer **s** $v \in$ (May 20, 2009), $u \dot{a}$ lb e d www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/05/chaityfraudshtm (including four cases

^{§§ 16931693}r, the privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68016809; and the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 626, 123 Stat. 524 (Mar. 11, 2009).

¹⁰ The FTC Act exempts banks and other depository institutions and bona fide nonprofits, among others, from the Commission's jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)(2). These exemptions apply to the FTC's jurisdiction under the Telemarketing Act and the TSR as well.

¹² The Commission has addressed similar problems with respect to companies offering to resolve consumers' mortgagedebts. The Commission has engaged in an aggessive, coordinated enforcement initiative to shut down companies falsely claiming the ability to obtain mortgageloan modifications or other relief for consumers facing foreclosure. In the pastyearalone, the FTC has brought 10 cases targeting foreclosure rescue andmortgagemodification frauds, with other matters under active investigation. In addition, state enforcement agencies have brought more than 200 cases agaist such firms in recent years. Further, asdirected by Congress under the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, the Commission has initiated a rulemaking proceeding addressing the for-profit companies in this industry. Under the proposel rule, companies could not receive payment until they have obtained for the

¹⁵ *FTC vA me D b t h c*, No. PJM 03-3317 (D. Md., final order May 17, 2006).

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 violations of the TSRs provisions that require certain disdosures and prohibit misrepresentations, as well as the requirements of the TSRs Do Not Call provisions.²⁰

In addition, over the bat several years, in response to abusseuch as these the RS has challenged a numbre of purportedly nonprofit CCAs – both through the procession of existing statutes and netwax code provisions – resulting in the vocation, or proceedings to revoke, the nonprofit status of 41 CCA's. In addition, state authorities halve ought at least 21 cases against CCAs under their own statutes and rules.

B. Debt Settlement Services

Debt settlement companies purport to obtain from consumers' unsecured creditors lump sum settlements for snigficantly less than the full outstandingalance of the consumers' debts. Unlike a traditional DMP, the goal of adebt settlement plan is to enable consumeto repay only a portion of the total debt owed. Debt settlement providers heavily market through Internet, television, radio, and joint advertising. The advertisements to pically make taims about the

See FTC v. Lek in, No. 06-cv-61851-WJZ (S.D. Fla., final order May 5, 2008); United Statev C e dt Found. of A m., No. CV 06-3654 ABC(VBKx) (C.D. Cal., final order June 16, 2006).

Eileen Ambrose, Cel it Fim s Status R e kl ; R S Say A 1 Db t Counk or W ill Low T - E mp S d g BALTIMORE SUN, May 16, 2006. To enhance the IRS's ability to oversee CAs, Congress amended the IRS Code in 2006, adding Section 501(q) to provide specific digibility criteria for CCAs sekting tax-exempt status as well as criteria for retaining that status. Se Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1220 (Aug. 2006) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(q)). Among other things, Section 501(q) of the IRS Code prohibits tax-exempt CCAs from refusing to provide credit counseling services due to a consumer's inability to pay or a consumer's ineligibility or unwilling gess to agree to enroll in a DMP; charging more than "reasonable fees" for services; and, unless allowed by state law, basing fees on a percentage of a client's debt, DMP payments, or savings from enrolling in a DMP. In addition, as a esult of changes in the federal bankruptcy code, 158 nonprofit CCAs, including the lagest entities, have been subjected to rigorous screening by the Department of Justice's Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee. Finally, nonprofit credt counseling agencies must comply with state laws in 49 states, most of which specify particular fee Imits.

company's supposed ability o reduce consumes' debts to a fraction of the full amount owde, and then necourage consumes to call a toll-fee number for more information²². During the calls, telemarketers repeat and embellish many of these claims.

Most debt settlement companies are consumes hundrels, or even thousands, of dollars in upfront fes, in manycases with the entire macount of fees due within the first for months of enrollment and force any debts are settled. An increasing number of providers spread their fees over a longer period – for example, 12 to 18 months – but consumers generally still pay a substantial portion of the fees before any of their payments are used to pay down their debt. Most consumers drop out of these programs before completion, and they typically forfeit all of the money they paid to the debt settlement impany regardless of whether they received any settlements from their creditors.²³

Since 2004, the Commission has brought nine actions against debt settlement providers, alleging that they deceived consumers about key aspects of their programs.²⁴ The defendants' misrepresentations included daims that:

• the provider will, or is highly likely to, obtain large reductions in debt for enrolless, e_{g} , a 50 percent reduction or elimination of debt in 12 to 36 months²⁵

²³ Then ak in g Sahar $u \not\in F$ in all $u \not\in$ 75 Fed. Reg. at 48471-72 (citing commenters).

²² Se, eg., FTC vC on k No. SA CV 06-701 DOC (RNBx) (C.D. Cal., final order Oct. 2, 2008); **T** C v. **k i a**, h c, No. CV-07-4087 (E.D.N.Y., final order Aug. 29, 2008); FTC v $Db \ tS \ eh \ c$, No. 1:07-cv-00558-RPM (D. Colo., final order Apr. 11, 2008); $FTC v \ bl \ eh \ Fn \ Se \ s$., Inc, No. 02-6468 ABC (Ex) (C.D. Cal., final order Dec. 12, 2004).

²⁴ Se Appendix A (items 2, 6, 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 22, and 23).

²⁵ *§ e*, *e*.*g*, **I** *C v*. **I** *g f t i a* , *h c*, No. CV-07-4087 (E.D.N.Y., final order Aug. 29, 2008); *FTC v h now i v Sy*. *Te h.*, *Inc*, No. CV04-0728 GAF JTLx (C.D. Cal., final order July 13, 2005).

- the provider will stop harassing alls from debt collector as well as adjusted as adjusted as a statement of the provider will stop harassing alls from debt collector as well as adjusted as a statement of the provider will stop harassing alls from debt collector as well as adjusted as a statement of the provider will stop harassing alls from debt collector as well as adjusted as a statement of the provider will stop harassing alls from debt collector as well as a statement of the provider will stop harassing alls from debt collector as well as a statement of the provider will stop harassing alls from debt collectors as well as a statement of the provider will stop harassing at the provider wil
- the providerhas speial relationships with creditors and is expert in inducing creditors to

Se, eg., FTC vD b tS th c, No. 1:07-cv-00558RPM (D. Colo., final order Apr. 11, 2008); FTC vB tB udgtF n. Se v., Inc, No. 04-12326 (WG4) (D. Mass. 2005). Some providers are also misrepresenting that their service is part of a government program through the useof such terms as "government bailout" or "stimulus money." Se, eg., FTC vD omin ant L a ds L LC, No. 1:10-cv-00997 (D.D.C., preliminary injunction issued July 8, 2010).

²⁸ Se e.g., FTC v Db -Se, No. 1:07-cv-00558RPM (D. Colo., final order Apr. 11, 2008).

Se, eg, FTC vh non iv Sy. Te h., Inc, No. CV04-0728 GAF JTLx (C.D. Cal., final order July 13, 2005).

³⁰ *§ e, e.g*, *FTC v. Connely*, No. SA CV 06-701 DOC (RNBx) (C.D. Cal., final order Oct. 2, 2008); **J** *C v. J* **b** *lee F n § rvs., In* ., No. 02-6468 ABC (Ex) (C.D. Cal., final order Dec. 12, 2004).

³¹ Steppendic et al. Stephendows and Steph

²⁶ Se, eg., FTC vD b tS e h c, No. 1:07-cv-00558RPM (D. Colo., final order Apr. 11, 2008); FTC vB eB udgeF in Se v., Inc, No. 04-12326 (WG4) (D. Mass., final order Mar. 28, 2005); **T** C v. Jb lee F n S rvs., In ., No. 02-6468 ABC (Ex) (C.D. Cal., final order Dec. 12, 2004).

C. Debt Negotiation

Debt negitiation companies assigned at they can obtain interest rate reductions or other concessions from creditors to lower consumer monthly payments. Such companies territion market debt negitiation services througeso-called automated robocalls." Like debt settlement companies, many debt negotiation providers charge significant upfront fees and promise specific results, such as particular interest rate eduction or anount of saving.³² In some cases, the telemaketers of debt negitiation services after to themselvessa "card services" or a "customer serviced epatment" during calls with consumer in order to mislead them into believithgat the telemarketers are associated with the consumer's credit card company.³³

The FTC has brought nine actions æginst defedants alleigng deceptive det negotiation practices.³⁴ In each case the Commission alleged that defindants (1) misrepresented that they could reduce consumers' interest payments by specific percentages or minimum amounts, (2) falsely purported to be affiliated, or have close relationships, with consumers' enditors,³⁵ and

StateU ndeN w Db t-Managen e t and Cel it Counk ing Rg ulations (Mar. 12, 2009), a it lb e ta www.ago.state.co.us/press_detail.cfmpressD=957.html; Texas v. CSA-Credit Solutions of Am, In ., No. 09-000417 (Dist. Travis Cty, filed Mar. 26, 2009); Flor da v Bogl, No. 2008-CA-002909 (Cir. Ct. 4th Cir. Duval Cty, filed Mar. 5, 2008).

Se FTC v As a Pac Te en , Inc, No. 10 C 3168 (N.D. III., preliminary injunction issued June 17, 2010); IF C v. JM A elerated rvs. In ., No. 09-CV-2021 (M.D. Fla., preliminary injunction issued Dec. 31, 2009); IF . E a . R lief F ch ., IC , No. 09-CV-3347 (N.D. Ga., preliminary injunction issued Dec. 17, 2009); FTC v2 145183 Ont b , h c, No. 09-CV-7423 (N.D. III., preliminary injunction issued Dec. 17, 2009); FTC v2 145183 Ont b , h c, No. 07- 0529 (N.D. III., preliminary injunction issued Dec. 17, 2009); FTC vS k tP e sM gmt, No. 07- 0529 (N.D. III., final order May 15, 2009); FTC v Ga p OneN e wok s Inc, No. 8:09-cv-352-T-26-MAP (M.D. Fla, final order March 19, 2009); FTC vD b tS oli tonsh c, No. 06-0298 LR (W.D. Wash., final order June 18, 2007).

³³ Se cases cited a pa, note 32

³⁴ Se Appendix A (items 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 14).

³⁵ Se cases cited μpa , note 32

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(3) violated the TSR's Do Not Call provisions, among other T

³⁷ PressRelease, FTC, **I** C Issues F **i** R e to P **o** ect C**a** m ers in C reil t Ca dD eb (July 29, 2010), avalue ble at www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/07/tsr.shtm. Commissioner Rosch dissented from the Commission decision.

³⁸ Comments were submitted by: 35 industry representatives, 10 industry trade associations and groups, 26 consumer groups and legal services offices six law enforcement organizations, three professors, two labor unions, the Uniform Law Commission, the Responsible Debt Relief Institute, the Better Business Bureau, and 236 individual consumers. The public comments are available at www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/index.shtm.

³⁹ A transcipt of the forum is available at

www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/tsr/tsr-debtrelief/index.shtm. After the forum, Commission staff sett letters to industry trade associations and individual debt relief providers that had submitted public comments, soliciting follow-up information in connection with certain issues that arcseat the forum. The letters are posted at www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/index.shtm. Sixteen organizations responded and provided data.

³⁶ Se cases cited αpa , note 32

- prohibits anytelemaketeror sellerof debt relief services from requesting or receiving payment until itproduces the promised selices and provides proof documenting his fact to the consume
- mandatesertain additional disclosures and obvibits misrepresentations in the telemaketing of debt relief services; and
- extends the exting protections of the TSR tonibound debt likef calls, *ie* those where consumers call a telemarketer in response to ageneral media or direct mail advertisement.⁴⁰

As to its scope, the Final Rule covers telemarketers of for-profit debt relief services, including oredit counstang, debt settlement, and debt groatiation services. Recause the FFC Act exempts nonprofit entities from the eargey's jurisdiction under that Atc and the Telemarketing Act incorporates the FTC Act exemptions, the TSR generally does not apply to such entities. However, companies flasely claiming nonprofit status are subject to both the FTC Act and the TSR.

The Final Rule specifies that fees for debt relief services may not be collected until:

 the debt relief provider successfully renegotiates, settles, reduces, or otherwise changes the 0 0.0000 TD (re)Tj 12.24d0000 TD (e)Tj 5.28.0000 5 TD (e)Tj 5.2800up

⁴⁰ Outbound calls to solicit the purchase of debt relief services are already subject to the TSR.

result of the greement negtiated by the debt risef provider.

To ensure that debt nies f providers do not front-load the fiees if a consume has earolled multiple debts in one dote relief program, the Final Rule specifies how debt nies f providers may collect the fee for each settled debt. First, the provider's fee for a single debt must be in proportion to the total ferthat would be chraged if all of the debts had been settled. Alternatively, if the provider bases its fee on the percentage of what the consumer saves as result of using its services, the percentage charged must be the same for each of the consumer's debts.

Another new provision of the Final Rule will allow debt relief companies to repuire that consumers stanside their des and savings for payment to creditors in a "dediated account." However, providers may only require a dedicated account as long as five conditions are met:

- the dedicated account is maintained at an insured financial institution;
- the consumer owns the funds (including any interest accrued);
- the consumer can withdraw the funds at any time without penalty;
- the providerdoes not own oromtrol or haveanyaffiliation with the compay administering the acount, and

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welfare of our troops and public feety personnein a time of crisis.

The Commission encoures wide inculation of all of its educational resources and makes bulk ordes available free of charge, includingshipping We provide FTC materials to state attorneys general and other local law enforcement entities, consumer groups, and nonprofit organizations, who in turn distribute them directly to consumers. In addition, media outlets – online, print, and brockcast – routinelycite our materials and point to ourugdancewhen covering debt-related news stories.

VI. Conclusion

The FTC appreciates theopportunity to describe its work to protect consumers form deceptive and abusive onduct in the matering of debt relief services. Stopping the narketers of debt relief services who pey on consumers acting financial hardship is amonthe FTC's highest priorities, and we involve our agressive law enforcement and eduational programs in this area

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- 13. *EB t*, No. 1:07-cv00558-RPM (D. Colo., final orderpA. 11, 2008) **d**(ebt settlement) *t* www.ftc.gov/os/casdist/0623140/index.shtm
- 14.
 C Hash (debt negotiation), tar
 ., No. CV06-0298 (W.D. Wash., final ordeune 18, 2007) www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523002/0523002.shtm
- 15. **E** v. **E**