Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission

regulation efforts. We think a careful analysis of current case law and enforcement guidance will alleviate muchf this concern. In particular, we belilemo-Clemo-Cthislie12-26(0f)3(t)--2

make up ausbstantial percentage of the audience? And, are these advertisements i to attract children and teenagers? After a comprehensiment study, the Commissi has found that the answers to both questions are plainly "yes."

Although all three indusies studied have selfegulatory systems that rate or label their products to help parents make choices about their children's entertainment, the Commission found that members of all three industries routinely target children in efforts to advertise and market entertainment products that have been rated or label parental advisories due to their violent content. The Commission believes that thes advertising and marketing efforts undermine each industry's parental advisories ar frustrate parents' attempts to protect their children from inappropriate material.

III. The Commission's Findings

The Commission carefully examined the structure of these rating and labeling syst and studied how these setfgulatory systems work in practice. We fsed on the marketing of products designated as violent under these systems. We did not exar content itself, but accepted each industry's determination of whether a particular procontains sufficient violent content to warrant parental caution.

The Commission found that despite the variations in the three industries' systems, outcome is consistent: individual companies in each industry routinely market to che the very products that have industries'-sreposed parental warnings or ratings with age restrictions due to violent content. Indeed, for many of these products, the Commis found evidence of marketing and media plans that expressly target children under addition, the companies' marketing and media plans showed strategies note and advf 12 0 0nd

realistic and interactive video games. The survey

compatibility so that consumers can make use of the widest and most convenient a services.

The benefits of industry selfegulation are numerous. First, many product standards developed through selfegulation enhance safety. Industry self-regulatory bodies such as the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI") and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers ("ASME") have established usands of voluntary standards regarding matters such as product design, fire prevention, and ethical standards of practice. By establishing a floor of common quality, such standards increase product acceptability and familiarity, which helps facilitate emergence of new markets and the entry of previously unknown products and suppliers. This enhances competition ar innovation.

Second, industry regulatory standards can improve the efficiency of industry members leading to lower costs of production distribution. For example, industry standards can reconcile diverse systems or products, permitting greater interchangeability of part more compatible designs. This is critical in computer, they and network industries. As compatibility increase

enforcement actions. As the Supreme Court observed in connection with standard There is no doubt that the choices. Member firms now had to disclose their marketing practices tumers and permit them to opt out. This option was previously unavailable to consumers, and unlikely to become available absent government action or explication.

Similar efforts to provide truthful information to consumers and to expand censum choices are likely to be found legal, as they would advance the purposes of the an and the consumer protection laws.

V. Applying Antitrust Principles to Entertainment Industry Self -Regulation

The analysis of current case law and enforcement age

group boycott of retailers who dealith price-cutting pirates violated section 5. However, while issues relating to actions against retailers may raise some of the m difficult concerns, appropriately structulreollective action of this type appears unlikely to violate federal antitrust laws. Other avenues that may be pursued include seal programs and "Hall of Shame" type publication of the module of course, entertainment media producers could individually opt not to deal with offending retailers.

Advertising Restraints. Efforts by producers to place appropriate limitations on the targeted advertising of products that rated or labeled as warranting parental caution need not restrict competition unreasonably. If, as suggested above, it is reasonably impose certain restrictions on actual sales or rentals of certain rated or labeled prochildren, it should be resonable under the antitrust laws to restrict advertising of these products to children. So long as the content of, and means available for, marketing products to adult audiences are not unduly restricted, consumers will continue to haccess to product information, and sellers can continue to compete for their patronage. Consequently, selfegulation reasonably tailored to prevent the advertising of certain entertainment products with violent content to children should not impose a significant restraint on legitimate competitive activity. In fact, reasonable regulation should further the competitive process by focusing competitive efforts on legitimate marke activities and by lessening the need for government regulation.

VI. Conclusion

The Commission's exhaustive study of certain segments of the entertainment indu reveals a continuous pattern of target marketing to underage users. Industry self regulation designed to eliminate this marketing is unlikely to violate the antitrust laws. The kinds of selfregulation that would be necessary are likely to be analyzed under the rule of reason. Thus, the Commission concludes that an exemption from the antitruis unnecessary for the industry to establish or expand codes that prohibit target marketing to children and impose sanctions for noncompliance, increase compliance at the relevel, or increase parental understanding of the ratings and labels.

Endnotes:

- 1. This written statement represents the views of the Federal Trade Commission. My oral presentation and responses to questions are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or Commissioner.
- 2. See Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission presented by Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, on "Mark Violent Entertainment of Children: A Review of Seegulation and Industry Practices in Metion Picture, Music Recording, and Electronic Game Industries," September 13, 2000.
- 3. 15 U.S.C. § 41-58.
- 4. 15 U.S.C. § 12-27.

Trade Commission, Before the D.C. Bar Association Symposium (Feb. 18, 1998).

- 16. Restrictions on sales of entertainment products to adults inevitably insistement issues. The Commission's support for enhanced industry-segifulation in the advertising context is motivated in part by our strong belief in the benefits of segifulation, and in part by our concern that government regulation of advertising and marketing-specially if it involves contentiased restrictions any raise First Amendment issues. The First Amendment issues that have been raised in the context of restricting or limiting advertisements for media products are identified in Appeal of the Commission's Reportification of Entertainment Media Products with Violent Content).
- 17. That the restraints have broader public origins, and are not imposed solely by agreemantifocs, is a relevant consideration under a rule of reason analysis. The Supreme Court has been skeptical arguments that competitors alone should be permitted to restrict consumer choice on grounds that consumers may make "unwise" or "dangerous" identissunder competitive market conditions. Stational Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). In Professional Engineers an association attempted to justify a ban on competitive bidding by claiming that such competition would lead "deceptively low bids, and would thereby tempt individual engineers to do inferior work with conseq risk to public safety and health?. at 693. The Supreme Court rejected the asserted justification, explaining that "the Rule of Reason does number a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable?. at 696. In contrast, an agreement to refrain from marketing restricted entertainment products to children would reflect a broader societal view that children occiapyeaplance in the marketplace.
- 18. Further, it is not entirely clear that the prohibited cond**set**ling to children products that warrant parental caution is one that the competitive process is intended to foster. Professional associations often adopt ethical standards to govern members' conduct. Such agreements are permissible so long as unreasonably restrict competition.
- 19. Reasonable selegulation to prevent targeted marketing of restricted products to children, therefore, could bedefended within the parameters established by the ruling of the Supreme Court in *Professional Engineers*, 435 U.S. 679, where the Court held that the rule of reason analysis is limited to competitive considerations. Reasonable selegulation to prevent meeting of such products to children can lend credibility to the rating system and thereby assist the functioning of the market. The situation in *Professional Engineers* was different. In that case, an association attempted to justify a ban on competitive bidding-i.e., on price competition by claiming that such competition would lead to "deceptively low bids, and would thereby tempt individual engineers to do inferior work with consequent risk to public safe health." *Id.* at 693. The Supreme Court rejected the asserted justification.
- 20. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296 (198 (expulsion from a purchasing cooperative did not create a probability of anticompetitive effect "unle cooperative possess[ed] market power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competitive possess[ed] market power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competitive possess[ed] market power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competitive possess[ed] market power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competitive effective competitive effective competitive effective competitive effective competitive effective ef

21. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit

speech of other private entities.

24. Even if a restricted advertising venue has a substantial audience suitable for the advertised product, as well as a significant underage audience, competition will not be significantly affected if firms have a access to other, permissible advertisine nues that reach adults. Only if the various advertising or marketing restrictions, taken together, significantly restrict the flow of information to adult consumer there be an antitrust or First Amendment concern.