## FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580



Office of Policy Planning Bureau of Economics Bureau of Competition

March 9, 2005


The Honorable Harry R. Purkey Commonwealth of Virginia House of Delegates General Assembly Building P.O. Box 406 Richmond, VA 23218





	Current Virginia law governing the practice of entometry prohibits on ontomotrics from
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	in person or through any commercial or mercantile establishment, that he is a licensed
	practitioner and is practicing or will practice optometry as a lessee of or in the commercial or
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	commercial operation. It is unlikely that this business model represents the most efficient
	integration of optometric practice and commercial sales of ophthalmic goods or would exist
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	commercial optometry tend to make commercial optometric practice more difficult and therefore
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· · · · · ·	restrictions tend to increase costs while producing no offsetting consumer benefit, thus resulting
	in a net loss for consumers.
	Two major studies by FTC staff examined many of the same issues presented in SB 272,
	HB 160, and HB 2518. These studies plus several others conducted by independent researchers
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	many price-sensitive consumers deferred seeking eye care. <sup>32</sup>	
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	prevent consumer harm, it is unclear why this prohibition would apply only to commercial
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	Conclusion
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	Current Virginia law places significant restrictions on the commercial practice of
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Mariem K. Oblhauser

Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Director Office of Policy Planning

Luke M. Froeb, Director Bureau of Economics

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