

# **Federal Trade Commission**

# The Vital Role of Truthful Information in the Marketplace

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# I. Introduction

Good evening. It is my great pleasure to present tonight's Roy H. Park Lecture. Thank you to Professor Hoefges of the UNC School of Journalism and Mass Communication for inviting me to participate in this distinguished lecture series. I am particularly honored to be invited, given my lack of journalism credentials. I not only am an attorney, but, I hesitate to tell you, an attorney who graduated from UVa. Tar Heels and Wahoos aside, I am delighted to be here.

We, without a doubt, have become an information society. We are constantly sending, receiving, and absorbing bits and bytes of information – no matter where we happen to be, no matter what the time of day. Being connected 24/7 has dramatically reshaped how we work and play, and how we interact with the world around us. Fortunately, well before we had the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Trade Commission or of any other Commissioner.

capacity to share songs wirelessly using devices like Zune or access the Internet with our iPhones, our constitutional drafters recognized, prominently and rightfully, that the free flow of information is critical to the functioning of a free society. The First Amendment protects citizens' rights to speak out on political issues and to petition their government, and it protects the press's vital role in informing citizens about the happenings of the day so that they can make responsible civic choices (or even just make decisions about what we think of Britney, Paris, government interest.4

Commercial speech is everywhere – particularly in the online marketplace. But let's be honest. We are not always fond of advertising; we may find it annoying or tacky. I recall earlier this year when I was speaking with an official from overseas about spam, and I reminded her that the First Amendment protects truthful speech. With a shake of her head, she muttered in disgust, "Oh yes, you Americans and your First Amendment." "Yes," I said, "we value it highly" – enough to put up with the annoying and tacky.

While you may not have thought of us this way, the FTC, through all of the statutes we enforce and policies we promote, is a protector and defender of commercial speech. The FTC is

bottom line is that although advertising can be annoying, excessive, and even tasteless in some cases, depriving consumers of the opportunity to understand what is available to them in the marketplace can have detrimental effects, just like failing to protect them from deception and fraud.

In an insight that garnered the Nobel Prize in economics for its originator, it is important to recognize that the price system itself is really a mechanism for transmitting information to those in the economy.<sup>7</sup> Prices, when determined in competitive markets, are amazing forces; in one easily understandable data point, a price represents an economy's entire stock of knowledge of the relative scarcity of a particular good or service – knowledge that is dispersed among millions of different consumers and producers.

Take the example of the effect of the 2004 movie *Sideways*. Staged in California wine country, its main character, Miles, has a thing for pinot noir, famously describing its flavors as "the most haunting and brilliant and subtle and thrilling and ancient on the planet."<sup>8</sup> This movie eventually became quite popular, and even was nominated for an Oscar<sup>®</sup>. One result was that purchases of pinot noir skyrocketed.

So, what happened? Stores began to see bottles of pinot noir moving from their shelves much faster than they used to.<sup>9</sup> Merchants ordered more cases of the wine from their

Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 337 (1972).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See F.A. Hayek, *The Use of Knowledge in Society*, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> SIDEWAYS (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Mary-Colleen Tinney, *Retail Sales Analysis: Comprehensive Review of Sales and Trends for 2006*, Wine Business Monthly (Apr. 2007), *available at* http://www.winebusiness.com/ReferenceLibrary/webarticle.cfm?dataId=47409 (pinot noir sales by volume have increased 111 percent since 2005, and dollar sales of pinot noir have increased by 117 percent since

distributors, who in turn increased their orders to the winemakers. The price of pinot noir grapes took off, as did the retail price.<sup>10</sup> Wine growers began to replace other plantings with pinot noir vines.<sup>11</sup> Winemakers in places like New Zealand responded to increased American demand by exporting their pinot noir.<sup>12</sup> Ultimately, wine producers and consumers did not have to see *Sideways*, or even have heard of this movie to respond. Rather, consumers looked at increasing prices and some economized, perhaps purchasing – much to Miles' dismay – merlot instead. Vintners across the world looked at increasing demand and increased their pinot noir production. The market orchestrated this response, directing millions of actors to take the "correct" actions by conveying one piece of data – the price. As a result, although retail prices appear to have risen somewhat, that increase likely will continue to be tempered by the combination of consumer and producer responses in the marketplace.<sup>13</sup>

Imagine how this coordination would have to be accomplished without the information signaled by prices. A central planner first would have to gather data from millions of wine sellers and consumers to measure the magnitude of the increased interest in pinot noir. She would then have to arrange a supply response to satisfy this increased demand by directing wineries to increase their pinot noir production and ordering land currently in other use to be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See Wine Business Insider, *Napa Grapes: Oversupply or Undersupply?* (Sept. 2006), *available at* <u>http://www.winebusiness.com/html/PrinterVersion.cfm?dataID=44490</u> (pinot noir "was selling for only \$800 a ton . . . [n]ow it[']s \$4,000 a ton. We knew Pinot was coming back, but after the movie (*Sideways*), all bets were off.").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See Bill Turrentine, *How Can U.S. Growers Compete with Low-Cost Imports?*, Wine Business Monthly (Jan. 2007), *available at http://www.winebusiness.com/html/PrinterVersion.cfm?dataID=46519*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See Dorothy J. Gaiter & John Brecher, *Charting the 'Sideways' Effect*, WALL ST.

planted with pinot noir grapes. This central authority also would have to figure out a way to ration the available pinot noir among those who wanted it: maybe first-come, first-served, a lottery, or nepotism? Somebody also would have to let New Zealand in on this as well. Of course, nothing is static, and any planner would have to adapt to changes like bad weather and warehouse fires. Clearly, nobody could ever accomplish this, even with the most powerful supercomputers. But, by allowing markets to work, prices choreograph this complex dance between producers and consumers, and our shelves are magically stocked with an everincreasing variety of pinot noir. Prices provide crucial marketplace information that benefits consumers.

When markets aren't allowed to work – either through unwarranted government intervention or private anticompetitive behavior – prices do not reflect true scarcities. The

with an insufficient appreciation of the dynamic nature of markets or consumers' ability to evaluate advertising and other marketplace information.<sup>14</sup>

Back then, the FTC sometimes assumed that consumers could not accurately evaluate some kinds of information or that they would make the "wrong" choices, even without deceptive or misleading advertising. The Commission used newly obtained authority to launch a spate of costly, ill-advised rulemakings – like drafting rules prohibiting the use of the term "waterproof," because at some depth even a nuclear submarine will spring a leak, or rules prohibiting the use of the term "automatic" for sewing machines because you could not just turn them on and let them sew. Similarly, the agency ordered a company to remove its allegedly deceptive ads for a "permanent" hair dye because consumers' hair, as it grew in, would not be the same color as the dyed hair.

Then, in 1978, the FTC embarked on a particularly ill-fated regulatory venture – a rulemaking that came to be known as "kidvid." Aimed at reducing tooth decay in children, the FTC undertook to craft rules restricting the television promotion of highly sugared foods to children – particularly those too young to understand either the nature of commercial advertising or the health risks (in particular, tooth decay) of excessive sugar consumption. One proposed rule would have banned all television advertising for any product that was directed to audiences with a significant proportion of children too young to understand the selling purpose of advertising. After three years, the kidvid matter was closed, and not one of the recommendations was adopted.

The record confirmed that there simply were no workable solutions that the Commission

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> On the antitrust side, the agency sought to reduce the market positions of dominant firms and deconcentrate industries, based merely on the existence of high market shares and without determining whether these high market shares translated into consumer harm.

could implement to effectively address the complex issues at stake. For example, an informational remedy was considered but ultimately determined to be ineffective for the very same reason that the advertising was perceived to be harmful to young children: their inability to understand the persuasive nature of advertising. Other, more practical problems included difficulties in identifying television shows for which the majority of the audience was young children. Audience composition data showed that if the advertising ban were to apply when children aged two to six comprised 50%, or even 30%, of the TV audience, only one network program, Captain Kangaroo, would have been affected.<sup>15</sup> Of course, lowering the threshold audience share would have encompassed more programming; however, that would have meant banning truthful advertising on programs whose audiences were predominantly over age six and presumably able to understand such advertising.

That the Commission would even consider such an intervention angered the public and members of Congress, and the damage to the Commission from this venture was substantial. For a brief time, Congress allowed the agency's funding to lapse, and the agency was literally shut down. The *Washington Post*, normally a reliable supporter of the agency's consumer protection work, editorialized that the proposal was "a preposterous intervention that would turn the FTC into a great national nanny."<sup>16</sup> The *Post* further observed:

[T]he proposal, in reality, is designed to protect children from the weaknesses of their parents – and the parents from the wailing insistence of their children. That, traditionally, is one of the roles of a governess – if you can afford one. It is not a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> FTC Final Staff Report and Recommendation, *In the Matter of Children's Advertising* 37-39 (Mar. 1981).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Editorial, *The FTC as National Nanny*, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22.

proper role of government.<sup>17</sup>

This experience taught our agency many lessons that, fortunately, we remember today.

#### **B.** The Present

Today, the FTC operates with a better appreciation of the ability of consumers and of markets to process information. To protect vital marketplace information, the FTC takes several, varied steps, including: (1) preventing fraud and deceptive advertising; (2) encouraging industry self-regulation, where appropriate; (3) combatting both private and public restrictions on the provision of non-misleading information, and (4) ensuring that prices convey accurate information.

## **1.** Preventing Fraud and Deceptive Advertising

To protect marketplace information, the FTC prevents fraud and deceptive advertising with much success. There are challenges in this area, however, that raise tricky issues, including navigating the proper course between protecting consumers and not unduly restricting speech. Let me relate the story of one recidivist whom the agency has had several occasions to challenge in court. In 1998, the Commission filed a complaint against Kevin Trudeau charging him with making false or deceptive claims in infomercials for various products or systems purported to cause significant weight loss, reverse hair loss, achieve a photographic memory, and cure addictions to food, alcohol, tobacco, or narcotics.<sup>18</sup> Trudeau paid half a million dollars in consumer redress and entered into a settlement that prohibited unsubstantiated representations for any product. In addition, he was required to disclose that his infomercials were in fact paid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> *Id. See also* J. Howard Beales, III, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory Retrospective That Advises the Present (2004), *available at* http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/040802adstokids.pdf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> *FTC v. Kevin Trudeau*, Civ. No. 98-C-0168 (N.D. Ill. 1998), *available at* <u>http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/01/megasyst.shtm.</u>

advertisements.

Notwithstanding the 1998 injunction, Trudeau claimed in subsequent infomercials that Coral Calcium Supreme, a dietary supplement purportedly made from marine coral, cured terminally ill cancer patients and enabled multiple sclerosis patients to get up out of their wheel calories a day), colon washes from a licensed therapist every other day for a month, daily injections of a prescription drug not easily obtained because it is not approved in the U.S. for weight loss, and lifelong dietary restrictions. This case is ongoing.

There are several points to be gleaned from the Trudeau saga. First, we consider the prevention of deceptive health-related advertising claims to be one of our highest priorities. We tenaciously pursue those who persist in making false and deceptive claims, particularly in important areas like health. Second, the FTC's targeted approach to preventing deception in the marketplace dovetails with First Amendment principles intended to promote the free flow of truthful and non-misleading commercial speech. Like the balancing that courts undertake in reviewing government restrictions on commercial speech, the FTC's approach strikes a balance that is rigorous enough to attack inaccurate or misleading claims, yet flexible enough to encourage accurate claims. This approach results in greater dissemination of valuable information with benefits for both consumers and competition. Third, although we rarely proceed against book authors on the basis of their book promotions, reference to a book does not afford a First Amendment shelter against false or deceptive advertising. Consumers are entitled to accurate information about advertised products, programs, and services – whatever form that information might take.

Unfortunately, the weight loss product industry is rife with deception. As you well know, we have an obesity problem in this country, and trying to lose weight has practically

them, we tried to get creative. We developed an Internet "teaser" site – our name for a website that mimics fraudulent sites by peddling a fake product our staff created. Our fake product is Fat Foe. Made from eggplant extract, it promises effortless weight loss. After one click, though, the site teaches viewers that, had they ordered the product, the only thing they would have lost was their money. To date, more than 170,000 people have visited the site and hopefully have learned to be more cautious about falling for promises of easy weight loss.

In another effort to battle this fraud from all angles, we decided to enlist the help of the media. In 2003, the FTC published a guide that describes seven claims in weight loss ads that should raise red flags because they are always false.<sup>24</sup> For example, any claim that you can lose weight without diet or exercise is false. My predecessor, then-Chairman Muris and one of my former colleagues, Commissioner Leary, met with members of the media and asked that they "do the right thing" and refuse to run advertisements that make the "Red Flag" claims.

comply with either decision, then the matter is sent to the appropriate government agency for review, often the FTC.

## a. Childhood Obesity

Self-regulation is playing a prominent role tackling the complex problem of childhood obesity. Nearly 20% of children ages 6-11 in the U.S. are overweight,<sup>27</sup> and the consequent health problems are serious. For example, in the past decade, the incidence of Type 2 diabetes in children and youth has doubled. The causes of the problem, however, are complex, with numerous contributing factors. I have been candid that government regulation of truthful, non-misleading advertising is not the answer for primarily two reasons. First, any proposal for government regulations broadly restricting food advertising to children would have to pass muster under the First Amendment.<sup>28</sup> Under that test, the government would first have to convince the courts that advertising negatively affects children's health, or at least that restricting food advertising to children would directly advance their health and would need to show that there are no options to protect children's health that would not involve limiting speech. Because commercial speech, including advertising, is a valuable source of information to consumers, the Supreme Court clearly disfavors approaches that restrict speech.<sup>29</sup>

Second, all segments of society – parents, schools, government, health care professionals,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Overweight and Obesity: Childhood Overweight: Overweight Prevalence," *available at* <u>http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/childhood/prevalence.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)(articulating a four-part test for evaluating whether government restrictions on commercial speech are constitutional under the First Amendment).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1995)(stating that if government can achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts speech less, it must do so); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996).

food companies, and the media – have an obligation to fight this public health crisis, and we will not conquer childhood obesity until we have succeeded in bringing about substantial, lasting, and holistic changes by all involved.

One of my priorities at the Commission has been to use the power of the food and media industries to tackle childhood obesity, guided by the First Amendment's protection for commercial speech and the kidvid experience. In 2005, the FTC, together with the Department of Health and Human Services, convened a public workshop on Marketing, Self-Regulation, and Childhood Obesity, bringing together some of the largest food manufacturers and entertainment companies, as well as academics, consumer advocates, pediatricians, and government officials. Out of the workshop came a series of recommendations for enhanced self-regulatory initiatives, product reformulation, development of nutritional guidelines for foods marketed to kids, and use of popular TV and movie characters to promote nutritious foods.<sup>30</sup> In July 2007, when the FTC and HHS convened a follow-up forum to review progress in implementing self-regulatory and educational initiatives, we were pleased to showcase some of significant developments in the two-year intervening period.<sup>31</sup>

For example, nearly a year ago, the Council of Better Business Bureaus and the BBB's National Advertising Review Council announced the Children's Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative, a bold effort to change the profile of food advertising directed to children under 12 and

<sup>30</sup> FTC, Perspectives on Marketing, Self-Regulation, & Childhood Obesity: A Report on a Joint Workshop of the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Health and Human Services 50-54 (Apr. 2006), available at <u>http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/05/PerspectivesOnMarketingSelf-</u> Regulation&ChildhoodObesityFTCandHHSReportonJointWorkshop.pdf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> FTC Workshop, *Weighing In: A Check-Up on Marketing, Self-Regulation, and Childhood Obesity* (July 2007), *available at* <u>http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/childobesity/index.shtml.</u>

to encourage healthier eating choices.<sup>32</sup> To date, 12 major food companies – including McDonald's, PepsiCo, and Kellogg, among others – have joined the Initiative. For nine of these companies, advertising directed to children under 12 – including, TV, radio, print, and Internet – will be limited to foods that qualify as "better for you" by meeting specified nutritional standards. These standards involve limitations on calories, fat, sugar, and sodium and/or providing certain nutritional benefits to children. Three companies – Coca Cola, Hershey, and Mars – have pledged to direct no advertising to children under 12. Other companies have separately committed to direct no advertising to children under ages 6 or 8. In addition, all of the companies have pledged to limit the use of licensed characters to ads for "better-for-you" products or to healthy lifestyle messages, not to seek product placements in child-directed media, not to advertise food or beverages in elementary schools, and to use only their "better-for-you" products in interactive games – or advergames – directed to kids. These pledges are a major step forward, and we are optimistic that they will produce a significant change in the children's food marketing landscape.

At the same time, media and entertainment companies are using their considerable marketing power to reach young audiences with positive health messages. Even Cookie Monster has changed his tune – cookies are now a "sometimes" food. And Sesame Workshop executives have even joked that he may soon become "Pilates Monster."<sup>33</sup> Disney, Nickelodeon, and Cartoon Network have adopted policies to limit the licensing of their characters to foods meeting certain nutritional guidelines. Disney has formed a partnership with Imagination Farms to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> See, Council of Better Business Bureaus, Children's Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative, available at http://www.cbbb.org/initiative/.

license favorite Disney characters to promote fresh fruits and vegetables, and Nickelodeon's SpongeBob and Dora the Explorer now appear on packages of carrots and spinach. And when Dreamwork's Shrek is featured in Ad Council messages urging kids to "Get up and play an hour a day," there is a good chance that children will respond. Most recently, Ion Media Networks – which through a partner produces children's weekend programming on NBC and Telemundo – made a commitment not to air advertising for less healthy foods and beverages on children's programs and to create story lines that promote good eating habits and physical activity.

As these initiatives are being launched, the FTC is undertaking its own research on food marketing to kids. At the request of Congress, the agency is conducting a comprehensive study of food industry marketing expenditures and activities targeted toward both children and teenagers. We will explore what is happening not only in the traditional measured media – TV, radio, and print – but also in the many non-traditional, and often unmeasured, promotional activities targeted to kids. These include, among many others: the Internet, including advergames; other digital advertising, such as cell phones; product placements in movies, videos, or TV programs; character licensing and toy co-branding; and word-of-mouth marketing. Because these media are largely "unmeasured," other researchers often have not been able to gain access to the relevant data. The FTC, however, has the statutory authority to require industry members to file special reports or answers to specific questions.<sup>34</sup> In early August, compulsory process orders were sent to 44 food and beverage companies and quick-service restaurants,<sup>35</sup> and responses are due on November 1. The resulting report to Congress, also to be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> The orders are available at <u>http://www.ftc.gov/os/6b\_orders/foodmktg6b/index.shtm</u>.

made publicly available,<sup>36</sup> will provide a comprehensive picture of spending and techniques used to market food to children and adolescents in 2006. This data will provide the Commission, and others, an important benchmark against which to measure the effects of the industry selfregulatory initiatives I just described.<sup>37</sup>

#### b. Media Violence – Truth in Labeling

Violence in entertainment products marked to children – an issue once largely outside of the purview of the FTC – has become another area of focus in recent years. Like childhood obesity, it is a problem that can be addressed, in part, by industry self-regulation and increased availability of accurate information. Because movies, music, and video games are types of speech, and thus government regulation must be limited, effective self-regulation regarding the labeling and advertising of entertainment media products can play an important role. It permits industry to be creative while at the same time fulfilling the need of parents to have accurate information about entertainment products so they can make informed decisions for their families.

The FTC's role here has been to periodically assess entertainment self-regulation through public reports. Since 2000, the FTC has responded to requests from Congress and issued six reports on the marketing of movies, music, and video games that are rated or labeled as containing content that may not be appropriate for children.<sup>38</sup> Our first report documented

<sup>37</sup> In June of this year, the FTC's Bureau of Economics published research comparing children's exposure to television advertising in 1977 and 2004. *See* FTC Staff, *Children's Exposure to TV Advertising in 1977 and 2004: Information for the Obesity Debate* (June 2007), *available at* <u>http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/cabecolor.pdf</u>. The report concluded that children are not exposed to more food ads on TV than they were in 1977, although their ad exposure now is more concentrated on children's programming, particularly that on cable television. Of course, such advertising also has shifted to new technologies not available to advertisers in 1977, and that phenomenon will be explored in the study currently underway.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> The FTC will protect the confidentiality of sensitive company financial information, and financial data will be reported only in the aggregate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> The reports are available at <u>http://www.ftc.gov/ratings/</u>.

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board of realtors in Austin, Texas<sup>47</sup> violated the antitrust laws by effectively preventing consumers who have opted for potentially lower-cost unbundled brokerage services from marketing their listings on public, real estate-related Internet sites. The potential anticompetitive effects of such conduct are significant, as the Internet has now surpassed the yard sign as the most important marketing tool to reach consumers of real estate.

Then, in October 2006, the FTC filed a law enforcement sweep, in which we challenged similar restrictive rules adopted by seven groups of brokers operating multiple listing services. MLSs are local or regional joint ventures of real estate brokers who pool and disseminate information on homes available for sale in their particular geographic areas. As anyone who has been involved in a real estate transaction knows, the MLS is an important resource for sellers, buyers, and brokers of real estate. In the enforcement sweep, the FTC alleged that the seven broker groups adopted rules that withheld the valuable benefits of the MLSs they control from consumers who chose to enter into non-traditional real estate listing agreements. Six of the seven groups blocked non-traditional, less-than-full-service listings from being transmitted by the MLS to a wide variety of popular Internet sites, while the seventh blocked such non-traditional listings from the MLS entirely. The FTC reached settlements with six<sup>48</sup> of the groups

<sup>48</sup> MiRealSource, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9321 (2007) (decision and order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9321/070323decisionorder.pdf; Northern New England Real Estate Network, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. C-4175 (2006) (decision and order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510065/0510065do061128.pdf; Monmouth County Association of Realtors, FTC Dkt. No. C-4176 (2006) (decision and order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510217/0510217do061128.pdf; Williamsburg Area Association of Realtors, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. C-4177 (2006) (decision and order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0610268/0610268do061128.pdf; Realtors Association of Northeast Wisconsin, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. C-4178 (2006) (decision and order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0610267/0610267do061130.pdf; Information and Real Estate Services, LLC, FTC Dkt. No. C-4179 (2006) (decision and order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0610267/0610267do061130.pdf; Information and Real Estate Services, LLC, FTC Dkt. No. C-4179 (2006) (decision and order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0610267/0610267do061130.pdf; Information and Real Estate Services, LLC, FTC Dkt. No. C-4179 (2006) (decision and order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0610087/0610087do061201.pdf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> *Austin Board of Realtors*, FTC Dkt. No. C-4167 (2006) (decision and order), *available at* http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510219/0510219c4167AustinBoardofRealtorsDecisionandOrder.pdf.

and non-misleading claims about the nutrient content and health benefits of foods.<sup>51</sup> As staff has observed, if food marketers can make truthful health and nutrient content claims for their products, consumers will become more aware of the significance of the nutrients in foods and will be prompted to review the nutrition facts panels to obtain more information. Comparative advertising among food marketers often highlights why one brand is more nutritious than a competing brand. This competition, along with consumers' heightened interest in purchasing more nutritious products, gives food marketers strong economic incentives to develop and market healthier products to satisfy consumers – so goes the cycle of the market.

Empirical evidence confirms that if consumers receive more and better information about nutrition and health, they are able to make better-informed choices about the food products they purchase. A study on the effects of the dissemination of health information in the ready-to-eat cereal market provides a concrete example of the consumer and competitive benefits of policies that allow health claims for food products.<sup>52</sup> Prior to 1984, such claims were not allowed. That year, however, the Kellogg Company began claiming on labels and in advertising that its All Bran® cereal was high in fiber and that diets high in fiber could reduce the risk of cancer, claims that were consistent with the existing recommendations of the National Cancer Institute.

<sup>51</sup> See, e.g., Comments of FTC Staff in the Matter of Draft Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff: Whole Grains Label Statements, FDA Dkt. No. 2006-0066 (Apr. 2006), *available at* <u>http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/04/v060014FTCStaffCommentstotheFDAReDocketNo2006-0066.pdf;</u> Comments of FTC Staff in the Matter of Request for Comments on Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, FDA Dkt. Nos. 1994P-0390 & 1995P-0241 (July 2004), *available at* <u>http://www.ftc.gov/be/V040020.pdf;</u> Comments of FTC Staff in the Matter of Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, FDA Dkt. No. 03N-0076 (Apr. 2004), *available at* <u>http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/04/040416foodlabeling.pdf.</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> See FTC Staff, Health Claims in Advertising and Labeling: A Study of the Cereal Market (Aug. 1989), available at <u>http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/232187.pdf</u>.

cereals.

The emergence of these health claims apparently led to significant changes in consumer cereal choices. Three years later, consumers had substantially increased their consumption of high-fiber cereals, with the greatest increase occurring in the groups that had previously consumed the least amount of such cereal. The profile of the cereal market changed as well, with the market share for high-fiber cereals increasing by almost four percentage points and more high-fiber cereals introduced into the market.<sup>53</sup> The dissemination of the fiber/cancer claims thus benefited consumers by providing important dietary guidance and by expanding the range of high-fiber cereal choices available to them in the market.

Another area in which the FTC has been actively seeking to prevent government restrictions on the provision of marketplace information is attorney advertising. Much like weeds that return to our gardens each spring, restrictions on attorney advertising seem to turn up in the states every few years. To be sure, the recurring debate over attorney advertising involves important policy concerns, not least of which is preventing claims that would deceive or mislead lay people and thereby undermine public trust in lawyers and the legal system. FTC staff, however, has repeatedly expressed its view to various state supreme courts and bar associations that consumers are better off if concerns about potentially misleading advertising of legal services are addressed through restrictions that are narrowly tailored to prevent deceptive claims. In contrast, imposing overly broad restrictions that prevent the communication of truthful and non-misleading information that some consumers may value is likely to inhibit competition in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> *Id.* at 33, 42-47, 82-87. For a more recent study of the effects of food advertising, see FTC Staff, *Advertising Nutrition and Health: Evidence from Food Advertising 1977-1997* (Sept. 2002), *available at* <u>http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/advertisingfinal.pdf</u>.

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group of competitors regulates another: that is, attorneys reviewing advertisements and

numerous calls in Congress and elsewhere for investigations of so-called "price gouging," particularly at the retail gasoline level, and for legislation making price gouging a violation of federal law. The FTC is acutely aware of the pain that these price increases have caused consumers and small businesses. Consumers understandably are upset when they face dramatic bring more product to the most severely affected areas of the country, further blunting the price increases. For example, imports of large quantities of gasoline to United States ports from European and other locations damped the price increases. In addition, because of increased refinery utilization and a shift in output from other products to gasoline, the production of gasoline increased at U.S. refineries outside the hurricane zone. This increase in gasoline production – which became profitable for these refineries precisely because of the post-hurricane gasoline price increase – ultimately led gasoline prices back down following the initial shock of the hurricanes.

If these price signals are distorted by price controls, consumers ultimately might be worse off because producers may manufacture and distribute an inefficient amount of goods and services, and consumers may lack the information necessary to properly value one product against another. Thus, if there is a "right" price for a commodity, it is not necessarily the low price; rather, it is the competitively determined market price. Relative to past prices, a competitive market price may sometimes be low, and it may sometimes be high; but it will send an accurate signal to producers to manufacture a sufficient amount of goods and services that consumers want to buy at that price, and an accurate signal to consumers to reallocate purchase decisions.

The troubling thing about proposals for price-gouging legislation is that they indicate that we do not learn from past mistakes. In April 2007, the FTC held a three-day conference on "Energy Markets in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Competition Policy in Perspective."<sup>58</sup> The first panel

Crises of the 1970s? What Did We Learn?" The 1970s oil crisis, one expert panelist explained, became serious largely because government officials turned to allocations and price controls. The inevitable result was an imbalance between supply and demand, long lines at gas stations, and forms of hoarding that actually compounded the problems. The clear lesson is that there is a role for government in dealing with such crises, but it consists not in efforts to dictate the final quantities of price or supply, but rather in adopting forms of regulatory flexibility that will allow firms to find effective responses to a situation.

Even if Congress outlaws price gouging, the law likely would be difficult to enforce fairly. The challenge in crafting a price-gouging statute is to be able to distinguish gougers from those who are reacting in an economically rational manner to the temporary shortages resulting from the emergency. This is more than just a problem for legislators and prosecutors. Gasoline suppliers may react to this difficulty in distinguishing gougers by keeping their prices lower than they rationally would. Consumers, in turn, may have no incentive to curb their demand as they would in response to a higher price. Other suppliers may have no incentive to send new supplies to the affected area, as they would if the price increased. The end result may be long gasoline lines or even rationing. For all of these reasons, the Commission remains persuaded that federal price-gouging legislation would unnecessarily hurt consumers. Enforcement of the antitrust laws is the better way to protect consumers.

## IV. The Future

Looking to the future, we anticipate that the flow of marketplace informationnew ns, thoC /Lhhfty rea, as

missions and for consumers.

### a. Tech-ade Hearings

Last November, the FTC held hearings on "Protecting Consumers in the Next Techade."<sup>59</sup> Over one hundred experts testified regarding the amazing changes in store for us over the coming ten years (to the extent anyone can predict). Many of the developments are rooted in the explosion of the Internet and other technologies that enable new methods of communication at speeds that could not have been imagined even a decade ago. The increased speed at which communication happens is only part of the equation, however. Speed, combined with the ability to receive this information virtually anywhere, has created an environment in which the average consumer, as one participant described it, demands "what I want when I want it." The end result is that the amount of data flowing in the marketplace will likely continue to increase, consumers will be the source of much of this information in the new "user-generated content" paradigm, and the information produced will be more easily obtained by all those seeking it.

To illustrate this point, consider the way in which something as simple as shopping for a new dishwasher has changed just over the past few years. Consumers can now conduct research online, from home, work, or even the showroom floor. The sources of information have multiplied, and now, in addition to information compiled by professional sources, shoppers can readily find product reviews posted by individual consumers. Price comparisons are also available on the Internet, through a variety of research and shopping sites. And, consumers can complete the transaction with a few mouse clicks, never having to set foot in a store.

During the Tech-ade hearings, we also heard a great deal about how companies are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> FTC Workshop, *Protecting Consumers in the Next Tech-ade* (Nov. 2006), *available at* <u>http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/techade/index.html</u>.

leveraging available technology to improve their marketing efforts. The practice of behavioral targeting – that is, tracking consumers' online activity to better target advertising – is one of the most important technology-driven developments we are following. In fact, on November 1-2, the FTC will hold a town-hall meeting, entitled "Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and Technology,"<sup>60</sup> to delve even more deeply into this topic. It is clear, however, that deployment of technology to develop in-depth profiles of consumers' habits and preferences and to market to consumers using that data, has already occurred. This represents a significant evolution from the early days of direct advertising, when, as one of our Tech-ade presenters pointed out, geographic location was the main factor in determining which advertising consumers would receive. Today, in addition to geography, marketers can tailor their advertising based on information about consumers' prior online and offline purchases, their online surfing habits, their self-reported interests, and very granular demographic data gleaned from data aggregators' files. This development, though, has led to concerns about consumer privacy, and we will address those concerns at our town hall.

The positive effects of this flow of information, both to and from consumers, are likely to continue as the introduction and adoption of new technology advances in the coming years. The

# **B.** Broadband Report

Let me next address an ongoing effort on the competition side. One of the single greatest sources of commercial (and non-commercial) information for consumers today – and for the foreseeable future – is, of course, the Internet. In August 2006, I convened the Internet Access Task Force to examine issues raised by converging technologies and regulatory developments, and to inform the enforcement, advocacy, and education initiatives of the Commission. A few months ago, the FTC released a staff report,<sup>61</sup> which summarizes the Task Force's findings in the area of broadband Internet access, including the issue of "network neutrality." For those of you unfamiliar with this ongoing debate, it generally involves the question of whether the transmission of data over the Internet should be subject to some type of regulation prohibiting or limiting certain practices by Internet service providers. For example, most net neutrality proposals would prohibit ISPs from providing priority data transmission to content and applications providers for a fee.

The bottom-line recommendation of the report is caution. Based on what we have learned through our examination of broadband connectivity issues and our experience with antitrust and consumer protection issues more generally, the report recommends that policy makers proceed cautiously in evaluating calls for net neutrality, for four principal reasons.

First, to date we are unaware of any significant market failure or demonstrated consumer harm from conduct by broadband providers. In general, policy makers should be wary of enacting regulation solely to prevent prospective harm to consumers. This is a particular concern where we do not know what the net effects of potential conduct by broadband providers will be on: (1) the prices that consumers may pay for Internet access, (2) the quality of Internet

FTC Staff, *Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy* (June 2007), *available at* http://www.ftc.gov/S0 ssue of "network n9 .0006 Tc -r6 -0ork n.pdf 5 BDC 0.0006 Tc 9.2 0 0 7.2g7.2 2822.916

access and other services that will be offered, and (3) the choices of content and applications that may be available to consumers in the marketplace.

Second, the broadband market is young and dynamic. We have seen evidence on a national scale that access speeds are increasing, prices – particularly speed-adjusted or quality-adjusted prices – are falling, and new entrants, including wireless and other competitors, are poised to challenge the incumbent cable and telephone companies.

My third reason for suggesting that policy makers proceed with caution is that regulation can have unintended negative consequences. Despite the good intentions of their proponents, industry-wide regulatory schemes – particularly those imposing general, one-size-fits-all restraints on business conduct – may well have adverse effects on consumer welfare, as certain unintended consequences may not be known until far into the future.

My final reason for suggesting that we proceed with caution is that the federal antitrust agencies – the FTC and the DOJ – and the FCC have the capacity and authority to address broadband access issues. Antitrust law, in particular, is well-equipped to deal with the competitive issues raised in the net neutrality debate. These competitive issues are not new to antitrust law, which is general, flexible, and able to analyze potential conduct and business arrangements involving broadband Internet access, just as it has been able to deal with such conduct and arrangements across many diverse markets.

# V. Conclusion

To conclude, as I hope my comments this evening have made clear, the free flow of accurate, truthful, and non-misleading information is crucial to the well-being of consumers and a competitive economy. As the FTC pursues its competition and consumer protection missions, it will continue to expend considerable resources to protect this vital marketplace information.

Thank you. I would be happy to take any questions.

37