


Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003

**Summary of Agreements Filed in FY 2009
A Report by the Bureau of Competition**

The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) requires that pharmaceutical companies file all agreements with the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice within ten days of execution. We summarize below the number and types of agreements received

- f Sixty-eight of the agreements were final resolutions of patent disputes between a brand company and a generic company.
- f Twelve were interim agreements that occurred during patent litigation between a brand and a generic company, but did not fully resolve the litigation.
- f One was an agreement between generic companies.
- f The remaining two agreements were brand-generic agreements that did not settle patent litigation on a patent held by the brand company on a final or interim basis, and thus do not fall within either three categories.

**Figure I:
Overall Breakdown of Agreements Provided under the MMA in Fiscal Year 2009**



I. Final Settlements

The analysis below categorizes the final settlements based on whether there is a restriction on the generic's ability to compete and what compensation, if any, flows between the parties. In FY 2009, 19 final settlements included both compensation to the generic company and a restriction on its ability to market its product more than in any year since passage of the MMA in 2003. As in FY 2008 and FY 2007, a majority of these involved first filer-generic companies (13, or 68%). In FY 2009, the form of compensation to generics was split almost evenly between direct payments to the generic and side deals which involve compensation to the generic that is not directly related to elements of the patent dispute. A handful of agreements also involved the brand's agreement not to compete with the generic through the launch of an authorized generic, for at least some period of time. Two agreements involved both side deals and an authorized generic restriction.

- f* In eight of the settlements, the brand made only a cash payment to the generic.
- f* In two of the settlements, the compensation principally took the form of an agreement by the branded company that effectively eliminated competition from an authorized generic product.
- f* In nine of the settlements involving compensation to the generic company and a restriction on its ability to market its product, the compensation flowed to the generic in the form of a side-deal. Two of these agreements involving side deals also included the brand's promise not to launch an authorized generic or to designate the generic first filer as the exclusive authorized generic.

In FY 2009, brand and generic companies entered several different types of side deals.

- f* Four agreements included supply and distribution deals whereby the brand agreed to supply the generic with an unrelated drug to be sold by the generic. In three of these agreements, the generic would sell the drug under its own name. Of those three settlements, two also included a side co-promotion agreement under which the generic company agreed to promote an unrelated product unrelated to the underlying litigation. In the fourth of these settlements, the generic would sell an authorized generic version of two future dosage strengths of the drug that had not yet received FDA approval. This settlement also included a separate asset purchase agreement whereby the brand agreed to purchase unrelated assets from the generic.
- f* Two agreements involved supply agreements with the generic supplying the brand as a back-up supplier for the product at issue.
- f* Two agreements involved development agreements between the brand and the generic to develop products related to the issue in the underlying litigation. Both development deals involved up-front payments from the brand to the generic.
- f* In one agreement, the brand agreed to purchase a license from the generic company to intellectual property related to the underlying drug, transferred eight products to the generic for the generic to sell, and made a cash payment characterized as attorneys fees.

The four agreements between the brand and generic in FY 2009 that effectively eliminated competition from an authorized generic product took two basic forms.

- f* In two agreements, the branded company promised that the generic company's product would not face competition from an authorized generic product for some period of time.

f In the two other agreements, the brand company designated the first-filer generic company as the exclusive distributor of an authorized generic product, effectively eliminating the possibility that the generic would face competition from an independent authorized generic product.

B. Thirty-eight settlements included a restriction on the generic's entry and no explicit compensation to the generic.

In FY 2009, 38 final settlements included a restriction on generic entry but no explicit compensation to the generic company.

f Of these 38 settlements filed in FY 2009, 15 involved generic companies eligible for 180-day exclusivity rights, while 23 involved generics without 180-day exclusivity rights.

o Of the 15 final settlements that restricted 180-day exclusivity holders' generic entry but did not include explicit compensation to the generic:

f Nine agreements involved products with multiple generic firms sharing potential 180-day exclusivity rights, including up to 10 first-filers in certain cases.

f One occurred when the district court granted a preliminary injunction precluding the sale of the drug after the generic had already shipped certain quantities of the product into the distribution network but had not yet sold the generic to end users because of a "standstill agreement." After the court granted the preliminary injunction, rather than recall the previously shipped product, the final settlement permitted the generic to sell product that it had already shipped and pay the brand a royalty on those sales.

f An additional two of these agreements included provisions that may have provided the generic with some implicit benefit. In one of these agreements, the generic agreed to pay the brand a royalty on generic sales, but the generic's royalty obligation is reduced or eliminated if the brand launches an authorized generic product. In the other agreement, the generic settled the matter after launching "at risk," raising the possibility that the at-risk launch may have been designed to compensate the generic for subsequently staying out of the market by allowing it to sell its stock of the drug without competition from another generic. As part of the settlement, the brand agreed to release the generic from liability arising from its one-day sale of the drug.

f In FY 2009, 23 final settlements involving generics without 180-day exclusivity rights restricted generic entry but did not include explicit compensation.

- Of these 23 final settlements, 15 were reached either in conjunction with or after settlements with first filers of the same drug and provided for generic entry by the later filer at least 180 days after the first filer enters. An additional six settlements followed decisions in favor of the branded company in related patent litigation. Of those six, five agreements involved situations following a court decision favoring the brand in which the generic had launched at risk. In those agreements, the brand granted the generics a license to sell a limited quantity of the gene

generic in the form of the brand's commitment to not launch an AG if the generic prevailed in the patent litigation in exchange for the generic's agreement to not launch "at risk" for a period of five months.

f Four interim agreements included a covenant by the brand not to sue a generic for infringement of a specific patent. One of these agreements also provided that the parties would be bound by the results of related litigation.

III. Generic-Generic Agreements

In FY 2009, one agreement between generic manufacturers was filed pursuant to the MMA, compared to three in FY 2008. The single agreement related to an arrangement under which one generic manufacturer agreed to relinquish its 180-day exclusivity rights in exchange for profit-sharing on the other's generic product.

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Figure III: Breakdown of Final Settlements by Restriction and Compensation




Figure IV: Breakdown of Final Settlements with First-Filers by Restriction and Compensation

