

# **Price and Quality Relationships in Local Service Industries**

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products. The results of these studies have also been quite consistent. In general, price and quality are only weakly correlated, with coefficients usually ranging from .20 to .25 [7]. These results are construed as evidence that consumer product markets perform "poorly," with one set of coauthors feeling motivated to title their article "The Chaos of Competition." [10]

This literature suffers from several weaknesses and limitations. Most obviously, the results can be no more reliable than CR's product ratings. Even if it is assumed that all of the CR protocols were appropriate and the tests performed competently, CR might not weight the various performance attributes for complex products such as stereo equipment, dishwashers, or tires in the same manner as would the average consumer.

And, if CR did happen to replicate the tastes of average consumers, significant subsets of buyers might still rank the products differently and willingly pay more for specialized products that might do relatively poorly in the ratings. Further, CR's ratings are not based on aesthetic qualities that may be very important to many consumers and that tend to be directly related to price.

Finally, sole reliance on CR automatically excludes all of the consumer service and retail industries that are supplied locally. Published studies of price and quality correlations for local services are limited to analyses of the legal and optometrical markets, where price advertising has been severely constrained [3]. We therefore have no systematic examinations of price and

Although some establishments refuse to participate in this phase of WCC's research, ratings generally are available for 85-90 percent of the rated firms. WCC confers a check rating for price to the firms with the lowest price index scores.

In addition to price data, WCC customarily contacts local consumer protection offices to determine the number of complaints on file for each of the surveyed firms. (As discussed below, the complaint data provide one means of checking the reliability of the WCC survey results.) Finally, for approximately one-third of the rated industries, WCC gathers information from firms on the number of principal employees, such as auto mechanics or licensed plumbers. This information is used to normalize the complaint data for size of firm, and is not published separately.<sup>3</sup> WCC agreed, however, to provide all available employee data for the most recent rating period. These data serve as a measure of firm size in the statistical analysis.<sup>4</sup>

WCC Magazine is published on a roughly biannual basis, with approximately five or six industries per issue. For certain industries, such as medical professionals and financial institutions, WCC does not provide overall quality ratings and/or price index information. For the current research, suitably complete data were available for 19 service industries. In most cases, each industry was rated on several occasions over time. These industries are presented in Table I below, with the number of individual data sets for each industry given in parentheses.

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<sup>3</sup> Assuming a firm has at least one complaint on file, the employee data can be derived using the absolute number of complaints and the complaint rate index, both of which are provided in the ratings. The majority of firms, however, have no complaints, thus precluding any indirect calculation of employee size.

<sup>4</sup> The ratings already contain a very rough indicator of firm size as measured by the number of respondents rating the various providers. These numbers will, however, be heavily skewed toward providers who have received high ratings in past issues of WCC, since respondents to the WCC questionnaire will be far more likely than the general public to have relied on those prior ratings as a shopping tool.



performance more critically, or be more likely to experience difficulties because of the nature of their particular service requests. Again, this potential bias in the WCC data may weaken or even reverse any positive relationship between price and quality that may actually exist in the surveyed service markets.

The price data published by WCC have their own potential problems. It would not be practical or prudent for WCC to gather price information as part of its consumer satisfaction survey. Even if consumers could remember price information reliably, there would in most instances be no way to pin down the precise nature and scope of the service that was provided. Thus, WCC gathers its own information, and is usually limited by time and budget constraints to soliciting price quotes for a small subset of the wide range of jobs provided by firms in most service industries. As a result, the price index based on these quotes is reliable only to the extent that the sampled prices reflect the prices of the services that consumers actually choose from each provider. As indicated earlier, WCC often publishes hourly labor data to supplement the price index, which provides a rough consistency check for the analysis.

The above difficulties notwithstanding, the WCC ratings provide the most comprehensive source of information on price and quality in the local service sector that we are likely to have in the foreseeable future. It would not be economically feasible for a private tester such as Consumers Union to purchase such services directly and evaluate quality. There are simply too many providers and the cost of many of the services is too high. Further, unlike many of the durables tested by CR, services cannot be resold in the used market. The WCC data therefore deserve attention by researchers.

## **II. HYPOTHESES TESTED**

A truly rigorous exploration of this subject area would begin with a complete structural model that would predict the equilibrium correlation between price and quality for firms in a given service industry based on production cost variables, consumer demand functions, and the magnitude of consumer search costs. Such a construct would allow us to test specific hypotheses concerning the absolute value of the correlation coefficient that we should expect in each of the the sample industries.

This study does not provide such a sophisticated underpinning, both due to the heroic scale of the theoretical challenges, and because suitable data would almost certainly not be available for many of the supply and demand variables that would be involved. Absent this theoretical construct, there is really very litt Agny omplyotrelation sg







would also be of interest to test theories that might predict which types of firms *within* a given industry are likely to offer higher levels of quality, or perhaps higher levels of value. That is, in those markets where consumers do not believe they can rely upon price as an accurate indicator of firm quality, are there other firm characteristics or practices that consumers can use as a time and money-saving substitute for extensive search in determining the level of quality and price that a firm is likely to provide?

## 1. Signaling Mechanisms

This issue has been treated extensively in the "signaling" literature, which originated in 1974 with Spence [15] and Nelson [11]. All else equal, it is hypothesized that higher quality providers will have a greater incentive to signal their advantage through advertising and through other bonding devices such as nontransferable physical capital (e.g., specialized building designs and accoutrements), the value of which is lost if consumers are disillusioned with a provider's quality post-purchase [8, 9]. In such cases, the advertising or other signal need not have any informational content *per se*. It is the mere existence and size of the advertising or other nontransferable physical investment that assures consumers that the firm is trustworthy and prepared to please customers over the long term.<sup>8</sup>

In some respects, service industries do not appear to fit the signaling model very well. First, with the exception of national chains and dealer franchises present primarily in the auto repair industry (discussed separately below), few of the firms in the industries rated by WCC engage in broadcast or other major media advertising. Many of the firms serve smaller regional markets and do not operate at a scale that would justify significant advertising outlays, although such firms may place ads in smaller regional newspapers and church bulletins.

In addition, firms in many of the industries under examination provide their services in the consumer's home. Thus, bonding signals in the form of fancy, imposing office sites would not prove very effective. Many of the remaining service industries perform repair functions, where the physical plant is likely to be a basic facility readily transferrable to other uses. There is, however, one form of advertising in this sector that might perform a signaling function. This is Yellow Pages advertising.

### a.. Yellow Pages Advertising

For many consumers, the Yellow Pages will provide the first and sometimes only step in the search process. Firms that wish to stand out in the crowd of listings must pay a substantial

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<sup>8</sup> The signaling literature is exceedingly complex, and the various signaling models often incorporate critical assumptions specifying precise consumer knowledge of firms' marginal and fixed costs. If these assumptions are relaxed, a positive relationship between quality and advertising or other signals need not be reached in equilibrium. In the words of a recent survey article, "Anything can happen." [5], p. 34.

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<sup>9</sup> This information was provided to the author by Marc Rysman from a data set containing pricing information for almost all Yellow Pages directories in the United States in 1997. See M. Busse and M. Rysman, “Competition and Price Discrimination in Yellow Pages Advertising” Working Paper Series ES, Number 13, Yale School of Management, June 2001.

will satisfy its customers, either in terms of the absolute quality of the service or in terms of quality adjusted for price.

Franchised car dealerships (*e.g.* Toyota, BMW, etc.) may benefit from any goodwill associated with the automobiles they represent, and consumers may assume that dealers have special expertise in repairing their brands of cars. (It should be noted, however, that the potential quality clue offered by franchise status does not constitute a pure signal in the economic sense, since its utility rests on direct information concerning the known quality of the automobile brand and logical inferences concerning the likely expertise a dealership would gain from specializing in the repair of a limited number of automobile brands.)

The hypotheses that chain or dealership affiliation is a reliable indicator of quality or value can be readily tested with the WCC data, since such affiliations are obvious from the title of the firm. Separate zero-one dummy variables were constructed for dealer and chain status, and included as a right-hand term in regressions using WCC quality ratings as a dependent variable.

## 2. Firm Size

Many consumers may also make quality inferences based on a service provider's size. Size is not a pure signal in the sense described above, since size is a highly complex market outcome rather than a simple short-term investment decision. Further, the relationship between size and quality (as well as price) is an interesting and important economic issue irrespective of whether consumers know a firm's scale of operations or make use of any information they might have. The fundamental question, of course, is whether large size is in fact a market reward for superior performance.

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<sup>10</sup> This is the outcome that *Bond et al.* [3] observed in their analysis of optometrists operating in states that did and did not allow price advertising and large chain operations. In nonrestrictive states, advertisers provided slightly less thorough eye exams than did smaller nonadvertisers, but charged substantially less for the bundled combination of eye glasses and eye exams.



“letting you know cost early,” “starting and completing work promptly,” and in some cases, even

In addition, the error terms for observations within any given firm will be correlated,

**Table II**  
**WCC Quality Ratings for Sample Industries**

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superior. At a minimum, these percentages do not suggest a major market meltdown of the magnitude associated with a “lemons” model outcome.

## **B. Consistency of WCC Quality Ratings and Complaint Data**

As discussed, the WCC ratings list the number of complaints on file at local consumer protection offices for each rated firm. For certain industries, this number is normalized for firm size, as measured by number of employees. The complaint variable was included in the initial regression runs to function as a possible consistency check on the WCC quality ratings. Since a firm’s complaint history is really an indirect measure of quality, it cannot be construed properly as a true independent variable in any regression that uses the WCC quality ratings as a dependent variable. It does have the potential, however, to shed some light on the reliability of the respondent ratings.

In particular, the complaint variable can help determine whether the WCC quality ratings are hopelessly biased by the possibly perverse impact that a firm’s prices might have on consumer attitudes toward the firm. As described earlier, this interaction between price and consumer satisfaction, combined with possible selection biases, might yield a strong negative correlation between price and quality, even when true quality was in fact directly related to price.

Consumers presumably take the trouble to write complaint letters over what is perceived as truly egregious firm behavior. Although these complaints may involve what a consumer feels is an exorbitant price, complaints should not be generated by the more subtle impact that, say, a somewhat above-average service repair charge price might have on the disposition of a WCC respondent rating the overall performance of a firm. Thus, the complaint rate variable should help flag firms that are genuinely poor performers, and this variable should be negatively associated with the WCC ratings if these ratings are at all reliable.

The results indicate that there is in fact a persistent and strong negative correlation between firm complaint histories and the quality ratings. For the most recent rating periods, WCC provided some form of complaint data for 14 of the 19 industries. In ten cases, the data were adjusted by firm employee size. In seven of these industries, the complaint rate was negatively and significantly correlated with quality. In the three remaining industries, the coefficient sign was negative but not significant. For five industries, WCC provided only the absolute number of complaints a firm had on file. The complaint coefficients for three of these industries were negative and significant, and insignificant in the remaining two. In the entire data base, the complaint rate variable was negative and significant in approximately 90 percent of the industries for which size-adjusted data were provided. These results, though far from conclusive, do suggest that the WCC ratings are at least flagging the very worst performers.



### C. Simple Price-Quality Correlations

In this section, we discuss the threshold question of whether price by itself provides a reliable indicator of quality as measured by WCC respondent performance ratings. The regressions reported do not control for any firm characteristic, such as size or status as a franchisee or dealership, or any signaling mechanism, such as Yellow Pages advertising. The analysis simply attempts to determine the extent to which consumers can rely upon price alone as an indicator of firm quality.

The results of the simple quality-price regressions for the most recent ratings period are reported in Table III. The coefficients were obtained by grouped logit analysis using the WCC quality rating as the dependent variable. P values for the price coefficients appear in parentheses.

**TABLE III**  
**Quality-Price Correlations in Most Recent Rating Period**

Industry	Coefficient Sign for Price (P-value)
Carpet Cleaning	Positive (.009)
Carpet Installers	Positive (.090)
Dry Cleaning	Positive (.102)
Local Movers	Positive (.216)
Pest Control	Positive (.000)
Restaurants	Positive (.000)
Supermarkets	Positive (.000)
Tree Experts	Positive (.403)
Auto Body Shops	Negative (.548)
Air Conditioning-Htg.	Negative (.034)
Appliance Repair	Negative (.000)
Auto Mechanical Repair	Negative (.000)
Computer Repair	Negative (.078)
Electricians	Negative (.001)
Locksmiths	Negative (.003)
Plumbers	Negative (.007)
Shoe Repair	Negative (.131)
Television Repair	Negative (.307)
Watch Repair	Negative (.732)

As hypothesized, those industries with particularly low search costs and relatively frequent purchase generally display significant positive correlations between price and quality. These are Carpet Cleaning, Restaurants, Supermarkets, and, just missing significance at the .10 level, Dry Cleaning ( $P=.102$ ). In addition, price and quality are also positively correlated for Carpet Installers and Pest Control. The most striking feature of Table III, however, is the relentless procession of negative correlations in the eleven repair industries, seven of which are significant.

The picture does not change substantially when results for all of the ratings periods are considered. Table IV provides a detailed listing of the observed price-quality correlations for each of the 60 data sets in the sample. Table IV reveals significant positive correlations in ten data sets, representing seven industries. Of these industries, however, only Carpet Cleaning, Drycleaners, and Restaurants are consistently positive over time. Supermarkets reports a highly significant positive price-quality correlation in the two later ratings periods, but is insignificant in 1979. Significant negative price-quality correlations can be observed in 22 data sets, accounting for ten industries, and 28 sets display no significant price-quality correlation.

The widespread occurrence of negative price-quality correlations is difficult to rationalize using any rigorous theory of market performance. Even in the presence of extremely high search costs, there are no *a priori* grounds for expecting price to serve as a *perverse* indicator of quality. Rather, we would simply expect a great deal of noise with no systematic relationship between price and quality. If we are to believe the results reported above, firms apparently prosper by choosing a strategy of high prices and poor performance. It is implausible that even serious market imperfections would perpetually reward such a strategy.<sup>11</sup> Thus, we certainly cannot dismiss the hypothesis that the WCC data are biased due to the previously discussed interaction between price and consumer satisfaction with firm performance.

One alternative hypotheses for certain industries in the sample is that the simple quality and price regressions fail to control for relevant firm cost variables, particularly higher rental

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<sup>11</sup> Such an outcome might occur under the extreme assumptions that consumers never purchase a service more than once and that absolutely no quality information is available pre-purchase. In that event, some firms might successfully pursue a strategy of high price and low quality, since consumers seeking high quality might specifically target firms quoting the highest price for a service, and by assumption such firms would never be punished for failing to deliver the expected quality. Once these assumptions are relaxed to allow for at least some repeat purchases and limited availability of quality information, it is once again difficult to understand how the high price-low quality strategy could persist so consistently in so many industries over such a long period of time.

**Table IV**  
**Quality-Price Correlations for All Industries and Ratings Periods**

Industry	Year	Sign	P Value	Observations
AC & Heating Contractors	97	negative	.034	119
	92	negative	.273	106
	87	negative	.428	78
	82	negative	.518	61
	77	positive	.972	44
Appliance Repair	96	negative	.000	46
	91	negative	.002	43
	85	negative	.012	52
	78	negative	.228	60
Auto Body Repair	98	negative	.548	120
	95	negative	.422	106
	90	negative	.393	90
	85	negative	.191	105
	82	negative	.041	71
Auto Mech. Repair	01	negative	.000	482
	97	negative	.000	444
	94	negative	.000	431
	91	negative	.000	380
	88	negative	.000	354
	85	negative	.000	310
	81	negative	.000	289
	76	negative	.004	148
Carpet Cleaning	98	positive	.009	33
	94	positive	.425	31
	87	positive	.727	30
Carpet Sales, Installation	96	positive	.090	24
	89	negative	.723	39

**Table IV (Continued)**

<b>Industry</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Sign</b>	<b>P Value</b>	<b>Observations</b>
Drycleaners	96	positive	.102	211
	90	positive	.038	232
Electricians	96	negative	.001	36
	90	negative	.036	21
Locksmiths	99	negative	.003	25
	94	negative	.499	27
	86	negative	.587	33
Movers	98	positive	.216	28
	92	negative	.720	29
	81	positive	.051	25
Pest Control	97	positive	.000	51
	93	positive	.477	37
	86	negative	.292	46
	77	negative	.030	25
Plumbers	95	negative	.007	134
	89	negative	.045	81
	83	negative	.019	97
	77	positive	.165	58
Restaurants	98	positive	.000	672
	95	positive	.000	718
Shoe Repair	95	negative	.131	95
	88	positive	.213	96
Supermarkets	01	positive	.000	8
	92	positive	.079	7
	79	positive	.997	16
Television Repair	89	negative	.307	36
Tree Experts	99	positive	.403	29
Watch Repair	96	negative	.691	41
	91	negative	.181	30
	80	negative	.002	52



discussed earlier, such firms might deliberately have chosen to limit their scale of operation and would never have considered signaling quality using a larger Yellow Pages ad.

The results provide little support for a Yellow Pages signaling function. A significant positive coefficient was found for only four of the 14 industries. In seven industries, the Yellow Pages variable was negatively and significantly associated with quality. There was no significant relationship in the remaining three industries. Simple regressions were also run to investigate whether the size of an ad might signal higher value as measured by the ratio of the quality rating to the price index. None of these regressions supported this hypothesis. Indeed, a significant negative correlation between Yellow Pages ad size and value was found in five industries.

## 2. Dealership and Franchisee Status

In two industries, Auto Mechanical Repair and Auto Body Repair, numerous firms in the sample were franchised dealerships for the major auto companies. In four industries (the two auto repair industries, Local Movers, and Pest Control), many of the firms were franchisees for

during which the firm will provide a free follow-up treatment, and the charge for treatment after

ratings. Price is not correlated with either firm size or chain status in this data set. (Dealerships, however, charged significantly higher prices than independents or chains.) Thus, the negative coefficients for the size and chain variables apparently should be accepted at face value.

**TABLE V**  
**Full Regression Results For Auto Repair 1997**

Dependent Variable = % rating firm superior or adequate

Logit estimates	Number of firms =	441.00
	LR chi2(7) =	872.69
	Prob > chi2 =	0.0000
Log likelihood = -6423.8417	Pseudo R2 =	0.0636

supq	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
chain97	-1.31156	.097349	-13.47	0.000	-1.502361	-1.12076
dealer97	-.9997785	.0806641	-12.39	0.000	-1.157877	-.8416797
Price97	.0046225	.0015918	2.90	0.004	.0015025	.0077424
Size7	-.0147877	.0034198	-4.32	0.000	-.0214904	-.008085
ASIE97	-.8662402	.2126259	-4.07	0.000	-1.282979	-.4495012
AAA97	.189219	.0550878	3.43	0.001	.0812489	.297189
Safety97	-.3748802	.0612289	-6.12	0.000	-.4948866	-.2548739
Constant	3.403598	.2461795	13.83	0.000	2.921095	3.886101

It should also be noted that the price index variable is positively and significantly correlated with quality in Table V, whereas the coefficient was negative and highly significant when used as a single predictor. The primary explanation for the shift in signs is the explicit accounting for dealer performance in this regression. As discussed, dealers tend to be more expensive and do considerably worse in the ratings than independents. Thus, price acts partially as a proxy for dealership status when used alone as a predictor of quality.

The positive correlation in the full regression cannot, however, be interpreted as an indicator of market efficiency. The reversal in sign merely indicates that we have identified and



## **E. Stability of Price and Quality Ratings Over Time**

## 2. Individual Firm Performance Over Time

chance events and earn a check rating in 1998. We could not conclude from this pattern, however, that check rated firms tend to milk their reputations and lower quality.

The probit analysis controls for such random fluctuations and shows more clearly whether there are real differences in the propensity for check rated and non-check rated firms to score well in the subsequent period. Still, the results do not lend themselves to an unambiguous test of the milking hypothesis. In the example above, a significant marginal probability of .42 would indicate that there is no pervasive tendency for firms to shirk once a check rating is achieved. But it would not reject the hypothesis that some firms behave in this manner.

Tables VII presents the probit results for the price and quality ratings. In the column labeled Marginal Probability, the first number represents the marginal probability that firms check rated in the earliest ratings period will repeat their performance in the next rating period. The second number is the WCC score. The third number is the index of the first rating period. The fourth number is the index of the second rating period. The fifth number is the index of the third rating period. The sixth number is the index of the fourth rating period. The seventh number is the index of the fifth rating period. The eighth number is the index of the sixth rating period. The ninth number is the index of the seventh rating period. The tenth number is the index of the eighth rating period. The eleventh number is the index of the ninth rating period. The twelfth number is the index of the tenth rating period. The thirteenth number is the index of the eleventh rating period. The fourteenth number is the index of the twelfth rating period. The fifteenth number is the index of the thirteenth rating period. The sixteenth number is the index of the fourteenth rating period. The seventeenth number is the index of the fifteenth rating period. The eighteenth number is the index of the sixteenth rating period. The nineteenth number is the index of the seventeenth rating period. The twentieth number is the index of the eighteenth rating period. The twenty-first number is the index of the nineteenth rating period. The twenty-second number is the index of the twentieth rating period. The twenty-third number is the index of the twenty-first rating period. The twenty-fourth number is the index of the twenty-second rating period. The twenty-fifth number is the index of the twenty-third rating period. The twenty-sixth number is the index of the twenty-fourth rating period. The twenty-seventh number is the index of the twenty-fifth rating period. The twenty-eighth number is the index of the twenty-sixth rating period. The twenty-ninth number is the index of the twenty-seventh rating period. The thirtieth number is the index of the twenty-eighth rating period. The thirty-first number is the index of the twenty-ninth rating period. The thirty-second number is the index of the thirtieth rating period. The thirty-third number is the index of the thirty-first rating period. The thirty-fourth number is the index of the thirty-second rating period. The thirty-fifth number is the index of the thirty-third rating period. The thirty-sixth number is the index of the thirty-fourth rating period. The thirty-seventh number is the index of the thirty-fifth rating period. The thirty-eighth number is the index of the thirty-sixth rating period. The thirty-ninth number is the index of the thirty-seventh rating period. The fortieth number is the index of the thirty-eighth rating period. The forty-first number is the index of the thirty-ninth rating period. The forty-second number is the index of the fortieth rating period. The forty-third number is the index of the forty-first rating period. The forty-fourth number is the index of the forty-second rating period. The forty-fifth number is the index of the forty-third rating period. The forty-sixth number is the index of the forty-fourth rating period. The forty-seventh number is the index of the forty-fifth rating period. The forty-eighth number is the index of the forty-sixth rating period. The forty-ninth number is the index of the forty-seventh rating period. The fiftieth number is the index of the forty-eighth rating period. The fifty-first number is the index of the forty-ninth rating period. The fifty-second number is the index of the fifty-first rating period. The fifty-third number is the index of the fifty-second rating period. The fifty-fourth number is the index of the fifty-third rating period. The fifty-fifth number is the index of the fifty-fourth rating period. The fifty-sixth number is the index of the fifty-fifth rating period. The fifty-seventh number is the index of the fifty-sixth rating period. The fifty-eighth number is the index of the fifty-seventh rating period. The fifty-ninth number is the index of the fifty-eighth rating period. The sixtieth number is the index of the fifty-ninth rating period. The sixty-first number is the index of the sixtieth rating period. The sixty-second number is the index of the sixty-first rating period. The sixty-third number is the index of the sixty-second rating period. The sixty-fourth number is the index of the sixty-third rating period. The sixty-fifth number is the index of the sixty-fourth rating period. The sixty-sixth number is the index of the sixty-fifth rating period. The sixty-seventh number is the index of the sixty-sixth rating period. The sixty-eighth number is the index of the sixty-seventh rating period. The sixty-ninth number is the index of the sixty-eighth rating period. The seventieth number is the index of the sixty-ninth rating period. The seventy-first number is the index of the seventieth rating period. The seventy-second number is the index of the seventy-first rating period. The seventy-third number is the index of the seventy-second rating period. The seventy-fourth number is the index of the seventy-third rating period. The seventy-fifth number is the index of the seventy-fourth rating period. The seventy-sixth number is the index of the seventy-fifth rating period. The seventy-seventh number is the index of the seventy-sixth rating period. The seventy-eighth number is the index of the seventy-seventh rating period. The seventy-ninth number is the index of the seventy-eighth rating period. The eightieth number is the index of the seventy-ninth rating period. The eighty-first number is the index of the eightieth rating period. The eighty-second number is the index of the eighty-first rating period. The eighty-third number is the index of the eighty-second rating period. The eighty-fourth number is the index of the eighty-third rating period. The eighty-fifth number is the index of the eighty-fourth rating period. The eighty-sixth number is the index of the eighty-fifth rating period. The eighty-seventh number is the index of the eighty-sixth rating period. The eighty-eighth number is the index of the eighty-seventh rating period. The eighty-ninth number is the index of the eighty-eighth rating period. The ninetieth number is the index of the eighty-ninth rating period. The ninety-first number is the index of the ninetieth rating period. The ninety-second number is the index of the ninety-first rating period. The ninety-third number is the index of the ninety-second rating period. The ninety-fourth number is the index of the ninety-third rating period. The ninety-fifth number is the index of the ninety-fourth rating period. The ninety-sixth number is the index of the ninety-fifth rating period. The ninety-seventh number is the index of the ninety-sixth rating period. The ninety-eighth number is the index of the ninety-seventh rating period. The ninety-ninth number is the index of the ninety-eighth rating period. The hundredth number is the index of the ninety-ninth rating period.

**TABLE VII**  
**Probability That Firms Check Rated For Price or Quality Will Be Check Rated in**  
**Subsequent Evaluation Period**

Industry*	Period	Marginal Probability, Price Check	P Value	Marginal Probability, Quality Check	P Value
Auto Body Repair	82-85	----	>.10	.645	.000
	85-95	----	>.10	.353	.005
	95-98	----	>.10	.536	.000
AC & Heating Contractors	77-82	----	>.10	Insufficient Observations	
	82-87	----	>.10	.477	.000
	87-92	.334	.010	.423	.000
	92-97	.450	.000	.350	.020
Appliance Repair	78-85	.485	.025	.484	.000
	85-91	.440	.047	.423	.009
	91-96	.590	.001	.409	.025
Auto Mechanical Repair	76-81	----	NA**	.550	.000
	81-85	.325	.000	.543	.000
	85-88	.330	.000	.492	.000
	88-91	.341	.000	.650	.000
	91-94	.449	.000	.657	.000
	94-97	.367	.000	.555	.000
Carpet Cleaners	87-94	----	>.10	Insufficient Observations	
	94-98	.620	.013	.340	.024
Carpet Installers	89-96	Insufficient Observations		----	>.10
Computer Repair	89-94	Insufficient Observations		Insufficient Observations	
	94-98	.576	.045	.420	.080
Drycleaners	90-96	No Price Check Variable		.430	.000

**TABLE VII (Cont.)**  
**Probability That Firms Check Rated For Price or Quality Will Be Check Rated in**  
**Subsequent Evaluation Period**

Industry	Period	Marginal Probability, Price Check	P Value	Marginal Probability, Quality Check	P Value
Electricians	90-96	Insufficient Observations		.500	.041
Local Movers	81-92	Insufficient Observations		----	>.10
	92-98	Insufficient Observations		Insufficient Observations	
Locksmiths	86-94	----	>.10	Insufficient Observations	
	94-99	.420	.070	----	>.10
Pest Control	77-86	----	>.10	Insufficient Observations	
	86-93	----	.10	Insufficient Observations	
	93-97	.544	.009	.681	.000
Plumbers	77-83	.260	.009	.561	.000
	83-89	.250	.050	.268	.020
	89-95	.174	.100	.467	.000
Shoe Repair	88-95	.451	.001	.283	.041
Watch Repair	89-91	Insufficient Observations		----	>.10
	91-96	No Price Check Variable		.470	.002

## **VII. CONCLUSIONS**

The results of this Working Paper paint a very mixed picture of the economic performance of the consumer service sector in the Washington D.C. area. Judging strictly from

does not appear that most firms “milk” any reputation advantage from the WCC ratings by lowering quality.

Overall conclusions are difficult, particularly because of the potentially serious bias introduced by an interaction between price and the WCC quality rankings. It does appear, however, that consumers in the Washington D.C area have a higher probability of reporting a favorable quality assessment to Washington Consumer Checkbook, if they patronize smaller independent service providers and rely on word-of-mouth reputation rather than Yellow Pages displays, or other indirect clues such as firm size, affiliation with a national chain, or status as a franchised dealership.

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## **APPENDIX A DETAILED REGRESSION RESULTS**

This appendix presents the principal regression results for the most recent ratings period for all industries in the data set. As explained in the main text (see pp. 13-14), the regressions that use the WCC quality ratings as a dependent variable employ a form of logit estimation suitable for use with grouped data. In essence, this procedure unfolds the summary quality rating for a given firm into a series of binary categorical variables, with a zero-one value generated for each respondent rating used in calculating the overall quality score.

Consider, for example, a firm that receives an overall performance rating of 80. For most industries this would mean that 80 percent of the consumers reporting on that firm rated it superior in overall performance. If there were a total of 10 respondents, the logit program would generate a series of dependent variables comprised of eight “one” values and two “zero” values. Each of these dummies would be associated with the corresponding firm-specific independent variables used in the logit regression. Thus, firms with the highest number of individual ratings automatically would be weighted heaviest in the regression estimation procedure. The estimation technique also adjusts standard errors to reflect the expected correlation of error terms among the observations for any given service provider.

The discussion first focuses on regressions that include each of the principal independent variables separately as predictors of the WCC quality score. These bivariate regressions test whether consumers can rely on the attribute in question in isolation as a signal of quality. For the Yellow Pages and firm size variables, regression results are also shown testing the hypothesis that consumers can rely upon the size of a Yellow Pages ad or the size of a firm to signal value, as measured by the WCC quality score divided by the WCC price index.

For those industries with a full complement of independent variables, results are then reported for multivariate regressions that reveal more precisely any independent explanatory power that the various variables might have in predicting firm quality. These results are not, however, directly relevant to the primary signaling hypothesis in question, since such theories do not posit that consumers will consciously or unconsciously control for other factors when viewing a single firm attribute as a possible signal of quality.

### **Air Conditioning and Heating Contractors (1997)**

This data set includes both the Yellow Pages and employment size variables. Regression

Yellow Pages ad to offer better value in terms of quality per dollar. There is actually a significant negative correlation between these two variables. Regression 5 reveals a negative but insignificant correlation between value (the quality rating adjusted for price) and the size of the firm.

Regression 6 discloses a significant positive relationship between Yellow Pages advertising and quality when firm size and price are also included as independent variables. As is shown in Regression 7, the Yellow Pages variable is positively correlated with price and firm size. Because these two variables are in turn negatively correlated with quality, Yellow Pages functions as a partial proxy for price and size in Regression 3 and loses much of its independent positive correlation with quality.

**Regression 1: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = WCC price index**

Logit estimates	Number of firms =	119
	Wald chi2(1) =	4.49
	Prob > chi2 =	0.0340
Log likelihood = -4318.1521	Pseudo R2 =	0.0047

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on idno97)

Logit estimates	Number of firms =	119
17.73	Prob > chi2 =	0.0340
	Log likelihood =	-4318.1521

**Regression 3: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 115  
Wald chi2(1) = 0.17  
Prob > chi2 = 0.6767  
Log likelihood = -4624.8634 Pseudo R2 = 0.0002

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on idno97)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
yp97	.0013026	.003124	0.42	0.677	-.0048203	.0074255
_cons	.9231844	.1079349	8.55	0.000	.711636	1.134733

**Regression 4: Dependent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad  
Independent Variable = value (quality/price)**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of firms = 102		
Model	5610.21758	1	5610.21758	F( 1, 100) =	13.86	
Residual	40478.981	100	404.78981	Prob > F =	0.0003	
Total	46089.1985	101	456.328698	R-squared =	0.1217	
				Adj R-squared =	0.1129	
				Root MSE =	20.119	

yp97	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
value	-45.44601	12.20733	-3.723	0.000	-69.66501	-21.22702
_cons	57.25293	11.50368	4.977	0.000	34.42995	80.07591

**Regression 5: Dependent Variable = number of employees  
Independent Variable = value (quality/price)**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of firms = 117		
Model	401.425903	1	401.425903	F( 1, 115) =	1.66	
Residual	27798.822	115	241.728887	Prob > F =	0.2001	
Total	28200.2479	116	243.105585	R-squared =	0.0142	
				Adj R-squared =	0.0057	
				Root MSE =	15.548	

employ97	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
value	-10.79503	8.376937	-1.289	0.200	-27.38812	5.798074
_cons	26.18363	8.028892	3.261	0.001	10.27994	42.08732

**Regression 6: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior**  
**Independent Variables = number of employees, size of Yellow Pages ad, WCC price index**

Logit estimates  
 Log likelihood = -3994.811  
 Number of firms = 101  
 Wald chi2(3) = 14.36  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0025  
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0143

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on idno97)

supgq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
employ97	-.0141104	.0048582	-2.90	0.004	-.0236323	-.0045885
yp97	.0089862	.0033431	2.69	0.007	.0024337	.0155386
price97	-.0148654	.004524	-3.29	0.001	-.0237323	-.0059986
_cons	2.647565	.4989876	5.31	0.000	1.669567	3.625562

**Regression 7: Dependent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad**  
**Independent Variables = number of employees, WCC price index, %rating firm superior**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of firms = 101		
Model	13071.5361	3	4357.1787	F( 3, 97) =	12.87	
Residual	32845.053	97	338.608794	Prob > F =	0.0000	
				R-squared =	0.2847	
				Adj R-squared =	0.2626	
Total	45916.5891	100	459.165891	Root MSE =	18.401	

yp97	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
employ97	.4527038	.1165674	3.884	0.000	.2213497	.6840579
price97	.5658379	.1158479	4.884	0.000	.3359119	.7957638
super97	.1546826	.1265388	1.222	0.225	-.0964618	.405827
_cons	-61.42468	17.26251	-3.558	0.001	-95.68598	-27.16337

### Auto Body Repair (1998)

The simple two-way regressions for the 1998 Auto Body Repair data set reveal no significant association between price and quality (Regression 1), and highly significant negative correlations between quality and firm size (Regression 2), dealer status (Regression 6), and chain status (Regression 7). (There is only one national chain represented in this data set). Regression 3 reveals no significant relationship between quality and the size of Yellow Pages advertising, and Regression 4 shows that the Yellow Pages variable is not significantly correlated with the value variable (WCC quality score/WCC price index). In Regression 5, there is a highly significant negative correlation between value and size of firm.

With all of the independent variables included in Regression 8, dealer status and chain status continue to display highly significant negative coefficients. Firm size and Yellow Pages advertising lose significance, however, and price remains insignificant. Further investigation revealed that the dealer dummy variable and firm size are positively correlated ( $r=.42$ ). Thus, when firm size is used as the only regressor, it functions partially as a proxy for dealer status in predicting firm quality. Taken together, the results for the full regression and si0ria gd:jw Pages

**Regression 3: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 95  
Wald chi2(1) = 0.79  
Prob > chi2 = 0.3730  
Log likelihood = -1882.6538 Pseudo R2 = 0.0009

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on idno98)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
yp	-.0083301	.0093499	-0.89	0.373	-.0266556	.0099954
_cons	1.04312	.1049185	9.94	0.000	.8374834	1.248756

**Regression 4: Dependent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad  
Independent Variable = value (quality/price)**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of firms = 95		
Model	130.662894	1	130.662894	F( 1, 93) =	1.29	
Residual	9404.25158	93	101.120985	Prob > F =	0.2586	
				R-squared =	0.0137	
				Adj R-squared =	0.0031	
Total	9534.91447	94	101.43526	Root MSE =	10.056	

yp	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
value	-6.909842	6.078726	-1.137	0.259	-18.98099	5.161304
_cons	12.17246	4.41782	2.755	0.007	3.399545	20.94537

**Regression 5: Dependent Variable = number of employees  
Independent Variable = value (quality/price)**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of firms = 120		
Model	558.897059	1	558.897059	F( 1, 118) =	25.21	
Residual	2615.85086	118	22.1682276	Prob > F =	0.0000	
				R-squared =	0.1760	
				Adj R-squared =	0.1691	
Total	3174.74792	119	26.6785539	Root MSE =	4.7083	

employ98	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
value	-12.46466	2.482447	-5.021	0.000	-17.38058	-7.548738
_cons	16.65288	1.776893	9.372	0.000	13.13414	20.17161





Regression 9: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
 Independent Variables = dealer status, WCC price index,  
 number of employees, chain status

Logit estimates  
 Log likelihood = -1847.7438

Number of firms = 120  
 LR chi2(4) = 176.25  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0455

supq	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
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**Regression 1: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior or adequate  
Independent Variable = WCC price index**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 444  
Wald chi2(1) = 30.05  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
Log likelihood = -6770.2166 Pseudo R2 = 0.0131

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pricin97	-.0159178	.0029039	-5.48	0.000	-.0216093	-.0102262
_cons	3.679106	.3079504	11.95	0.000	3.075534	4.282678

**Regression 2: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior or adequate  
Independent Variable = number of employees**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 515  
Wald chi2(1) = 55.66  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
Log likelihood = -7610.5535 Pseudo R2 = 0.0311

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
employ97	-.0429339	.0057547	-7.46	0.000	-.0542129	-.0316549
_cons	2.583182	.0872403	29.61	0.000	2.412194	2.75417

**Regression 3: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior or adequate  
Independent Variable = size of Yellow Pages advertisement**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 321  
Wald chi2(1) = 1.11  
Prob > chi2 = 0.2913  
Log likelihood = -4669.489 Pseudo R2 = 0.0004

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
yp97	-.0030682	.0029076	-1.06	0.291	-.0087671	.0026306
_cons	2.154566	.0848792	25.38	0.000	1.988206	2.320926

**Regression 4: Dependent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad  
Independent Variable = value (quality/price)**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of firms = 278	
Model	1338.41317	1	1338.41317	F( 1, 276) =	3.23
Residual	114319.277	276	414.200277	Prob > F =	0.0733
				R-squared =	0.0116
				Adj R-squared =	0.0080
Total	115657.69	277	417.536786	Root MSE =	20.352

yp97	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
value	-10.3485	5.756882	-1.798	0.073	-21.68147	.9844806
_cons	19.89839	5.525921	3.601	0.000	9.02008	30.77669

**Regression 5: Dependent Variable = number of employees  
Independent Variable = value (quality/price)**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of firms = 444	
Model	6026.86996	1	6026.86996	F( 1, 442) =	143.80
Residual	18524.6993	442	41.9110844	Prob > F =	0.0000
				R-squared =	0.2455
				Adj R-squared =	0.2438
Total	24551.5693	443	55.4211496	Root MSE =	6.4739

employ97	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
value	-16.59809	1.384129	-11.992	0.000	-19.31838	-13.8778
_cons	24.0596	1.299164	18.519	0.000	21.50629	26.6129

**Regression 6: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior or adequate  
Independent Variable = dealer status**

Logit estimates	Number of firms =	515
	Wald chi2(1) =	137.69
	Prob > chi2 =	0.0000
Log likelihood = -7531.3521	Pseudo R2 =	0.0412

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
dealer97	-1.098344	.0936021	-11.73	0.000	-1.281801	-.9148873
_cons	2.591357	.0745284	34.77	0.000	2.445284	2.73743



**Regression 2: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior or adequate  
 Independent Variable = size of Yellow Pages advertisement**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 38  
Wald chi2(1) = 0.91  
Prob > chi2 = 0.3395  
 Log likelihood = -1129.8918 Pseudo R2 = 0.0024

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
yp98	-.0046769	.0048966	-0.96	0.340	-.0142742	.0049203
_cons	.7946941	.3790674	2.10	0.036	.0517356	1.537653





**Regression 2: Dependent Variable = %rating firm adequate or superior  
Independent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 18  
Wald chi2(1) = 0.79  
Prob > chi2 = 0.3749  
Log likelihood = -396.03579 Pseudo R2 = 0.0109

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
yp98	.02605	.0293559	0.89	0.375	-.0314865	.0835865
_cons	.9515454	.2741594	3.47	0.001	.4142029	1.488888

### **Drycleaners (1996)**

The drycleaners data set is one of the largest in the sample, although it does not contain



Regression 2: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
 Independent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad

Logit estimates  
 Log likelihood = -2423.9233

Number of firms = 188  
 Wald chi2(1) = 2.14  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.1434  
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0013

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
yp96	.0521381	.0356334	1.46	0.143	-.017702	.1219782
_cons	.4273209	.0758077	5.64	0.000	.2787405	.5759013

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**Regression 1: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = WCC price index**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 36  
Wald chi2(1) = 10.87  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0010  
Log likelihood = -414.3513 Pseudo R2 = 0.0314

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
price96	-.0164893	.0050023	-3.30	0.001	-.0262937	-.006685
_cons	2.993674	.5343611	5.60	0.000	1.946345	4.041002

**Regression 2: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = number of employees**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 35  
Wald chi2(1) = 1.65  
Prob > chi2 = 0.1996  
Log likelihood = -383.62685 Pseudo R2 = 0.0061

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
employ96	-.0323265	.0252028	-1.28	0.200	-.0817232	.0170701
_cons	1.596658	.1849404	8.63	0.000	1.234182	1.959135

**Regression 3: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 40  
Wald chi2(1) = 9.05  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0026  
Log likelihood = -449.60778 Pseudo R2 = 0.0287

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
yp96	-.0224215	.007454	-3.01	0.003	-.0370311	-.007812
_cons	1.622553	.1432273	11.33	0.000	1.341832	1.903273

**Regression 4: Dependent Variable = size of yellow pages ad**  
**Independent Variable = value (%superior/WCC price index)**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of firms = 36		
Model	1636.75634	1	1636.75634	F( 1, 34)	=	5.19
Residual	10714.695	34	315.13809	Prob > F	=	0.0291
				R-squared	=	0.1325
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1070
Total	12351.4514	35	352.898611	Root MSE	=	17.752

  

yp96	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
value	-24.25008	10.64073	-2.279	0.029	-45.87465	-2.625506
_cons	33.12038	9.236143	3.586	0.001	14.35028	51.89048

**Regression 5: Dependent Variable = number of employees**  
**Independent Variable = value (%superior/ WCC price index)**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of firms = 32		
Model	31.6064178	1	31.6064178	F( 1, 30)	=	1.20
Residual	790.768582	30	26.3589527	Prob > F	=	0.2822
				R-squared	=	0.0384
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0064
Total	822.375	31	26.5282258	Root MSE	=	5.1341

  

employ96	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
value	-3.87234	3.536306	-1.095	0.282	-11.09444	3.349761
_cons	8.745292	3.044999	2.872	0.007	2.526574	14.96401

### Locksmiths (1999)

The 1999 data set for Locksmiths is very small and lacks a Yellow Pages advertisement size variable. When this WCC rating was published, staff resources were no longer available to collect the relevant Yellow Pages data. In addition, WCC did not provide firm size data for Locksmiths. In Regression 1, the WCC price index is seen to be negatively correlated with the WCC quality index.



**Regression 2: Dependent Variable = %rating firm adequate or superior  
Independent Variable = number of employees**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 54  
Wald chi2(1) = 23.43  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
Log likelihood = -642.45782 Pseudo R2 = 0.0513

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
employ96	-.0778501	.016082	-4.84	0.000	-.1093703	-.0463299
_cons	2.7201	.2109764	12.89	0.000	2.306594	3.133606

**Regression 3: Dependent Variable = %rating firm adequate or superior  
Independent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 35  
Wald chi2(1) = 6.74  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0095  
Log likelihood = -1005.0842 Pseudo R2 = 0.0203

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
yp96	-.0253057	.0097507	-2.60	0.009	-.0444167	-.0061947
_cons	-4ns 5v4133Mc89m		-Y133j T*t-----s40444---	12.89	-0.7201	.2109764





**Regression 4: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = agent status (agent=1)**

Logit estimates	Number of firms =	30
	Wald chi2(1) =	0.37
Log likelihood = -425.2212	Prob > chi2 =	0.5431
	Pseudo R2 =	0.0024

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
agent98	-.2566645	.42205	-0.61	0.543	-1.083867	.5705383
_cons	1.09089	.1886116	5.78	0.000	.7212183	1.460562

### Pest Control Firms (1997)

The Pest Control data set contains information on firm size and Yellow Pages ad size, as well as two other variables that permit testing of signaling hypotheses. The first is a dummy variable identifying firms that are part of national chains. The second is a variable representing the

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<sup>1</sup> This three-part measure consists of (1) a firm's estimated charge for the first treatment of a sample house, (2) the length of period during which the firm will perform a free follow-up treatment, and (3) the estimated charge for treatment after the free followup period. Various alternative specifications were constructed by compiling a composite index that weighted the initial treatment charge by the length of free followup period, and combined this with the charge after the followup period. All such composite measures were either negatively correlated with quality or uncorrelated. In any event, it is not clear which, if any, of the tested specifications is most appropriate, particularly since it is impossible to estimate expected total costs without firm-specific knowledge of the probability that followup treatments will be needed.



correlation between satisfaction and firm status as a member of a national chain. For the final signaling hypothesis, Regression 7 indicates that consumers cannot rely on the length of the warranty period for the initial treatment as a predictor of satisfaction. There is a significant negative correlation between these two variables.

All of the signaling variables are included as predictors of satisfaction in Regression 8. With the exception of size of Yellow Pages ad, all of the variables are significant and retain the same sign as displayed in the simple two way regression. Further analysis showed that the Yellow Pages variable is highly correlated with chain status ( $r=.52$ ), and loses its explanatory power when both variables are used as predictors.

**Regression 1: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = termite inspection charge**

Logit estimates	Number of firms =	51
	Wald chi2(1) =	16.96
	Prob > chi2 =	0.0000
Log likelihood = -1480.7173	Pseudo R2 =	0.0173

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
chgter97	.0235317	.0057148	4.12	0.000	.0123309 .0347325

**Regression 3: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad**

Logit estimates Number of firms = 51  
Wald chi2(1) = 12.23  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0005  
Log likelihood = -1512.4115 Pseudo R2 = 0.0219

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
yp97	-.0125807	.0035981	-3.50	0.000	-.0196328	-.0055286
_cons	.792496	.2053677	3.86	0.000	.3899828	1.195009

**Regression 4: Dependent Variable = size of Yellow Pages ad  
Independent Variable = value (quality/price)**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of firms = 48		
Model	5469.12685	1	5469.12685	F( 1, 46) =	8.75	
Residual	28742.3614	46	624.833944	Prob > F =	0.0049	
Total	34211.4883	47	727.904006	R-squared =	0.1599	
				Adj R-squared =	0.1416	
				Root MSE =	24.997	

yp97	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
value	-22.58214	7.632881	-2.959	0.005	-37.94634	-7.217952
_cons	54.88138	10.37279	5.291	0.000	34.00205	75.76072

**Regression 5: Dependent Variable = number of employees  
Independent Variable = value (quality/price)**

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of firms = 51		
Model	66.4344209	1	66.4344209	F( 1, 49) =	4.45	
Residual	731.920183	49	14.9371466	Prob > F =	0.0401	
Total	798.354604	50	15.9670921	R-squared =	0.0832	
				Adj R-squared =	0.0645	
				Root MSE =	3.8649	

empls97	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
value	-2.453904	1.163576	-2.109	0.040	-4.792198	-.1156102
_cons	8.672254	1.55833	5.565	0.000	5.540673	11.80383

Regression 6: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = chain status (chain=1)

## Plumbers (1995)

The 1995 data set for Plumbers contains variables for size of firm and Yellow Pages ad. The dependent variable, however, is the less sensitive overall satisfaction measure that combines superior and adequate ratings. A dummy variable was also constructed to identify members of a national chain (of which there was only one.) Analysis (not shown) revealed that this variable was unrelated to consumer satisfaction or to any of the other independent variables.

Regression 1 shows a strong negative correlation between price and quality. Regression 2 reveals a similarly strong negative relationship between quality and firm size. In Regression 3, there is an even more systematic negative relationship between size of Yellow Pages ad and quality. Regression 4 shows that Yellow Pages ad size cannot be used to identify firms providing particularly good value in terms of price-adjusted quality. This reflects a positive correlation between the Yellow Pages variable and price ( $r=.390$ ). Value is also negatively correlated with firm size, as shown in Regression 5. Finally, Regression 6 reveals that the Yellow Pages variable demonstrates the greatest predictive power in a regression that employs all of the independent variables. This suggests that Yellow Pages ad size is not merely functioning as a proxy for price or firm size in this data set.

**Regression 1: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior or adequate  
Independent Variable = WCC price index**

Logit estimates	Number of firms =	134
	Wald chi2(1) =	7.37
	Prob > chi2 =	0.0066
Log likelihood = -1657.9036	Pseudo R2 =	0.0083

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on comidno)

	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
supq					

Regression 2: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior or adequate  
Independent Variable = number of employees

Logit estimates

Number of firms =

137

Regression 5: Dependent Variable = number of employees  
 Independent Variable = value (quality/price)

Source	SS	df	MS	
Model	2268.99974	1	2268.99974	Number of firms = 133 F( 1, 131) = 11.45
Residual	25955.7296	131	198.13534	Prob > F = 0.0009
SourCoef. urcetid. Err.34		t	> t( Sourc[95%rConf.uInterari]	R-squared = 0.0804 -T1_1 w 133)Tj 0

R6gression 5: Dependent V%rating Numb superio r ade te employees  
 Independent VWCC (qua i( x, size Yellow PagesSourc = 1s)Tj 70 -urcccc

coefficients. WCC did not collect firm size data for restaurants, and Yellow Pages ad size data were not collected due to resource constraints and the perceived low probability that such a variable would be correlated with quality in this industry.

## **Shoe Repair (1995)**

The Shoe Repair data set for 1995 contains price and quality information for 95 firms. Although WCC did not collect information on firm size, the data set does contain a Yellow Pages ad size variable. Regression 1 shows a negative but not quite significant negative correlation



## Supermarkets (2001)

The Supermarkets data set for 2001 includes only 8 firms, but over 10,000 respondents provided ratings based on experiences at dozens of individual stores. Regression 1 shows a very strong positive correlation between price and quality in this industry.

**Regression 1: Dependent Variable = % rating store superior**  
**Independent Variable = WCC price index**

Logit estimates	Number of chains =	8
	Wald chi2(1) =	116.89
	Prob > chi2 =	0.0000
Log likelihood = -6870.3591	Pseudo R2 =	0.0337

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on idno)

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supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err. Robust	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Intee Conf. Intal]w 0
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## Tree Experts (1999)

The 1999 data set for Tree Experts is limited to information on price and quality. WCC could not provide firm size data, and resources were no longer available to collect Yellow Pages ad size data. Regression 1 shows no significant correlation between price and quality.

**Regression 1: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = WCC price index**

Logit estimates	Number of firms =	29
	Wald chi2(1) =	0.70
	Prob > chi2 =	0.4029
Log likelihood = -505.6894	Pseudo R2 =	0.0031

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on idno99)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
price99	.0069715	.008334	0.84	0.403	-.0093627 .0233058
_cons	.6667981	.8065977	0.83	0.408	-.9141043 2.247701

## Watch Repair (1996)

The 1996 data set for Watch Repair contains information on Yellow Pages ad size, but not firm size. In Regression 1, The WCC quality ratings and the WCC price index are uncorrelated. Similarly, in Regression 2, there is no significant relationship between quality and size of Yellow Pages ad. Further analysis (not shown) failed to find any significant correlation between the Yellow Pages variable and price or value (quality divided by price).

**Regression 1: Dependent Variable = %rating firm superior  
Independent Variable = WCC price index**

Logit estimates	Number of firms =	41
	Wald chi2(1) =	0.12
	Prob > chi2 =	0.7321
Log likelihood = -622.39017	Pseudo R2 =	0.0002

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on idno96)

supq	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
price96	-.0018618	.0054376	-0.34	0.732	-.0125193 .0087958
_cons	1.371141	.5230825	2.62	0.009	.3459186 2.396364

