UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS:	Edith Ramirez, Chairwomar Julie Brill Maureen K. Ohlhausen
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COMPLAINT

to the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission ACK, Shifted Kingdanyand its United Federal trade Commission ACK, Shifted Kingdanyand its United Federal trade Commission ACK, Shifted Kingdanyand Order, as follows: s PLE Response for the Mark of the Sand Order, as follows: s PLE Response for the Mark of the Sand of the Sand Order, as follows: s agreed to acquire Roxane with the Sand Boehringer gelheim Roxane, cane") from Boehringer Resemble of Bartish the Sand hard of the Roxane, engaged in FTC ARM as a mended, 15 U.S.C. § would and the Sand of the Mark of the Roxand Act of the Richard of the Roxand Act of the Rox

flecainide tablets. The Acquisition would therefore eliminate the entry ith and ependent market participant.

V. ENTRY CONDITIONS

9. Entry interact of the relevant markets described in Paragraphsough 8 would not be timely, likely, or sufficient in magnitude, character, and scope to deter or counteract the anticompetitive effects of the Acquisition. De novore would not take place in a timely manner because the combination of drug development times and productive requirements would be lengthy In addition, no other entry is likely to occur such that it would be timely and sufficient todeter or counteract the competitive harm likely to result from the Acquisition.

VI. EFFECTS OF THE ACQUISITION

- 10. The effects of the cquisition, if consummated, would like by to substantially lessencompetition of other to create a monopoly in the relevant markets in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45, in the following ways, among others:
 - a. by eliminating actual, direct, and substantial competition between Hikma and Roxane and reducing the number of independent significant competitors markets for generic 5 mg, 10 mgnd 20 mg prednisone tablets and generic lithium capsules, thereby increasing the likelihood that: (1) Hikma would be able tounilaterally exercise market power in these markets; (2) the remaining competitors would engage in coordinated interaction between or among each other; and (3) customers would be forced to pay higher paices;
 - b. by eliminating future competition between Hikma and Roxane in the market for generic flecainide tablets, thereby (1) increasing the likelihood that the combined entity would forgo or delay the launch of the generic flecainide tablets to which Hikma owns the U.S. marketing rights; and (2) increasing the likelihood that the combined entity would delay, reduce, or eliminate the substantial additional price competition that would have resulted from an additional supplier of these products.