ANALYSIS OF AGREEMENT CONTAINING CONSENT ORDERS TO AID PUBLIC COMMENT

In the Matter of AbbVie Inc. and Allergan plc File No. 191-0169

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission") has accepted, subject to final approval, an Agreement Containing Consent Orders ("Consent Agreement") from AbbVie Inc. ("AbbVie") and Allergan plc ("Allergan") designed to remedy the anticompetitive ef4 (gi)-1 (co.d)1 (y)1t gicp TJ [(t)-2 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45, by substantially lessening competition in the U.S. markets for (1) prescription drugs for the treatment of exocrine pancreatic insufficiency ("EPI"); (2) Interleukin-23 ("IL-23") inhibitors for the treatment of moderate-to-severe Crohn's disease; and (3) IL-23 inhibitors for the treatment of moderate-to-severe ulcerative colitis. The proposed Consent Agreement will remedy the alleged violations by preserving the competition that otherwise would be lost in these markets as a result of the proposed Acquisition.

THE PARTIES

Headquartered in North Chicago, Illinois, AbbVie researches, develops, manufactures, and sells prescription pharmaceutical products and biologic products in several therapeutic areas, including immunology, oncology, virology, neuroscience, and women's health. Among other products, AbbVie sells a product to treat EPI and is developing an IL-23 inhibitor to treat moderate-to-severe Crohn's disease and ulcerative colitis. Like AbbVie, Allergan researches, develops, manufactures, and sells prescription pharmaceutical products in the United States. Among its products, Allergan also sells a product to treat EPI and is developing an IL-23 inhibitor to treat moderate-to-severe Crohn's disease and ulcerative colitis.

EVANT PRODUCTS AND STRUCTURE OF THE MARKETS

ment of Exocrine Pancreatic Insufficiency

ition that results from a deficiency of pancreatic enzymes. Patients who perly digest fats, proteins, and carbohydrates in the foods they eat and, as a m malnutrition and have uncomfortable gastrointestinal symptoms when ed using pancreatic enzyme products. Pancreatic enzyme products contain pancrelipase, a mixture of the digestive enzymes amylase, lipase, and cted from the pancreas of a pig.

npanies sell prescription pancreatic enzyme product in the United States: ivus Inc. ("Vivus"), and Chiesi USA, Inc. ("Chiesi"). AbbVie is the clear s product, Creon, and Allergan is the second-largest supplier, with its vus sells Pancreaze and Chiesi sells Pertzye. Allergan also sells a second roduct, Viokase, although its sales in the United States are much more bbVie and Allergan have a share of more than 95 percent of the market for

bitors for the Treatment of Moderate-to-Severe Crohn's Disease and for oderate-to-Severe Ulcerative Colitis

litis and Crohn's disease are the most common causes of chronic digestive track. Both diseases have similar symptoms—severe diarrhea, que, and weight loss—and both can be debilitating and lead to lifetions. The location of the inflammation is the primary difference between cerative colitis is a continuous inflammation of the colon, affecting only the ile Crohn's disease can occur anywhere between the mouth and the anus, he digestive tract between inflamed parts, and can occur in all layers of the the diseases are similar, drugs that are effective in treating ulcerative ally effective in treatment Crohn's disease (and vice versa), but the United g Administration ("FDA") requires that companies seeking ulcerative colitis indications for drugs conduct separate clinical studies and submit separate et drugs for each indication.

lrugs are approved to treat ulcerative colitis and Crohn's disease, but the st drugs is limited. IL-23 inhibitors are a new class of drugs to treat both Johnson's Stelara is the only IL-23 inhibitor currently approved to treat Crohn's disease and ulcerative colitis in the United States. Stelara is both an n Interleukin-12 inhibitor. Only three other companies—AbbVie, Allergan,

THE RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET

The United States is the relevant geographic market in which to assess the competitive effects of the proposed Acquisition. Drugs to treat EPI and drugs to treat moderate-to-severe ulcerative colitis and Crohn's disease are prescription pharmaceutical products and regulated by FDA. As such, products sold outside the United States, but not approved for sale in the United States, do not provide viable competitive alternatives for U.S. consumers.

COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF THE ACQUISITION

The proposed Acquisition would likely result in substantial competitive harm to consumers in the markets for prescription drugs for the treatment of EPI, IL-23 inhibitors for the treatment of moderate-to-severe Crohn's disease, and IL-23 inhibitors for the treatment of moderate-to-severe ulcerative colitis. Together, AbbVie and Allergan account for more than 95 percent of the market for drugs to treat EPI, and they are two of a limited number of companies in late-stage development with IL-23 inhibitors to treat moderate-to-severe ulcerative colitis and Crohn's disease.

ENTRY CONDITIONS

Entry in the relevant markets would not be timely, likely, or sufficient in magnitude, character, and scope to deter or counteract the anticompetitive effects of the proposed Acquisition. New entry would require significant investment of time and money for product research and development, regulatory approval by the FDA, developing clinical history supporting the long-term efficacy of the product, and establishing a U.S. sales and service infrastructure. Such development efforts are difficult, time-consuming, and expensive, and often fail to result in a competitive product reaching the market.

THE CONSENT AGREEMENT

The Consent Agreement eliminates the competitive concerns raised by the proposed Acquisition by requiring the combined company to divest Allergan's Zenpep and Viokase business, including its regulatory approvals, intellectual property, contracts, and inventory to Nestlé, and Allergan's brazikumab business to AstraZeneca. AbbVie and Allergan also must transfer all business information, research and development information, regulatory, formulation, and manufacturing reports related to the divested products, as well as provide access to knowledgeable employees to assist in the transfer. The provisions of the Consent Agreement ensure that Nestlé and AstraZeneca become independent, viable, and effective competitors in the U.S. markets.

Nestlé is the world's largest food and beverage company, operating in more than 190 countries around the world. While the company is most well-known for its chocolate products, it also operates Nestlé Health Science, an integrated health company that focuses on nutrition

products, including enteral feeding products that are used in hospitals and at home by patients who are unable to chew or swallow food. Nestlé's existing business includes products that are highly complementary to the divestiture assets. Nestlé has the expertise, U.S. sales infrastructure, and resources to restore the competition that otherwise would have been lost due to the proposed Acquisition.

AstraZeneca is a global research-based pharmaceutical company specializing in researching, developing, manufacturing, and marketing prescription products. AstraZeneca was responsible for conducting some of the early phase clinical studies for brazikumab, but outlicensed the product to Allergan in 2016. AstraZeneca is a well-qualified buyer for brazikumab because, as the original innovator of the product, it already has experience developing brazikumab prior to out-licensing it to Allergan, and, further, the key team members who were previously responsible for brazikumab's development are still employed by the company and will take responsibility for the developing the product. With its resources, capabilities, and previous experience with brazikumab, AstraZeneca is well positioned to successfully develop and commercialize the product and thereby replace the competition that otherwise would have been lost through the proposed Acquisition.

AbbVie and Allergan must accomplish the divestitures no later than ten days after consummating the proposed Acquisition. If the Commission determines that Nestlé or AstraZeneca are not acceptable acquirers, or that the manner of the divestitures is not acceptable, the proposed Order requires AbbVie and Allergan to unwind the sale of rights and assets and then divest A (o un(os)o k [)-1 e (e)-p (a)-1 (t)-2 (o) Ciconsrcquitnne tein