
Discussion of Contracting, Exclusivity, and the Formation of Supply Networks with Downstream Competition

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Main ingredients: Buyers and sellers with market power, inter-connected payoffs/externalities, contracting

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Examples

- Mobile handsets and tablets
- iPhone

Apple Store, Best Buy, Amazon, Verizon retail, AT&T retail, Target, Wal-Mart, etc...


- Samsung Galaxy
- Google Pixel
- Amazon Fire
- Sony xPeria
- Mixed availability at different retailers.
- Incomplete network of supply relationships (some brands aren't in some retailers).
- Would be nice to understand how we ended up here and be able to predict what would happen after a merger (eg Amazon buys Sony).

More Examples

- Some video programming (sports, specialty channels) and cable/satellite providers.
- Hospitals and doctors on managed care plans.
- Grocery stores and food products.
- Department stores and clothing brands.
- Soft drinks and restaurant chains.
- In many cases of bilateral oligopoly, we see some interesting cases of incomplete supply networks.

Big Picture: Bilateral Oligopoly

Main ingredients: Buyers and sellers with market power, inter-



Main ingredients: Buyers and sellers with market power, inter-connected payoffs/externalities, contracting

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This paper

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Horn and Wolinsky Supply Networks

- Analysis using Horn and Wolinsky equilibrium notion (also known as Nash-in-Nash)
- Recall that HW equilibrium checks for U-D pairwise deviations.

Horn and Wolinsky Supply Networks

- Consider 2 identical upstream manufacturers and downstream monopoly. Only HW equilibrium involves both firms serving the downstream monopoly at cost.
- Were only one firm serving the downstream monopoly, either U1-

Horn and Wolinsky Supply Networks

- That said, the potential weakness in the HW model is that it only requires single pair deviations to be unprofitable.
- This rules out:
- : deviations involving the same firm in two negotiations
 - : multi-firm deviations
- This criticism applies of course to both determination of contractual terms and supply networks.

CPNE Supply Networks

- If we think about trying to predict two types of outcomes: (1) supply networks and (2) contractual terms, then looking at CPNE is really about working on (1).
- The key difference with HW

Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE)

- Make sure doesn't allow for horizontal coordination
- Any deviation that requires two firms in the same segment jointly deviating could be problematic.
- Like Nash-in-Nash, CPNE its own impurities.
 - Why do deviations by a sub-coalition only have to be immune to further deviations within the sub-coalition?
 - Can we get to CPNE in this setting with offers and counteroffers?
- Potentially difficult to compute (paper restricts to 2x2 analysis mostly).
 - Would be interested to know how feasible for computer simulations.

Demand vs Supply vs Contracting Model

• Come across several papers recently which take standard supply-demand models in IO (eg BLP demand, Nash pricing equilibrium) and...

General Contracting Spaces

• As mentioned before, one ingredient that makes analyzing coalition formation more feasible (but still difficult) here is

General Contracting Spaces

General Contracting Spaces

- Theory is fairly clear here.
- However, in practice/data, (cable, music streaming, certain medical procedures, fuel for trucks, etc).
- One has to choose between allowing for flexible contract spaces (theoretically satisfying) and assuming linear fee

Conclusion

- Very interesting paper wrestling with important issues in antitrust and IO.
- Combines insights from contracting in vertical relations literature with coalition formation theory.
- Can predict a decent array of supply relationships.
- Show us what CPNE can do that Nash-in-Nash can not, and trade off against downsides (eg computational costs).
- Important area of research for theory.