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Unfortunately, many of the causes of higher driges, including systemidistortions created by massive regulatory regimes and a perverpivincipal/agent probm, fall outside the jurisdiction and legalauthority of the Federal Trade Commission. But within its limited authority as a competition agency, the Commission can – and does – pursue a comprehensive agenda to address anticompetitive mergers aladvitual conduct in the pharmaceutical industry. Specifically, the Commission:

- Carefully Screens Plarmaceutical Mergers: Similar to the current enforcement action, the Commission routinely has challengedcompetitive mergers and acquisitions.
 During the past five years, the Commission issued complaints challenging 13 mergers and required the divestiture of 130 branded generic products to address competitive overlaps for the sale or development of particular drugs.
- Combats Anticompetitive Patent Litigation Settlements: In 2013, the FTC won a landmark victory at the upreme Court in the ctaviscase, and has prevailed in subsequent challenges of similar agreements instance, earlier this year, the Commission issued a unanimous opinion condegna patent litigation settlement after finding that the brand manufacter possessed market power the market for branded and generic oxymorphone ER, the potential entrant received a large and unjustified payment, and the respondent faited how a cognizable stification for the restraint. The Commission's successful dealges of prior settlements have substantially reduced the number anticompetitive patent litigation settlements into which companies are entering today.
- Challenges Abuse of FDA Regulatory Processes to Commission has brought several cases alleging that pharmaceutical communications are FDA regulatory processes to impede competition. For example, 2014 the FTC challenged a pharmaceutical company for abusing the litigate process by filing merities patent lawsuits against competitors to keep them off the market. The Commission won a judgment for \$448 million. The FTC also sued Shire ViroPharma in 2017, alleging anticompetitive abuse of the FDA citizen-petition process teep the FDA from approving the competitive products, thereby keeping theolower-cost drugs off the mater. (Unfortunately, the Commission lost the case on a statutory contitutions that kepthe Court of Appeals from ruling on the merits of the allegation) sAnd under Chairman Tim Muris, the FTC

the past decade six times as fast **esctist** of goods and services overall." **MARLES SILVER & DAVID A. HYMAN, OVERCHARGED. WHY AMERICANS PAY TOO MUCH FORHEALTH CARE 25-27 (2018) (discussing analyses from Schondelmeyer & Purvis, Pearl, and others).

⁴ SeeBaxter Int'l Inc, Dkt. No. C-4620 (F.T.C. July 20, 2017)mneal Holdings, LLCDkt. No. C-4650 (F.T.C. Apr. 27, 2018); FTC v. Mallinckrodt ARD IncNo. 1:17-cv-00120 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2017)ylan, N.V., Dkt. No. C-4590 (F.T.C. July 26, 2016) eva Pharmaceutical Indus. LtcDkt. No. C-4589 (F.T.C. July 26, 2016) kma Pharmaceuticals PLCDkt. No. C-4572 (F.T.C. Mar. 28, 2016) kma Pharmaceuticals PLCDkt. No. C-4568 (F.T.C. Feb. 26, 2016) pupin Ltd, Dkt. No. C-4566 (F.T.C. Feb. 18, 2016) pdo Int'l PLC, Dkt. No. C-4539 (F.T.C. Sept. 24, 2015) fizer Inc, Dkt. No. C-4537 (F.T.C. Aug. 21, 2015) pax Labs, Inc.Dkt. No. C-4511 (F.T.C. Mar. 5, 2015); Novartis ACDkt. No. C-4510 (F.T.C. Feb. 20, 2015) pn Pharmaceutical Indus. LtcDkt. No. C-4506 (F.T.C. Jan. 30, 2015).

⁵ FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).

⁶ See e.g. Impax Laboratories, IncDkt. No. 9373 (F.T.C. April 3, 2019) (Commission Decision).

⁷ FTC v. AbbVie, Inc. 329 F. Supp. 3d 98 (E.D. Pa. 2018).

⁸ FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2019).

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• Informs Courts of Relevant Competition Principles and Policies: The Commission has filed briefs as amicus curiae in cases involving platigration settlements, REMS and restricted distribution systems, and product hopping.

This list of actions by the FTC is by no means exhaustive the message is clear — the FTC uses the full force and weight its authority to protect commers from unlawful conduct that increases prices and reduces innovation is important sector of our economy.

Notwithstanding the Commission's liænt efforts, there are marfigictors that contribute to ncreasing drug prices but that are not cognizable the antitrust lawand therefore that the FTC does not have the legal authority to ftwen if the FTC and other government enforcers did their job flawlessly (and our "retrospective" income of our past work suggests we do quite well), pharmaceutical prices would still rise for involve (FTEO) items in the FTC of Schrift (Schrift) in the Section of
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