


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James M. Nicholson, Commissioner
Federal Trade Commission

Before the

Council on Audit and Financial Reporting



contrary in its official pronouncements and decisions "In


of motions or cross-motions which are idled through in quite
a deliberate manner from the start to delay and

expense which impair or destroy the value of the right to
prosecute or defend." 6/

Although most members of the antitrust bar are as
concerned as are we with resolving issues as rapidly as
is consistent with procedural fairness, there is enough truth
in these allegations to justify the Commission's actions de-
signed to eliminate any purely mechanical barriers to the
effective discharge of its statutory responsibilities in the
public interest. Discovery is simply not a game, or at
least is not designed to be, and if there are any members of
the bar who listen to or read these remarks with the hope of
receiving instruction in the artful use of discovery motions
to thwart Commission proceedings, they will receive no
lessons from me.

The evolution of our present Rules began in 1961.
Perhaps the most significant change made at that time, and
certainly the one with the most drastic effect on the rules
of discovery, was the adoption of the continuous hearing

Prior to this amendment, hearings in adjudicative proceedings



issues consistent with procedural fairness. It can even be argued that the present rule incorporates the best features of each system in that, as now drafted, the rule provides sufficient flexibility to permit intervals between hearings where the circumstances indicate good cause therefor.

This change has required far greater attention to the

hearings permit a process of continuous refinement of the
~~issues as the hearings progress and further development of the~~

to dwell upon the subject of prehearing conferences except to set the stage for discovery and to point out that the Commission itself has recognized the impropriety of attempting discovery until "a clear delineation of issues to be tried" has been accomplished to permit intelligent assessment of the scope and need for discovery. 12/

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

avoiding the injection of the Commission into the conduct of hearings. Rulings on interlocutory appeals are no longer subject to appeal as a matter of right, but will now be entertained by the Commission only upon a showing that the ruling involves substantial rights which will materially affect the final decision and that a determination by the Commission before conclusion of the hearing is essential to serve the interests of justice. Further, the examiner's rulings on such matters will not be reviewed or disturbed in the absence of unusual circumstances. 16/

In my view, these steps are of extreme importance in light of the constantly increasing volume of work which is being pressed upon the Commission both by new legislation and the normal increment of an expanding economy. Much has
[REDACTED]

to devising ways in which we can make even more efficient use of our examiners' time and talents both in our consideration of matters which the parties seek to have us review and in further appropriate revisions in our rules where the need

and are authorized to make use of admissions as to facts

Fundamental to the successful operation of the continuous hearing procedure is the assumption that complaint counsel will, at the time the complaint issues, have all the evidence he will need to establish a prima facie case. To that end they have been furnished with a broad range of discovery materials which are more than adequate for

comprehensive pre-complaint investigation. Therefore, as a

general proposition, use of the discovery processes are not allowable when the purpose is to investigate and obtain materials and information required as part of complaint counsel's prima facie case in chief. Fairness to the respon-

post complaint investigation, but only post complaint
discovery. But the Commission also made clear that complaint

_____ all evidence he will need prior to

and on reviewing courts the burden - to police the implemen-

~~ment of the Commission's housekeeping rules in this regard.~~

questions which arise. Too much depends upon the facts of

each individual case to permit more than the evolution of

thereof. The exercise of Commission's broad and extensive power to investigate encompasses not only evident violations,

it is not" 26/. This entails the acquisition of detailed information concerning the business assets and other confidential data concerning persons or corporations being investigated or who possess information relevant to an investigation. This

The requirement that respondent show "good cause" has not been precisely defined in the decisions, except in a

It has been held that a mere argument

... information as is necessary for

Under page 217 the Commission ordered that certain special

reports filed by respondent's competitors not be disclosed to

that disclosure could be made to respondent's

has been forced to rule that neither technique was mandatory,
and was not intended to be a substitute for the exercise of
the sound and responsible discretion of the examiner. 33/
The examiner is in a far better position than the Commission,
because of his proximity to the case, to assess the multitude

which he is in a far better position to make an informed decision as to the

the possession of third parties or depositions to secure

tute for the continuous hearings required by the rules or to delay the proceeding and there must be a showing of good cause for the use of the procedure and of the need for eliciting the information by deposition rather than by testimony at the hearings. 35/

In the area of respondents' discovery, much as been said and written of late concerning the right of access to interview reports of potential witnesses prepared by members of the Commission's staff. Starting with the Supreme Court's landmark Jencks decision 36/ and the subsequent enactment of the so-called Jencks Act 37/, the Commission has taken the position ~~that if a witness has testified on direct examination~~

interview and also his own thoughts and subjective impressions
of what he is being told . . .".

It is important, I think, to distinguish between interview reports prepared by attorneys of the Commission

interview reports prepared by the trial attorney during the process of getting ready for trial. The investigatory interview reports are prepared at a time when it is uncertain whether a complaint will be issued, or even recommended, and thus the more general report, interspersed with opinions and evaluations of the witness could be issued. The reasons for protecting these reports would seem obvious, for they represent a perfect illustration of an attorney's work product, defined in its narrow sense as the distillation of his subjective impressions, evaluations and interpretations, which is traditionally protected from disclosure. 40/ However, when a trial attorney is preparing an interview report of a witness whom he knows he intends to call, the type of report should be different -- so also the propriety of disclosure.

With respect to trial attorney interview reports, a middle ground seems worthy of consideration. If as

well take another look to see if there are ways in which they can be more adequately advised as to the nature of the testimony they might expect from Commission witnesses.

Commission attorneys need Commission opinions on at

staff, then I for one would be favorably disposed. 41/
From personal trial experience this type of statement
would seem to best suit the needs of the trial counsel
in preparing his witness for testifying.

To conclude these remarks I would return to the
beginning and remind one and all that discovery is not
a game to be played by opposing counsel at the expense
of their clients and the public interest. The rules
discussed above are not designed to enable counsel to
demonstrate their technical skills in delaying proceedings

in order to gain an unfair advantage over their opponent.

common good. While this is regrettable, it cannot be regarded as justification for restrictions on the legitimate right of discovery which the law confers upon parties to litigation and without which the whole truth might never come to light. Consequently, if this Commission is, as I think it should, to be ever vigilant