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Thank you, Kathleen, for that generous introduction and thank you to the Federal Communications Bar Association and to the Practising Law Institute for inviting me to share remarks this morning. I'm sure many of you were here last year for the Chairman's dinner, was, I so. Welcome back. Unfortunately, I don't have a funny video to show because I accidentally say anything entertaining, please remember that this is my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of other FTC Commissioners.

D.C.

providers. We reviewed ISP and cable mergers and transactions with internet components. We shut down a rogue ISP engaged in illegal activities. And we've investigated major ISP data security practices related to potential router vulnerabilities. Most recently, the FTC brought cases alleging that wireline providers throttled congested consumer traffic and thus broke their promise to provide unlimited data.<sup>2</sup>

As the FTC acted to protect consumers in the case, the net neutrality debate

FTC's efforts to combat unfair or deceptive acts and practices and unfair methods of competition in these interconnected markets.<sup>4</sup>

Since that report, concerns animating net neutrality have not changed much. Solutions certainly have. At our 2007 workshop, a leading advocate for net neutrality regulation stated that she didn't know anyone who is talking about going<sup>5</sup> back to Title II. Fast forward to summer, 2014. Although FCC leadership was reportedly not seriously considering Title II reclassification, the idea had gained new prominence. In the fall of 2014, I expressed concern that broadband reclassification would have the unintended consequence of shielding additional activities under the common carrier exemption, and so giving a new defense strategy against FTC enforcement action.<sup>6</sup>

In November 2014, President Obama called the FCC to reclassify broadband as Title II common carrier service.<sup>7</sup> The FCC's subsequent 2015 Open Internet Order<sup>8</sup> did so. As a result, the FTC's jurisdiction over ISP practices may be limited. And ISPs now must comply with many Title II requirements including privacy and data security requirements. The FCC is currently exploring whether and to adopt privacy and data security rules for broadband services.

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<sup>4</sup> FTC NET NEUTRALITY REPORT at 41.

<sup>5</sup> FTC NET NEUTRALITY REPORT at n.683 (quoting Statement of G. Sohn, Tr. I at 125).

<sup>6</sup> *The Communicators* (C-SPAN broadcast Sept. 24, 2014), <http://www.c-span.org/video/?321665> *Communicators* <http://www.c-span.org/video/?321665> *maureenohlhausen*

<sup>7</sup> See generally, White House, Net Neutrality: President Obama's Plan for a Free and Open Internet <https://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality> (timeline with Nov. 10, 2014 as the day President Obama called for Title II reclassification)

<sup>8</sup> See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, *Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order* FCC 1524 (Mar. 12, 2015).

In the meantime, the FCC increased privacy and data security enforcement. Indeed, from the outside, it appears that the FCC has focused more on privacy and data security issues than on the net neutrality problem. The net Order was intended to address.

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That brings us to today. How are the new limits on FTC jurisdiction likely to affect consumers? According to recent observers, this will obviously make consumers better off because we now have two cops on the privacy and data security beat. More enforcers is always better for consumers. For example, consumers will be off if overlapping efforts necessarily divert resources from more pressing issues. When two cops are on one beat, another beat may be left to the 8P-14(l)-6(ec 0.01 Tw [(d)-20(i)- Tc 0.02 Twber)--0.0

resolved its first data security case against a cable operator to the Order  
 Consent Decree breach at issue involved information about Cox Communications  
 more than 6 million subscribers.<sup>12</sup> Amateur hackers seized Cox employees; there  
 was no technical failure involved.<sup>13</sup> Reportedly, no payment information was accessed.<sup>14</sup> The  
 hackers posted some information about affected consumers on social media.<sup>15</sup> Cox  
 detected and halted the breach within a matter of days and worked with the FBI, who arrested  
 the hacker.<sup>16</sup> The FCC's Order and Consent Decree offers no evidence of any resulting identity  
 theft, or any consumer harm at all. Yet the FCC imposed a \$595,000 fine  
 and \$10,000 per affected consumer, along with extensive compliance measures.<sup>17</sup>

The FCC's approach in the Cox matter differs significantly from the FTC's reasonable  
 security approach. I am concerned that what appears to be liability data security  
 standard will actually harm consumers. The goal of consumer protection enforcement is  
 to make headlines; it is to make harmed consumers whole and incentivize appropriate practices.  
 The costs imposed by a regulator on a legitimate, non-fraudulent company are ultimately born by  
 its consumers. If an enforcement action is disproportionate to the actual consumer  
 harm, that enforcement action may make consumers worse off if prices rise or innovation slows.

This example suggests that the FTC and FCC rulebooks are different, at least as enforced.  
 Some have argued that it makes sense for the rulebooks to differ, claiming that ISPs are uniquely  
 situated to collect consumer information because all of a consumer's communications travel

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<sup>11</sup> Fed. Comm. Comm. In the Matter Cox Communications Order and Consent Decree DA 15-1241 (Nov. 5, 2013), <http://www.fcc.gov>.

over the ISP network. If this was ever true, it is not true today. Consumers multihomed and they use multiple ISPs throughout the day. They connect to the internet through home broadband connection, their mobile device connects to their employer's network, their local coffee shop's Wi-Fi. Each of these different ISPs has only a fragment of the user's total internet traffic. Thus I question the assumption that an ISP has more comprehensive data than, say, a mobile device that a consumer carries constantly, a browser that syncs across computers, or a web service that interacts with the same consumer on different devices. Any data that crosses an ISP's network comes from a piece of hardware or software, perhaps an equally comprehensive view of the consumer's activities. Additionally, net services increasingly encrypt their traffic, so ISPs can access it. In short, I am not convinced that ISPs have access to types or volume of consumer data that is unique, that it justifies a special set of particularly strict rules.

Others argue that ISPs are unique because consumers pay for their internet service, therefore do not expect ISPs to collect data for other purposes. Examining this accurately describes consumer expectations today's business models isn't a good reason to impose stricter rules that might preclude the development of new business models. Email and search were once primarily paid services, yet today many consumers choose self-supported versions of these services that collect consumer information. The popularity of such services suggests

In short, believe there is little evidence

consumer harm not only ensures enforcement actually makes consumers better off, it also creates more business certainty.

FCC rules that followed these principles and in particular an emphasis on limiting action to addressing real consumer harm, would do a lot to align the rulebooks of the cops on the beat.

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Let me quickly address the recently released Memorandum of Understanding, or MOU, between the FCC and the FTC.<sup>19</sup> As an agency of general jurisdiction, the FTC needs to coordinate with other agencies and MOUs facilitate that coordination. The FTC/FCC MOU largely formalizes already existing processes. There is one piece of interesting substance I believe this MOU is the first time FCC staff has acknowledged that the FTC's common carrier exemption is an actual (as opposed to status) exemption.

While the MOU formalizes coordination, it does not provide any of the principle process-based constraints that we just discussed. In short, it does not solve the problem. This problem may be resolved by the D.C. Circuit, which in just a few minutes, will hear oral argument.



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Going forward the FTC will continue its active privacy and data security enforcement focusing on real consumer harms with the ultimate goal of making consumers better off. I think that the FCC will use the same touchstone as it evaluates how to regulate broadband service providers privacy and data security practices. Thank you for your attention, and I would be glad to take questions at this time.