-		

Case No.	ED CV 18-2104-DMG (PLAx)		October 9, 2020
Title Fed	eral Trade Commission v Jason Cardiff, et al.		Page 3 of 28

while Jason was managing member, owner, and President. SUF 45, 53, 57-59, 209, 224. Eunjung changed AMI's name to Redwood Scientific Technologies, LLC in November 2014, and then converted it to its corporate form, Redwood California. SUF 61, 210-11. Between January 1, 2014 and October 3, 2018, Jason was the sole owner, President, CEO, Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"), Secretary, and director of Redwood California, and Eunjung was its owner, director, Secretary, Chief Operating Officer ("COO"), and Director of Marketing. SUF 9-24, 61-65, 256. Redwood Nevada was incorporated in December 2014, and Redwood CA became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Redwood Nevada. SUF 212-13, 215. Redwood Delaware was formed when Redwood Nevada merged with a Delaware corporation in 2017. SUF 217. The Cardiffs retained similar positions in Redwood Nevada and Redwood Delaware to the ones they held in Redwood CA. SUF 25-31, 66-67. The principal places of business for both Redwood Nevada and Redwood Delaware are in California. SUF 214, 218.

In 2017, Jason became the sole member and manager of Defendant Identify LLC and used it as an umbrella to register Redwood Scientific Technologies, Runaway Products, Advanced Men's Institute, and TBX-FREE as Identify's trade names. SUF 32-33, 47-48, 254. Jason and Eunjung were also named benefici

Case	No. ED CV 18-2104-DMG (PLAx)	Date	October 9, 2020
Title	Federal Trade Commission v Jason Cardiff, et al.		Page 4 of 28
			<u> </u>

merchant accounts to process payments for the Products, and purchased or acted as consignees for oral film strips from suppliers in China and SUF 236-39. In response to one supplier's bank's request to clarify that all of these compess whose names appeared nvoices are related, Jason Cardiff signed a statement as Presidente of that declared that Redwood, AMI, Run Away, and Identify were "ourroup of companies (our sistemacern companies)." SUF 240.

Undisputed evidence shows that both Offerdiontrolled the Entity Defendants' bank accounts and used various bank accounts to opperational costs for Redwood and their other businesses and to pay for the Catedipersonal expenses such assury car leases, cruises, resort lodging, private charter air travel, and clothiangd department store purchases. SUF 51, 72-75, 78, 170, 173-77, 234-46, 251. Between April 2015 and May 2018, the Entity Defendants transferred almost \$4 million between themselves F 264. Both Cardiffs ave also personally guaranteed payments promised by one or motheriaf businesses. \$50123, 171, 266. While the Cardiffs assert that they invested \$3 million their "own money" into Redwood, and Eunjung asserts that she invested \$800,000 personally into Redwood, indispectionancial documents support either asserti. DSUMF 1, 28.

The Cardiffs do not dispute that they had finathority over most, if not all, business decisions regarding the Entity Defendants. SUF 4206 or example, Jason Cardiff had final approval of Redwood's websites thall Redwood product advertisi

_		
		_

Case	No. ED CV 18-2104-DMG (PLAx)	Date	October 9, 2020
Title	Federal Trade Commission v Jason Cardiff, et al.		Page 7 of 28
•			

through national television campaigns and websi84sF 459-60, 482-522The active ingredient is "Paulinia cupana H.B.K. et K. 1x," or grama. SUF 194, 453; Jason Decl., Ex. 1 [Doc. # 441-2]. Cannella alone arranged for 8,039 airing Exon pepsia Thin advertisements. SUF 474.

Below are some of the representations miand Defendants' Eupepsia Thin television advertising:

Χ

Case	No. ED CV 18-2104-DMG (PLAx)	Date	October 9, 2020
Title	Federal Trade Commission v Jason Cardiff, et al.		Pag

Case No.	Case No. ED CV 18-2104-DMG (PLAx)			2020
Title Fee	deral Trade Commission v Jason Cardiff, et al.		Page	9 of 28

all three were in fact registed in the National Drug CodDirectory as an "unapproved homeopathic" drug, which does not den approval. DSUMF 54, 59, 65.

The Cardiffs were aware of the need forbstantiation for the claims of the Products' effectiveness and provided stransiation packets to networks insisting of articles about TBX-FREE's and Eupepsia Thin's active ingredier \$157-58, 190, 192; Caiffo Decl. at ¶¶ 23-25, Ex. 1-2 [Doc. # 441-2]. Eunjung in particular handler equests for substantiatio See, e.g., SUF 162-63 (she was informed that FDA approval, not juegistration, was needed to satisfy certain networks); 165 (she was informed that "[t] estrimitals will need to be provided, to make sure weight loss claims weren due to being paid").

The FTC has retained experts in the fields moking cessation, weight-loss, and male sexual health who each concluded that Defets dæfficacy claims are not substantiated by competent and reliable scientification and did not find anyinical testing of TBX-FREE, Eupepsia Thin, or Prolongz to support Defendated in its proven claims. The Cardiffs have submitted no expert testimony rebutting the analysis of the FTC's experts.

#### 1. TBX-FREE

The FTC's smoking cessation expert. Judith Prochaska, opines that Defendants do not have substantiation for the hallenged TBX-FREE claims. SUF 433-437. She says that to substantiate these claims, experts in the fixel holicotine addiction would require randomized,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> It is not clear what Eunjung offered as substantiation for Prolongz besides asserting that "[t]he FDA registration is proof that our product is certified by the AFabs an over the counter drug that treats the condition[.]" SUF 160. The package for Eupep Shan was put together by anotract researcher. SUF 192.

<sup>6</sup> The Cardiffs argue that eaon the experts' opinions should beobxded for analyzing claims made about the Products prior to February 2018 ee, e.g.SUF 376, 539, 649. As discussed below in Section III.A.2, some misleading advertisements continued after February 2001 Defendants continued to sell the Products until October 2018. Furthermore, the lack of substantiation for prior claims made about the Products is relevant to the Cardiffs' liability and likelihood for violations to recur. The CoON ERRULES the objection.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The Cardiffs argue that Dr. Prochaska's opinions should be excluded because her expert report, which was produced in support of the FTC's application for TRO in October 2018, does not comply with Rule 26(a)'s requirement to provide a list of all other cases in which she testified as an expert at trial or by deposition and a statement of the compensation to be paid for her testimony. SUF 376. Information may be introduced if the parties' failure to disclose the required information is substantially justified or harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The Cardiffs have not sought discovery sanctions under Rule 37, and there is no indication of harm the Cardiffs have suffered since 2018 from the lack of disclosure. The Co@VERRULES the objection.

Case No.	ED CV 18-2104-DMG (PLAx)	Date	October 9, 2020
Title Fed	eral Trade Commission v Jason Cardiff, et al.	-	Page 11 of 28

that high doses (more than 400 mg) of caffeineasseciated with appetite uppression, but that there is no evidence that Eupepsia Thin, a homeopproduct, contains that much caffeine or that caffeine consumption causes weight loss. SUF 573-75.

In addition, as discusdeabove, the Eupepsia Thin advertisents and websites used false testimonials from individuals who did not usepepsia Thin to lose weight. SUF 762-63.

Defendants' claim on Eupepsīanin product packaging and their websites that Eupepsia Thin was "Made in USA" is also false, as ther @fas were aware that Eupepsia Thin strips and packaging was manufactured in China and India. SUF 712-16, 718-21.

#### 3. Prolongz

Dr. Hossein Sadeghi-Nejad, ærxpert in urology and seal medicine, opines that Defendants have no reliable stoice to support the Plongz ejaculation control claims. SUF 704-05. Dr. Sadeghi-Nejad says that to substantiate the Prolongz claimsrefased ejaculatory control and treatment or previewn of premature ejaculation, experin his field would require randomized, double-blind, properly coorded human clinical testing Prolongz or a substantially similar product using the same dosage anderocutadministration. SUF 664-671. Dr. Sadeghi-Nejad has found no relevant evidence in the scientificature that meets standards. SUF 683-703.

He also reviewed the purported substation anaterial Defendants provided to the FTC—a pilot survey and a collection of journal alleisc on other products—anothines that Defendants' substantiation does not meet the start of experts in the field. SUF 683-702. The pilot survey sponsored by Defendants did not have a raintendencontrol group. SUF 686. The study lasted only one week and involved only 29 test subjects and was obsustant and too small to yield accurate and reliable results. SUF 687-89. Strientific literature compiled by Defendants on the purported active ingredients in Prolongz was nonparable either to the dosage or to the route of administration of Prolongz. SUF 694-702.

## D. Consumer Contact, Shipping, and Billing Programs

### 1. Money-back guarantee

Defendants advertised money-back guteres for the Products. SUF 725-36. For example, Jason claimed in a TBX-FREE Francek video, "We have a lifetime money-back

_		
		_

	-		

_		
		_

Case No. ED CV 18-2104-DMG (PLAx) Date October 9, 2020

Title Federal Trade Commission v Jason Cardiff, et al. Page 17 of 28

#### IV. DISCUSSION

The FTC moves for summary judgment on each of its claims under the FTC Act, Restore Online Shoppers' Confidence A(CROSCA"), Electronic Fund Træfer Act ("EFTA"), and the Telemarketing Sales Rule ("TSR") and seekspermanent injunction prohibiting Jason and Eunjung Cardiff from engaging in deceptive unfair business practices and ordering equitable monetary relief in the amount of \$18,213,899.

The Cardiffs move for summary judgmeon each of the FTC's claims, arguing that: (1) the FTC treated Defendants unfairly by choosinkitionate rather than issuing a warning letter; (2) Defendants discontinued sales and marketing to the FTC filing this action and had reasonable basis to believe in the efficacy of their products; (3) the FTC Act does not support the FTC's "common enterprise" theory; (4) Section 13(b) of the FTC Act does not provide for restitution; and (5) when calculating a restitutionary, reliance may not be imputed to every consumer.

The Court first considers the Cardiffs' motion.

#### A. The Cardiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

The Court already has dispedswith one of the Cardiffs' anuments regarding its authority to order monetary equitable relief under \$2000 13(b) of the FTCAct, notwithstandind\_iu v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (262@March 10, 2020 Order at 5-7 [Doc. # 305]; July 7, 2020 Order at 6-9 [Doc. \$48]; September 9, 2020 Ordet 6 [Doc. # 485]. Since the issuance of this Court's rulingships regard, no new authority has abrogated Federal Trade Commission v. H.N. Singer, In668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982), which construed Section 13(b) to give courts the "authority to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice," including the "power to order restitution." Id. at 1113. Indeed, biding Ninth Circuit decisions afteSingerhave confirmed that Section 13(b) permits equitable monetary relief. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. AMG Capital MgmtLLC, 910 F.3d 417, 426 (9th Cir. 2018ert. granted 2020 WL 3865250 (U.S. July 9, 2020); T.C. v. AT&T Mobility 883 F.3d 848, 864 (9t6)ir. 2018). After the Supreme Court decided, this Court held that iu did not displace well-established Ninth Circuit precedent because its holding wasineed to a provision of the Securities and Exchange Act. July 7, 2020 Ordetr8 [Doc. # 388]. In that sanvein, the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Yalog 19-55289, (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2020), does not affect the Court's it to grant restitutionaryelief under the FTC Act.

_		
		_

Case N	No. ED CV 18-2104-DMG (PLAx)	Date	October 9, 2020
Title	Federal Trade Commission v Jason Cardiff, et al.		Dago 20 of 29
Title	rederal frade Commission v Jason Cardin, et al.		Page 20 of 28

future. *United States v. Or. State Med. Soc.*, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952); *see also F.T.C. v. Accusearch Inc.*, 570 F.3d 1187, 1202 (10th Cir. 2009); *S.E.C. v. Murphy*, 626 F.2d 633, 655 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, the Cardiffs' demonstrated eagerness to launch new business ventures without any assurances—sincere or otherwise—that consumer protection violations will not recur heightens the likelihood that they will engage in similar deceptive practices in the absence of court intervention.

#### 3. Common enterprise

Defendants cite no legal authority for their argument that there is no common enterprise liability in an FTC enforcement action. Rather, courts routinely apply the elements for determining common enterprise in FTC cases at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Elegant Sols., Inc., No. SA CV 19-1333-JVS (KESx), 2020 WL 4390381, at \*11 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2020) (granting summary judgment and finding that defendants operated as a common enterprise); F.T.C. v. Consumer Def., LLC, No. CV 18-00030-JCM (BNWx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225283, at \*5-6 (D. Nev. Dec. 5, 2019) (same); FTC v. AMG Servs., No. CV 12-00536-GMN (VCFx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66689, at \*26-28 (D. Nev. May 1, 2017) (same). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[w]here corporate entities operate together as a common enterprise, each may be held liable for the deceptive acts and practices of the others." F.T.C. v. Grant Connect, LLC, 763 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014). A common enterprise may be demonstrated by "strongly interdependent economic interests or the pooling of assets and revenues." F.T.C. v. Network Servs. Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the undisputed facts indicate that the Cardiffs and the Entity Defendants are all involved in the sale of the Products and that money, products, and employees flowed freely between them. The FTC has amply shown that the Cardiffs are beneficiaries and masterminds of a common enterprise to sell the Products through the Entity Defendants, which constitute various iterations and shells of one another.<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore, individuals are liable for corporate violations of the FTC Act if they (1) "participated directly in the deceptive acts or had the authority to control them and (2) [] had knowledge of the misrepresentations, [were] recklessly indifferent to the truth or falsity of the misrepresentation, or [were] aware of a high probability of fraud along with an intentional avoidance of the truth." *F.T.C. v. John Beck Amazing Profits, LLC*, 865 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting *F.T.C. v. Stefanchik*, 559 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2009)). The Cardiffs

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Although the uncontroe

Case No.	<b>ED CV 18-2104-DMG (PLAx)</b>		
		-	

Case No.	ED CV 18-2104-DMG (PLAx)	Date	October 9, 2020
Title Foo	leral Trade Commission v Jason Cardiff, et al.		Page 23 of 28
	erai Trade Commission v Jason Caraijj, ei ai.		1 age 23 01 20

Prolongz is clinically proven to work for thousands of men. These guarantees of success, testimonials, clinical studies, and endorsements by prominent academic institutions are certainly material to a consumer purchasing the Products.

Accordingly, the Court **GRANTS** summary judgment on Counts 1 through 6 for violations of Sections 5(a) and 12 of the FTC Act.

#### b. False "Made in the United States" advertising (Count 7)

The FTC has authority under Section 5 to regulate claims of U.S. origin in advertising. *See* "*Made in USA*" and Other U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 63756, 1997 WL 737641 (Dec. 2, 1997). The FTC recognizes two types of U.S. origin statements: unqualified and qualified. *Id.* An unqualified statement claims only that the product is of U.S. origin, while a qualified statement goes on to explain the source of the ingredients. *Id.* The FTC distinguishes between statement types because consumers expect that products labeled with unqualified statements of U.S. origin contain a high amount of U.S. content. *Id.* at \*63763. Accordingly, the FTC permits unqualified statements of U.S. origin only when "all or virtually all" of the ingredients are domestic; that is, the product must contain no more than a *de minimis* amount of foreign content and have "been last substantially transformed in the United States." *Id.* at \*63756.

It is undisputed that Eupepsia Thin strips are made in India and China. Defendants' employees attest that the product packaging was also made in China. Walker Decl. at ¶ 48 [Doc. # 424-1]; Wu Decl. at ¶ 8, 12-13 [Doc. # 428-5]. Jason admits that "the products were received from China and India in bags containing 500 strips per bag. The products were removed, ETC." Jason Decl. at ¶ 83 [Doc. # 491-3]. The Cardiffs cite no evidence about what transformation the strips underwent once they arrived in the United States. Their Opposition provides inadmissible argument regarding the cost of "organizing the strips, inserting them into plastic cartridges with labeling, [and] sealing them in plastic bags with labeling." Defs.' Opp. at 23. Even if the Court could take those assertions into consideration, the Court finds as a matter of law that "all or virtually all" of the Eupepsia Thin strips were not made of domestic ingredients or substantially transformed in the United States, thus rendering an unqualified "Made in USA" statement false.

The Court **GRANTS** summary judgment on Count 7 for violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act for a false unqualified U.S. origin claim.

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

-				

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No.	<b>ED CV 18-2104-DMG (PLAx)</b>		October 9, 2020		
Title Fede	eral Trade Commission v Jason Cardiff, et al.		Page 28 of 28		

The Court defers ruling and judgment on the proper remedy pending the Supreme Court's decision in the Consolidated Appeals. The parties shall file a joint status report within 15 days of the Supreme Court's ruling, proposing a new briefing schedule as to the remedies phase, if appropriate.

Unless and until the Court orders otherwise, the Preliminary Injunctions [Doc. ## 59, 389] remain in effect.

#### IT IS SO ORDERED.